OK, I understand Conor Friedersdorf's point that talk radio listeners aren't inherently bigots and loons; read his whole argument. But still...I think he doesn't hold them responsible enough for, you know, listening in the first place. That's a choice, and I think it's a choice that matters, even if it's also true that the same people can, in a different context, make better choices. As one of his readers said today about Levin/Rush/Hannity: "It is more entertaining for them to pretend that the Left is not motivated by a desire to make the country better, but a desire to destroy it and enslave much of the population, so that's what they say." It seems to me that if you're entertained by that kind of fantasy, well, it's not something to be proud of. (Does Olbermann promote an equivalent fantasy? I don't watch enough to know).
On to the good stuff:
1. Alan Abromowitz and Norman Ornstein debunk myths (5) about midterms.
2. Matthew Dickinson explains MMS. Essential.
3. Happy 75, Social Security! Kevin Drum explains the trust fund, and CBPP debunks myths (10).
4. Tyler Cowen takes on free parking (speaking of which: never play with goofy rules where landing on Free Parking gets you fines, or anything like that. Monopoly advice: stick to the original rules, and play quickly). Cowen leaves Matt Yglesias free to campaign against government-enforced barber cartels -- and if you think it sounds silly, you're wrong. Part two here, and especially part three here. Great series, and I hope he keeps going.
5. Jamelle Bouie joins the fight against judicial elections.
6. Ezra Klein's takedown of Matt Bai is considerably more epic and way more fun than mine. Also, on health care cost control.
7. Newt bashing? You wanted Newt bashing? I'll give you Newt bashing: here and here. Also, here.
Friday, August 20, 2010
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Rocket
Well, there you go. The Greatest Postwar Pitcher and the Greatest Postwar Player (don't even think about arguing; it's not close) are now both under federal indictment for the crime of We Want Baseball to Conform to Some Arbitrary Never-Existed Standard of Pure Goodness and Wonderfulness.
It seems rather unlikely, you know, that Roger Clemens was unusually dishonest in his testimony to Congress. It's not at all difficult for anyone who has followed politics for some time to come up with a list of people who lied to Congress on far more important matters but were never charged with crimes. That this anything other than selective prosecution of two gentlemen who are very, very famous (and, perhaps not coincidentally, two guys who were always disliked by reporters) wouldn't pass a giggle test. In my book, it's a clear abuse, and a shameful disgrace.
(But political scientists are apparently not monolithic on this one; see Joshua Tucker for a different, albeit totally wrong, view).
It seems rather unlikely, you know, that Roger Clemens was unusually dishonest in his testimony to Congress. It's not at all difficult for anyone who has followed politics for some time to come up with a list of people who lied to Congress on far more important matters but were never charged with crimes. That this anything other than selective prosecution of two gentlemen who are very, very famous (and, perhaps not coincidentally, two guys who were always disliked by reporters) wouldn't pass a giggle test. In my book, it's a clear abuse, and a shameful disgrace.
(But political scientists are apparently not monolithic on this one; see Joshua Tucker for a different, albeit totally wrong, view).
Presidential Decisions
I haven't really blogged about presidential power recently, but a couple of excellent posts by Noam Scheiber (here and here) about whether Barack Obama will appoint Elizabeth Warren to head the brand new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection give me a good excuse, because he really does excellent analysis of How Things Work in Washington. I'll add in this related item from Tim Fernholz.
The idea that I want to get across here is twofold. First, presidential decisions are rarely about "doing the right thing" vs. "doing the wrong thing." They're not even, really, usuallly about doing the right thing vs. doing the expedient thing. Moreover, it's too simple to talk about whether presidents "have the power" or not to do things. Reality is usually a lot more complicated.
So: for those who haven't been following this, the question is over whether Obama will make liberals happy by appointing Warren despite some apparent reluctance of some Democratic Senators to support her, not to mention interest group (that is, banking) opposition. So, how did this play out? Well, first of all, the White House leaked out not only Warren's name, but also the names of alternatives that wouldn't be much (if at all) better for affected businesses, as Fernholz reports. Scheiber notes that Warren has been, meanwhile, meeting with big bank lobbyists, presumably in part to reassure them that she's no worse than the other plausible choices. Scheiber concludes that the banks have decided that they can live with her. Meanwhile, I agree with Scheiber's argument that Democratic Senators who would prefer a different nominee are unlikely to actually oppose confirmation. But as he points out, it's a bit trickier for the president than that:
What makes the presidency so hard is that it's not about deciding right vs. wrong. It's almost always about choices about priorities -- which of the many possible "right" things should move up to the top tier, which are clearly not worth the effort, and which are somewhere in the middle. This requires gauging all sorts of things...are cranky Dem Senators really upset about Warren, or just putting up a show for the benefit of home-state interests. How much does Warren's obvious symbolic importance to some liberals translate to liberal activists in general, and how will that play out if Obama was to choose a substantively similar but symbolically less fraught nominee? How do Washingtonians feel about the president's resolve, and will his reputation for being tough be helped if he stands up to balky Senators? What if he stands up to liberals? How much do the banks actually care about Warren's symbolic importance? How likely is this choice to take up valuable Senate floor time compared to alternative nominees, and which nominations or legislation might that jeopardize? What options does he have on those other items that might clear more space for a Warren floor fight (if one is likely), and how important would those compromises be?
Then realize that there's a similar set of questions for each of the things that Barack Obama wants to do, and for all the things he doesn't really care about but for which others are urging him to act. Remember that while on the one hand he has far more tools than any other individual to use in order to persuade others to go along with what he wants, he's using those tools across dozens, maybe hundreds, of issues, while many of those he deals with may only care -- and care intensively -- about one or two or maybe a handful of issues. And note that everyone is watching what the president decides, and how he decides, and who he listens to and what strategies he uses, so that they can maximize their ability to get what they want from him when it's their turn to play. None of which should be taken as apologizing for the president...he asked for the job! He certainly should be held to account. It's just important, in my opinion, to understand what it means for a president to make a decision before we start attacking him for one.
Of course, many things a president wants to do are "wrong" in the view of many citizens, but I think rarely from the point of view of what the president told his supporters he wanted to do during a campaign. So clearly most Republicans think that on health care reform the president willfully tried to do something they thought of as "wrong," and from their point of view they are probably correct. I'm sure there are some times when a president really does "betray" his supporters, in the sense of affirmatively choosing to support a policy they oppose and had every reason to believe he would oppose: there are cases in which a president and his supporters really are surprised to find themselves disagreeing on what is right and wrong. I believe, however, that such cases are rare. Most of the time a president's supporters feel betrayed, even major cases such as Reagan's conciliatory stance towards the Soviets, or Clinton and welfare reform, or Bush and Medicare, or Obama and the public option, the odds are good that the president doesn't fundamentally disagree with his supporters about right and wrong, just about the correct move to make given all the circumstances (which, again, doesn't mean he necessarily is correct about that).
Obviously, the president has the Constitutional and statutory authority to nominate Elizabeth Warren. Even if he believes she is the best choice for the job, however, that's just the beginning of the story. A president who doesn't take all of those other questions into account (and, presumably, others I'm not aware of) is going to wind up unable to do very much at all.
The idea that I want to get across here is twofold. First, presidential decisions are rarely about "doing the right thing" vs. "doing the wrong thing." They're not even, really, usuallly about doing the right thing vs. doing the expedient thing. Moreover, it's too simple to talk about whether presidents "have the power" or not to do things. Reality is usually a lot more complicated.
So: for those who haven't been following this, the question is over whether Obama will make liberals happy by appointing Warren despite some apparent reluctance of some Democratic Senators to support her, not to mention interest group (that is, banking) opposition. So, how did this play out? Well, first of all, the White House leaked out not only Warren's name, but also the names of alternatives that wouldn't be much (if at all) better for affected businesses, as Fernholz reports. Scheiber notes that Warren has been, meanwhile, meeting with big bank lobbyists, presumably in part to reassure them that she's no worse than the other plausible choices. Scheiber concludes that the banks have decided that they can live with her. Meanwhile, I agree with Scheiber's argument that Democratic Senators who would prefer a different nominee are unlikely to actually oppose confirmation. But as he points out, it's a bit trickier for the president than that:
Even if Obama can get the 60 votes he needs to confirm Warren, that probably comes at some cost in the Senate, since the moderate Dems who grudgingly vote with him may feel less favorably disposed on the next tough vote--and that may be an issue where they have the political space to oppose him. I'd say that's the biggest White House political consideration at this point--not whether Warren can be confirmed, but at what cost in terms of goodwill among Senate Democrats.That's exactly the right way to look at these things. Given that he has more cards to play than any other individual within the political system, a president often is in a position in which he can get his way if he wants something badly enough -- but that doesn't mean it doesn't come with real costs. It's not about whether he wants to do something; it's about how much he wants to do it, what the costs and benefits are for moving ahead compared to the costs and benefits of pulling back.
What makes the presidency so hard is that it's not about deciding right vs. wrong. It's almost always about choices about priorities -- which of the many possible "right" things should move up to the top tier, which are clearly not worth the effort, and which are somewhere in the middle. This requires gauging all sorts of things...are cranky Dem Senators really upset about Warren, or just putting up a show for the benefit of home-state interests. How much does Warren's obvious symbolic importance to some liberals translate to liberal activists in general, and how will that play out if Obama was to choose a substantively similar but symbolically less fraught nominee? How do Washingtonians feel about the president's resolve, and will his reputation for being tough be helped if he stands up to balky Senators? What if he stands up to liberals? How much do the banks actually care about Warren's symbolic importance? How likely is this choice to take up valuable Senate floor time compared to alternative nominees, and which nominations or legislation might that jeopardize? What options does he have on those other items that might clear more space for a Warren floor fight (if one is likely), and how important would those compromises be?
Then realize that there's a similar set of questions for each of the things that Barack Obama wants to do, and for all the things he doesn't really care about but for which others are urging him to act. Remember that while on the one hand he has far more tools than any other individual to use in order to persuade others to go along with what he wants, he's using those tools across dozens, maybe hundreds, of issues, while many of those he deals with may only care -- and care intensively -- about one or two or maybe a handful of issues. And note that everyone is watching what the president decides, and how he decides, and who he listens to and what strategies he uses, so that they can maximize their ability to get what they want from him when it's their turn to play. None of which should be taken as apologizing for the president...he asked for the job! He certainly should be held to account. It's just important, in my opinion, to understand what it means for a president to make a decision before we start attacking him for one.
Of course, many things a president wants to do are "wrong" in the view of many citizens, but I think rarely from the point of view of what the president told his supporters he wanted to do during a campaign. So clearly most Republicans think that on health care reform the president willfully tried to do something they thought of as "wrong," and from their point of view they are probably correct. I'm sure there are some times when a president really does "betray" his supporters, in the sense of affirmatively choosing to support a policy they oppose and had every reason to believe he would oppose: there are cases in which a president and his supporters really are surprised to find themselves disagreeing on what is right and wrong. I believe, however, that such cases are rare. Most of the time a president's supporters feel betrayed, even major cases such as Reagan's conciliatory stance towards the Soviets, or Clinton and welfare reform, or Bush and Medicare, or Obama and the public option, the odds are good that the president doesn't fundamentally disagree with his supporters about right and wrong, just about the correct move to make given all the circumstances (which, again, doesn't mean he necessarily is correct about that).
Obviously, the president has the Constitutional and statutory authority to nominate Elizabeth Warren. Even if he believes she is the best choice for the job, however, that's just the beginning of the story. A president who doesn't take all of those other questions into account (and, presumably, others I'm not aware of) is going to wind up unable to do very much at all.
Palin's Constitution
Regardless of the importance of various small-bore controversies that get inflated by the need to fill cable net and talk show time during slow news months, it's still always a good thing for people to explain core Constitutional principles...or mistaken notions about them:
It's not surprising that Sarah Palin would come out in support of Dr. Laura Schlessinger's interpretation of the First Amendment as not guaranteeing freedom of speech, but rather freedom from criticism. Palin's expressed similar beliefs before, basically that the First Amendment only guarantees her and her political allies freedom of speech, while any criticism of her statements is an unconstitutional infringement on her right to say whatever she wants.That's Adam Serwer taking apart the Sage of Wasilla. You are reading him, right?
It goes without saying that this is painfully stupid...
"Learning" and Rejectionism
I first want to steer you to two excellent posts earlier this week by Ezra Klein and Matt Yglesias. Both excellent. Might as well also toss in a link to John Sides, who started this particular ball rolling. So read all of those.
My interest here is in the last paragraph from Yglesias's post:
That's not the only way to think about behavior, however. It's also the case, at least sometimes, that pols do what they do not because they're responding to incentives, but because they're following a previous pattern that they believe worked out well for them. That accounts for a lot of electioneering, for example; no one really knows (in many cases) what actually works, but instead whatever winners do gets adopted by everyone whether it actually helped the winner or not. I continue to believe that this sort of "learning" explains Republican actions in Congress over the last couple of years. The lesson Republicans took from 1993-1994 is that simply opposing everything the president does is the key to success against unified Democratic control of government. Thus while the actual 1993-1994 Republicans selectively opposed Bill Clinton (cooperating, for example, on NAFTA, and not filibustering absolutely everything), what they remember is that they chose to oppose rather than to cooperate, and that they triumphed at the polls in 1994.
My sense is that it takes both of these things to add up to the extraordinary rejectionist strategy that Republicans settled on after getting clobbered in both the 2006 and 2008 elections. I've read quite a few liberal observers lately who believe that Republican behavior is strictly rational and reveals a real problem with the political system: Republicans obstruct, the government doesn't work well, voters punish the Democratic incumbents. But that formula, while it may work with the stimulus or unemployment benefits or perhaps Fed appointments, really doesn't apply across the board. Did anyone outside of Washington care that Lael Brainard's nomination was delayed for months? Of course not, and it's hard to make a case that Brainard's absence had any effect on the economy, certainly not large enough to affect midterm election results. And that, at least, is something in the economic realm -- it's even more of a stretch that blocking, say, judicial nominations could matter electorally. Nor is there any obvious electoral benefit to blocking most legislation.
What seems to have happened, I think, is that Republicans believed that their rejectionist strategy in 1993-1994 was responsible for their 1994 landslide, and from that the expectation that Republicans should oppose everything in as strong a way as possible became accepted wisdom in conservative circles, which in turn made it very difficult for Republican elected officials to buck the tide, even if they otherwise might want to. And, of course, the subsequent drop in Barack Obama's approval ratings in spring 2009 just seemed to confirm they were on the right track (even if in fact that drop was a consequence mainly of the economy, not of GOP actions).
Of course, on many issues opposition to a liberal Democratic president hardly needs any explanation. But I do think that Yglesias and others are correct that opposition could have taken other forms, and could have included far more accommodation -- which would have allowed Republicans to achieve more of their policy goals. Why they didn't, I think, is best explained by the combination of electoral incentives and what I think virtually all Republicans and conservatives see as the lessons of 1993-1994 -- lessons which, assuming that November goes as expected, they'll certainly carry forward the next time they perceive themselves in a similar situation.
My interest here is in the last paragraph from Yglesias's post:
But I don’t think it’s a given that the opposition party’s leaders will reject the president’s proposals out of hand. It really depends on what they’re more interested in doing. The Democratic Party showed in the 2005 Social Security debate that it’s possible for a Republican President to formulate a proposal that meets with a response of massive resistance, but on most issues—taxes, Medicare, immigration, K-12 education, invading Iraq—there were always Democrats who were eager to cut deals with the Bush administration.That's right, and I think what you see here is the intersection of two different models of understand behavior in general, and politician's behavior in particular. On the one hand, there's certainly a lot of behavior by pols and other elite political actors that can be explained by thinking about electoral incentives -- so we can suppose that the incentives for Republican Senators are different depending on whether they are in the majority or minority, whether the House is Democratic or Republican, whether there's a Democrat or a Republican at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Even there, it's tricky...the incentives for the party as a whole may be different than the incentives for individual Senators (and electoral incentives may conflict with incentives for other goals a Senator might have, such as becoming a national figure or changing the world to his or her liking).
That's not the only way to think about behavior, however. It's also the case, at least sometimes, that pols do what they do not because they're responding to incentives, but because they're following a previous pattern that they believe worked out well for them. That accounts for a lot of electioneering, for example; no one really knows (in many cases) what actually works, but instead whatever winners do gets adopted by everyone whether it actually helped the winner or not. I continue to believe that this sort of "learning" explains Republican actions in Congress over the last couple of years. The lesson Republicans took from 1993-1994 is that simply opposing everything the president does is the key to success against unified Democratic control of government. Thus while the actual 1993-1994 Republicans selectively opposed Bill Clinton (cooperating, for example, on NAFTA, and not filibustering absolutely everything), what they remember is that they chose to oppose rather than to cooperate, and that they triumphed at the polls in 1994.
My sense is that it takes both of these things to add up to the extraordinary rejectionist strategy that Republicans settled on after getting clobbered in both the 2006 and 2008 elections. I've read quite a few liberal observers lately who believe that Republican behavior is strictly rational and reveals a real problem with the political system: Republicans obstruct, the government doesn't work well, voters punish the Democratic incumbents. But that formula, while it may work with the stimulus or unemployment benefits or perhaps Fed appointments, really doesn't apply across the board. Did anyone outside of Washington care that Lael Brainard's nomination was delayed for months? Of course not, and it's hard to make a case that Brainard's absence had any effect on the economy, certainly not large enough to affect midterm election results. And that, at least, is something in the economic realm -- it's even more of a stretch that blocking, say, judicial nominations could matter electorally. Nor is there any obvious electoral benefit to blocking most legislation.
What seems to have happened, I think, is that Republicans believed that their rejectionist strategy in 1993-1994 was responsible for their 1994 landslide, and from that the expectation that Republicans should oppose everything in as strong a way as possible became accepted wisdom in conservative circles, which in turn made it very difficult for Republican elected officials to buck the tide, even if they otherwise might want to. And, of course, the subsequent drop in Barack Obama's approval ratings in spring 2009 just seemed to confirm they were on the right track (even if in fact that drop was a consequence mainly of the economy, not of GOP actions).
Of course, on many issues opposition to a liberal Democratic president hardly needs any explanation. But I do think that Yglesias and others are correct that opposition could have taken other forms, and could have included far more accommodation -- which would have allowed Republicans to achieve more of their policy goals. Why they didn't, I think, is best explained by the combination of electoral incentives and what I think virtually all Republicans and conservatives see as the lessons of 1993-1994 -- lessons which, assuming that November goes as expected, they'll certainly carry forward the next time they perceive themselves in a similar situation.
Iraq and Trust
If you're interested in the polling about Americans who are mistaken about the president's religion, I'll send you over to Brendan Nyhan, who knows a lot more about it than I do, and has a typically good post up. I'll just add that for the first time this blog seems to have attracted a troll, who is making comments about religion to various posts, and which after the first one I'm deleting. I've mentioned my comments policy in passing a few times, although I've never gotten around to spelling it out in full, but basically I'll zap any comments that in my judgment are commercial, offensive, or in other ways disruptive. Critical of me? Not a problem. I'll even welcome comments from Dodgers fans -- there was an ill-informed comment a ways back that actually praised Steve Garvey, and I let that go. Hmmm...I should probably get to the point, shouldn't I?
What's interesting me this morning isn't so much the fantasies that Barack Obama's opponents, as the lack of trust that liberals have in him. I should throw in a caveat right up top: this is fairly speculative stuff, really just my reading of various pundits and bloggers, nothing definitive, but at any rate: Case in point is the news that the last of the "combat troops" have left Iraq. Now, those reluctant to celebrate this development certainly have strong grounds for doing so, with 50K troops remaining, plus private security forces and civilians, so more American casualties are certain (although the pace seems to have slowed again in the last couple months). And I can certainly understand a reluctance to celebrate a retreat, even if it's orderly and good policy (as Obama's supporters presumably believe). Still, I tend to think there's what I'd consider an unusual amount of skepticism of Obama's commitment among liberals. Looking around, liberals either seem to be relieved but subdued (for example Steve Benen, or Heather at Crooks and Liars), or, as with Spencer Ackerman, primarily skeptical. Now, again, I'm not criticizing that attitude, since among other things one might believe it's in poor taste to celebrate the situation the Americans are (to some extent at least) leaving behind. Still, it does strike me that few liberals, at least few liberals who are speaking up right now, really appear to trust that Obama on Iraq. I'm not sure why -- is it because of Obama's policy in Afghanistan? The disappointment of 2007, when a Democratic victory in 2006 failed to produce rapid results? The residue of Obama's defeat on Gitmo? His other policies on secrecy and rule-of-law issues? Something inherent in liberals when it comes to trusting even liberal pols? I don't know, and perhaps I'm reading things that aren't there, but I just don't see much trust there. Support, yes, when he does something they like, and perhaps even general support. But trust? Not really.
What's interesting me this morning isn't so much the fantasies that Barack Obama's opponents, as the lack of trust that liberals have in him. I should throw in a caveat right up top: this is fairly speculative stuff, really just my reading of various pundits and bloggers, nothing definitive, but at any rate: Case in point is the news that the last of the "combat troops" have left Iraq. Now, those reluctant to celebrate this development certainly have strong grounds for doing so, with 50K troops remaining, plus private security forces and civilians, so more American casualties are certain (although the pace seems to have slowed again in the last couple months). And I can certainly understand a reluctance to celebrate a retreat, even if it's orderly and good policy (as Obama's supporters presumably believe). Still, I tend to think there's what I'd consider an unusual amount of skepticism of Obama's commitment among liberals. Looking around, liberals either seem to be relieved but subdued (for example Steve Benen, or Heather at Crooks and Liars), or, as with Spencer Ackerman, primarily skeptical. Now, again, I'm not criticizing that attitude, since among other things one might believe it's in poor taste to celebrate the situation the Americans are (to some extent at least) leaving behind. Still, it does strike me that few liberals, at least few liberals who are speaking up right now, really appear to trust that Obama on Iraq. I'm not sure why -- is it because of Obama's policy in Afghanistan? The disappointment of 2007, when a Democratic victory in 2006 failed to produce rapid results? The residue of Obama's defeat on Gitmo? His other policies on secrecy and rule-of-law issues? Something inherent in liberals when it comes to trusting even liberal pols? I don't know, and perhaps I'm reading things that aren't there, but I just don't see much trust there. Support, yes, when he does something they like, and perhaps even general support. But trust? Not really.
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Amplifier
Conor Friedersdorf wants people to take Gary Johnson's presidential campaign more seriously. He's right about this:
At any rate, I'm more interested in the follow-up conservation between Marc Ambinder and Friedersdorf. Ambinder, I think, correctly points out that the media's role (and here I'm talking, as I think Ambinder is, about the neutral, traditional press) is reactive. They'll ignore candidates until and unless those candidates achieve some of the marks of Serious: Ambinder mentions grassroots success, but there's also fundraising , endorsements, and general word-of-mouth among party insiders. But I disagree about Ambinder's insistence (and Friedersdorf's regret) that candidates must "sparkle" to get noticed by the press. Well, mostly disagree. For the most part, "sparkle" is caused by success, not the other way around. Now, that's not absolutely true...it's hard to tell what makes up the good political skills that allow a Barack Obama or a George W. Bush or a Bill Clinton to impress insiders. But we do know that plenty of presidential also-rans, people such as Chris Dodd and Bill Richardson and Jack Kemp and Bruce Babbitt, had plenty of "sparkle" in the right circumstances; they just couldn't, for all kinds of understandable reasons, win the support of party insiders for President of the United States.
The point is that Gary Johnson isn't a hopeless case because he's not good on TV; he's a hopeless case because his issue positions make him unacceptable to the most important groups within the Republican Party, and he doesn't bring anything to compensate for that. Which no doubt stinks if you want a different GOP than the one that actually exists in 2010. Now, it may be that Johnson can mobilize new groups to enter the Republican Party and start to change it...that sort of thing happens to American political parties all the time, in presidential and lower-level nomination battles. But as of now, I'd say that the nomination process does a fairly good job of allowing parties to work together to nominate candidates who are responsive to who those parties are, and the problems that Johnson faces have to do with substance, not process.
Here's the thing about politicians and their initial rise to national attention: it's often a phenomenon driven by elites.Actually, I would say it's always, not often, driven by elites. Party elites, generally -- not the press, who mostly just amplify what party insiders are saying (in this, we should count the Bill Kristols of the world who make up the partisan press as party insiders, not as part of the neutral media). And while I think that Friedersdorf makes an excellent point in bashing GOP insiders -- he should have specified the governors -- for anointing George W. Bush in 2000, on Gary Johnson I think Friedersdorf is simply out of step with what Republicans want:
...a successful two-term Republican governor with a credible small government record, a demonstrated commitment to civil liberties, skepticism about foreign wars, a longstanding determination to right America's fiscal ship, evidence of competent management skills in the public and private sectors, and an utter lack of ugly populist rhetoric during the whole of his substantial time in public life. You'd think he'd be a God send for tea partiers and civil libertarians...Civil libertarians, sure, but how many Republicans fit into that category? As for Tea Party types...I'm certainly not of the impression that they're (collectively) marked by a commitment to civil liberties, skepticism about foreign wars, or hostility to ugly populist rhetoric. If that's the party that Friedersdorf wants the GOP to be, I think he's going to be disappointed.
At any rate, I'm more interested in the follow-up conservation between Marc Ambinder and Friedersdorf. Ambinder, I think, correctly points out that the media's role (and here I'm talking, as I think Ambinder is, about the neutral, traditional press) is reactive. They'll ignore candidates until and unless those candidates achieve some of the marks of Serious: Ambinder mentions grassroots success, but there's also fundraising , endorsements, and general word-of-mouth among party insiders. But I disagree about Ambinder's insistence (and Friedersdorf's regret) that candidates must "sparkle" to get noticed by the press. Well, mostly disagree. For the most part, "sparkle" is caused by success, not the other way around. Now, that's not absolutely true...it's hard to tell what makes up the good political skills that allow a Barack Obama or a George W. Bush or a Bill Clinton to impress insiders. But we do know that plenty of presidential also-rans, people such as Chris Dodd and Bill Richardson and Jack Kemp and Bruce Babbitt, had plenty of "sparkle" in the right circumstances; they just couldn't, for all kinds of understandable reasons, win the support of party insiders for President of the United States.
The point is that Gary Johnson isn't a hopeless case because he's not good on TV; he's a hopeless case because his issue positions make him unacceptable to the most important groups within the Republican Party, and he doesn't bring anything to compensate for that. Which no doubt stinks if you want a different GOP than the one that actually exists in 2010. Now, it may be that Johnson can mobilize new groups to enter the Republican Party and start to change it...that sort of thing happens to American political parties all the time, in presidential and lower-level nomination battles. But as of now, I'd say that the nomination process does a fairly good job of allowing parties to work together to nominate candidates who are responsive to who those parties are, and the problems that Johnson faces have to do with substance, not process.
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