I want to pass along some excellent posts on the upcoming health care summit. Ezra Klein says that what the Hill wants is "to leave Democrats confident enough to push this into the end zone." He also thinks that the summit has the Republicans a bit confused. Jonathan Cohn agrees, and is optimistic about the White House commitment to have an actual bill settled on by the summit, and also thinks that challenging the Republicans to have one is a nice touch. Jonathan Chait sees the same thing, and has a nice little analysis of the attempts by the president to focus on substance, while the Republicans try to focus on process. I recommend all four of these posts.
I'm not as taken with John Judis's post. Judis (and by the way, I'm not just picking on him because he doesn't have the good sense to be a Jonathan) says that the way to judge the success or failure of the summit is "in opinion polls, because that’s what members of Congress will look at."
I sure hope that's not the case, because I think it's pretty unlikely that there will be much movement in the polls. Judis points to a small spike that showed up after the September speech to Congress, but even if that was real (he cites a small positive movement in a couple of polls, which could easily be just random fluctuation), it's not especially likely that an event like this could yield much of any visible results. Not only have opinions probably settled for now, but...well, face it: the summit is probably going to be pretty boring. I think it will be boring in a good way for the president; I agree with Chait that substance is good for his side of the argument, and if people tune in briefly and hear something that sounds like Serious Discussion Of The Issues, they're likely to respond positively...and then turn to something more exciting, like curling reruns. Very few people actually want to watch Serious Discussion of the Issues, even if they think that such things are Good For Democracy.
I think Members of Congress probably know that. I can't really tell what the Members that Pelosi needs are thinking (we don't actually know, from the reporting I've read, whether they're stubborn liberals, or Blue Dogs, or pro-life Dems, or Dems in electoral trouble, or perhaps just random Dems going through weird panic rituals). Pelosi, however, knows, and so does (I assume) the White House, and it's unlikely in my view that what they want is something the summit is unlikely to provide -- because otherwise the White House wouldn't have made this move. My guess is that Ezra Klein is right, and it has to do with some amorphous "comfort level." The House, in my opinion, is understandably but in this case incorrectly concerned that it will act, and then the Senate will find some way to screw over the House. A little public support from the president might go a long ways at alleviating that worry. And, as we've heard, they're not eager to defend the process (especially the Senate portion of the process, which is what took most of the hits); the summit gives them an easy response on process ("We did it publicly! On CSPAN!"), and maybe that's all a few of them need to move ahead to a vote.
But I really wouldn't count on the summit to help the polling numbers of health care reform.
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
The Future of the Public Option (On Schedule...)
Always listen to Plain Blog. Back in December, I said:
If Democrats can manage to pass health care reform this year, they'll add the public option soon -- perhaps in the next Congress, but if not then very likely in the following Congress is Obama is reelected and Democrats have control of both Houses of Congress. Of course, if the Democrats fail to pass health care reform, then all bets are off.
[P]ublic option supporters are going to win their war, even while losing this battle...Public option is going to be a litmus test for liberals in Congressional primaries in 2010 [and] 2012...[O]ver time, more and more Democrats in Congress -- moderates as well as liberals -- are going to have campaign commitments to a public option. Not only that, public option will be much more front-and-center in future Democratic campaigns.And now Ezra Klein notes:
Michael Bennett is a moderate Democratic senator from Colorado. Kirsten Gillibrand was a moderate Democrat in the House until she was appointed to fill Hillary Clinton's Senate seat. Neither is the sort of politician you'd expect to be out front on a major liberal priority. But there they are, signatories to a letter asking Harry Reid to bring a public option up for a vote through the reconciliation process...Both Bennett and Gillibrand are facing [primary] challengers from the left, and so they're signing their names to liberal priorities you might otherwise expect them to avoid.I think Ezra actually understates the situation: Gillibrand is in fact facing a challenge from the left, but the potential Harold Ford challenge is more likely to be from the right. And it still pushes her towards the public option, because the public option is overwhelmingly popular among Democratic activists and primary voters, and polls pretty well among all voters.
If Democrats can manage to pass health care reform this year, they'll add the public option soon -- perhaps in the next Congress, but if not then very likely in the following Congress is Obama is reelected and Democrats have control of both Houses of Congress. Of course, if the Democrats fail to pass health care reform, then all bets are off.
Re-Nomination
I agree with everything Matt Yglesias says about how silly the idea of an Evan Bayh challenge to Barack Obama would be for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2012. Obama is overall fairly popular, and he's very popular among Democrats, and he's well positioned pretty much square in the middle of the Democrats, as far as ideology is concerned. Bayh is a nobody who occupies a terrible place on the ideological spectrum and has, really, pretty much nothing to run on
On the history, however, Yglesias says:
Of course, that was before primary elections, and the Truman, Wilson, and Johnson cases were before the current process was implemented in 1972. After that, it is true that no incumbent has been defeated: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush were all renominated, with only two as close cases. But Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton all won landslides; of course they were renominated! The question is what would happen should Obama look like a loser in November. I'd say that George W. Bush is also not relevant here; even though he wound up winning a close race, he was pretty popular a year before the election, when choices would have to be made.
That leaves the three presidents since the modern nomination began who were renominated and then defeated: Ford, Carter and George H.W. Bush. Ford and Carter were seriously challenged, but Bush was not (although fringe candidate Pat Buchanan did run a real campaign, albeit without ever threatening Bush's renomination). That history would suggest that an unpopular president stands a significant risk of a serious challenge.
On the other hand...the two serious challenges took place early in the reformed process, before party elites had fully figured out how to control the system. Moreover, in both cases the challenge came from a long-acknowledged leader of the party; the only comparable figure in the Democratic Party today is the Secretary of State in Obama's own administration. Both of those challenges also came from the ideological extreme (which is apt to feel betrayed by any president because the nomination process pushes candidates to the extremes while the general election and governing pushes them to the center).
So as I said at the top, anyone who thinks Evan Bayh is a nomination threat to Obama is nuts. But denying a sitting president renomination isn't quite as historically far-fetched as Yglesias believes. If a double-dip recession brings unemployment to over 12%, I wouldn't be certain that Obama will be the Democratic candidate in 2012 (I think he would be, but I wouldn't be certain). But it ain't gonna be Evan Bayh.
On the history, however, Yglesias says:
No incumbent president has ever been defeated in a primary. And the only “close calls” came in a tightly bunched historical period (1968, 1976, 1980) characterized by substantial transformation of the regional bases of the major political parties.I'm not sure what he means by "in a primary." If he means "denied renomination by his party when he wanted the nomination," then it's not true. Johnson in 1968 is a hard case -- he dropped out before it could be tested, but it's fairly likely he would have been renominated. But it's typical of the pre-1972 situation, when it was difficult to tell who the "real" candidates might be. Truman in 1952 and Wilson in 1920 probably wanted renomination, but weren't going to get it. I'm not much of an expert on the 19th century process, but there are several such cases back then.
Of course, that was before primary elections, and the Truman, Wilson, and Johnson cases were before the current process was implemented in 1972. After that, it is true that no incumbent has been defeated: Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush were all renominated, with only two as close cases. But Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton all won landslides; of course they were renominated! The question is what would happen should Obama look like a loser in November. I'd say that George W. Bush is also not relevant here; even though he wound up winning a close race, he was pretty popular a year before the election, when choices would have to be made.
That leaves the three presidents since the modern nomination began who were renominated and then defeated: Ford, Carter and George H.W. Bush. Ford and Carter were seriously challenged, but Bush was not (although fringe candidate Pat Buchanan did run a real campaign, albeit without ever threatening Bush's renomination). That history would suggest that an unpopular president stands a significant risk of a serious challenge.
On the other hand...the two serious challenges took place early in the reformed process, before party elites had fully figured out how to control the system. Moreover, in both cases the challenge came from a long-acknowledged leader of the party; the only comparable figure in the Democratic Party today is the Secretary of State in Obama's own administration. Both of those challenges also came from the ideological extreme (which is apt to feel betrayed by any president because the nomination process pushes candidates to the extremes while the general election and governing pushes them to the center).
So as I said at the top, anyone who thinks Evan Bayh is a nomination threat to Obama is nuts. But denying a sitting president renomination isn't quite as historically far-fetched as Yglesias believes. If a double-dip recession brings unemployment to over 12%, I wouldn't be certain that Obama will be the Democratic candidate in 2012 (I think he would be, but I wouldn't be certain). But it ain't gonna be Evan Bayh.
The Middle
Jonathan Chait believes polarization in Congress is the inevitable consequence of two-party politics, and that it just seems unusual because of the long historically unusual period of the bipartisan conservative coalition. The latter part is true -- it was historically rare and a product of specific historical events that the Democrats developed into a bipolar party in the mid-20th century.
It isn't true, however, that pure polarization is inevitable. Chait says:
If parties had no influence at all on candidate ideology, and ideology drove voting, then we could expect (per Anthony Downs) close races everywhere, with the Democratic candidate just to the left of the Republicans in each district -- and plenty of New England, west coast, and perhaps even inner city Republicans who would be far to the left of bunches of Democrats from the south, from places such as Kansas and Nebraska, and from Utah. Since neither of those conditions holds (parties do influence candidate ideology, and many things other than ideology -- such as group membership -- drive partisanship which then drives voting), we can't quite expect that result. But some of it should be expected. What's probably really going on is that ideological conservative activists have captured Republican nominations to such a large extent that Republicans start off with a large disadvantage, but those Republicans who do win in moderate or liberal districts are pretty far to the right of their constituencies.
It is not at all inevitable that this will continue, however. It's possible that liberals will eventually learn to copy Republican activists and better control nominations for purist candidates -- and it's also possible that Republicans may choose to nominate candidates more in line with their districts in order to maximize total seats in Congress. We're never going to return to the mid-20th century lowpoint of polarization, but there's no reason to expect that polarization at quite this historically high level is inevitable, either. As usual, I recommend scrolling down to the bottom of this page and watching the pretty pictures (courtesy of Poole, Rosenthal, and McCarty), and then explore their other links, if you want a better long-term idea of polarization in Congressional voting.
It isn't true, however, that pure polarization is inevitable. Chait says:
The creation of more ideologically-coherent parties is a natural trend, and it's hard to see how or why it will stop. Northern moderates vote for Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe, but they're going to join a Republican filibuster to stop even a health care bill they voted for. Arkansans who think Barack Obama is a dangerous socialist probably aren't going to want to keep Blanche Lincoln in the Senate any more. To the extent that moderates do win Senate seats these days, it's largely by obscuring the political choices before their electorate.The thing is that northern moderates may stop voting for Collins and Snow -- the way they stopped voting for all of those Republican Members of the House such as Nancy Johnson and Chris Shays -- if they don't maneuver to make the median voter in their districts happy. If Republicans nominate only Jim Inhofes and Sam Brownbacks, they'll have ideological coherence but very few seats. And while Arkansans who think Obama is a socialist might not vote for Lincoln, there are plenty of Arkansans who are willing to vote for Lincoln and Pryor as long as they clearly separate themselves from at least some of Obama's positions on public policy issues.
If parties had no influence at all on candidate ideology, and ideology drove voting, then we could expect (per Anthony Downs) close races everywhere, with the Democratic candidate just to the left of the Republicans in each district -- and plenty of New England, west coast, and perhaps even inner city Republicans who would be far to the left of bunches of Democrats from the south, from places such as Kansas and Nebraska, and from Utah. Since neither of those conditions holds (parties do influence candidate ideology, and many things other than ideology -- such as group membership -- drive partisanship which then drives voting), we can't quite expect that result. But some of it should be expected. What's probably really going on is that ideological conservative activists have captured Republican nominations to such a large extent that Republicans start off with a large disadvantage, but those Republicans who do win in moderate or liberal districts are pretty far to the right of their constituencies.
It is not at all inevitable that this will continue, however. It's possible that liberals will eventually learn to copy Republican activists and better control nominations for purist candidates -- and it's also possible that Republicans may choose to nominate candidates more in line with their districts in order to maximize total seats in Congress. We're never going to return to the mid-20th century lowpoint of polarization, but there's no reason to expect that polarization at quite this historically high level is inevitable, either. As usual, I recommend scrolling down to the bottom of this page and watching the pretty pictures (courtesy of Poole, Rosenthal, and McCarty), and then explore their other links, if you want a better long-term idea of polarization in Congressional voting.
Electoral Incentives
Ezra Klein has an item this morning referring to comments from Alan Abramowitz at the Monkey Cage, which I discussed earlier. Abramowitz, remember, points out that evaluations of Congress don't seem to affect Congressional elections, while evaluations of the president do. Ezra's takeaway from this is frustration:
This makes a rejectionist strategy quite risky for incumbents in the minority party; that's why Democrats in 2001-2002 generally didn't use a pure rejectionist strategy while George W. Bush had very high approval ratings, and why traditionally parties have not embraced such strategies. Parties that oppose popular presidents may be able to benefit even if their own image is damaged -- after all, by definition minority parties are better off if all incumbents suffer. Individual Members of Congress from those minority parties, however, may find themselves more vulnerable to defeat even if their party overall benefits, and therefore they may choose to accommodate, rather than reject, the president's agenda.
The story here is that Republicans in 1993-1994 were able to convince incumbents to carry out a rejectionist strategy, and Republicans won in 1994, so Republicans (and many Democrats) are now convinced that rejectionist strategies are obvious choices. It's not at all clear, however, that Republican strategies in 1993-1994 were responsible for Clinton's low approval ratings or the other causes of the Democrats' 1994 electoral debacle. And it's not at all clear to me that the Republican strategy is succeeding now. Barack Obama's approval ratings remain at around 50%, despite historically very high levels of unemployment. Would he be higher if Republicans had allowed his nominations to clear the Senate? Somehow, I doubt it. Higher if health care had passed? That, I can buy -- but I also think health care is still likely to pass, regardless of Republican actions. Meanwhile, Republican incumbents are subject to attacks for opposing locally popular projects, and Democrats will be attacking them on obstructing popular legislation.
If the economy stalls and unemployment lags, Republican incumbents will probably win their bet. But if the economy recovers and Obama enters the fall campaign with health approval ratings, Republican incumbents in marginal districts may find themselves in trouble because they opposed a president their constituents have embraced.
The point is that rejectionist policies are not the automatic winners that Ezra Klein and other liberals -- or that GOP strategists -- have assumed. Republicans are taking real risks, and it's too early to know whether those risks will pay off or not.
It's hard to see how you can find much bipartisanship under these circumstances. If the president's success is the best predictor of the minority's defeat, the minority can't let the president succeed. But there's no way to keep the president from succeeding politically while still helping him govern effectively. So they just block both things from happening.One needs to be careful here. It's true that evaluations of Congress don't have any noticeable effect on Congressional elections. But evaluations of one's individual Member of Congress do have such effects. Moreover, individual Members of Congress are hurt in their reelection campaigns if the nation is doing badly (generally measured by economic indicators).
This makes a rejectionist strategy quite risky for incumbents in the minority party; that's why Democrats in 2001-2002 generally didn't use a pure rejectionist strategy while George W. Bush had very high approval ratings, and why traditionally parties have not embraced such strategies. Parties that oppose popular presidents may be able to benefit even if their own image is damaged -- after all, by definition minority parties are better off if all incumbents suffer. Individual Members of Congress from those minority parties, however, may find themselves more vulnerable to defeat even if their party overall benefits, and therefore they may choose to accommodate, rather than reject, the president's agenda.
The story here is that Republicans in 1993-1994 were able to convince incumbents to carry out a rejectionist strategy, and Republicans won in 1994, so Republicans (and many Democrats) are now convinced that rejectionist strategies are obvious choices. It's not at all clear, however, that Republican strategies in 1993-1994 were responsible for Clinton's low approval ratings or the other causes of the Democrats' 1994 electoral debacle. And it's not at all clear to me that the Republican strategy is succeeding now. Barack Obama's approval ratings remain at around 50%, despite historically very high levels of unemployment. Would he be higher if Republicans had allowed his nominations to clear the Senate? Somehow, I doubt it. Higher if health care had passed? That, I can buy -- but I also think health care is still likely to pass, regardless of Republican actions. Meanwhile, Republican incumbents are subject to attacks for opposing locally popular projects, and Democrats will be attacking them on obstructing popular legislation.
If the economy stalls and unemployment lags, Republican incumbents will probably win their bet. But if the economy recovers and Obama enters the fall campaign with health approval ratings, Republican incumbents in marginal districts may find themselves in trouble because they opposed a president their constituents have embraced.
The point is that rejectionist policies are not the automatic winners that Ezra Klein and other liberals -- or that GOP strategists -- have assumed. Republicans are taking real risks, and it's too early to know whether those risks will pay off or not.
Getting Away With It, Sort Of
Well, here's a case where someone is, in a way, getting away with it (regular readers will know that it's become a pet peeve of mine that various people are said to be "getting away with" things when in fact they are quite unpopular and their arguments have been repudiated by elections).
I just saw torture apologist Marc Thiessen on CSPAN repeating, first of all, his argument that the Obama Administration is foolishly killing, rather than torturing, too many terrorists (today's news apparently notwithstanding; I turned it on too late to hear his explanation if any on that part of it), but more to the point his claim that torture and only torture prevented the Library Plot in Los Angeles from working. And yet a quick search returns me to Tim Noah's wonderful quick piece thoroughly debunking the Library Plot story: it seems that by the Bush Administration's own chronology, that particular plan was busted, with its leader arrested, a full year before KSM was captured (and then tortured, after which he supposedly spilled the beans on the Library Plot). Of course, it's also true, as Noah points out, that hijacking planes to use as missiles was hardly a viable strategy after (or even on) September 11, 2001.
Now, when I say that Theissen is getting away with it, I certainly don't mean that Republicans in general are getting away with these bogus arguments; in fact, Obama's approval ratings on national security issues are just fine. And national security certainly didn't do much for Republicans in the 2006 and 2008 elections cycles. No, the Republican Party is not getting away with much in that area these days.
But Thiessen? Well, he made the Library Plot argument in a Washington Post op-ed back in April of last year. It was, as I said, pretty thoroughly debunked by Noah the same day (and see too this relevant and in my opinion underplayed story). His reward for that, and for his creative but ludicrous "Obama is weak because he's killing too many terrorists" attack line, is a regular gig at the Washington Post, where he's apparently going to continue to peddle his long-discredited bunk and hokum. Including the biggest fraud, which he also repeated on CSPAN this morning, that the United States never tortured anyone.
The arguments aren't winning. The GOP isn't winning by making these arguments.
But Marc Thiessen is, in fact, getting away with it.
I just saw torture apologist Marc Thiessen on CSPAN repeating, first of all, his argument that the Obama Administration is foolishly killing, rather than torturing, too many terrorists (today's news apparently notwithstanding; I turned it on too late to hear his explanation if any on that part of it), but more to the point his claim that torture and only torture prevented the Library Plot in Los Angeles from working. And yet a quick search returns me to Tim Noah's wonderful quick piece thoroughly debunking the Library Plot story: it seems that by the Bush Administration's own chronology, that particular plan was busted, with its leader arrested, a full year before KSM was captured (and then tortured, after which he supposedly spilled the beans on the Library Plot). Of course, it's also true, as Noah points out, that hijacking planes to use as missiles was hardly a viable strategy after (or even on) September 11, 2001.
Now, when I say that Theissen is getting away with it, I certainly don't mean that Republicans in general are getting away with these bogus arguments; in fact, Obama's approval ratings on national security issues are just fine. And national security certainly didn't do much for Republicans in the 2006 and 2008 elections cycles. No, the Republican Party is not getting away with much in that area these days.
But Thiessen? Well, he made the Library Plot argument in a Washington Post op-ed back in April of last year. It was, as I said, pretty thoroughly debunked by Noah the same day (and see too this relevant and in my opinion underplayed story). His reward for that, and for his creative but ludicrous "Obama is weak because he's killing too many terrorists" attack line, is a regular gig at the Washington Post, where he's apparently going to continue to peddle his long-discredited bunk and hokum. Including the biggest fraud, which he also repeated on CSPAN this morning, that the United States never tortured anyone.
The arguments aren't winning. The GOP isn't winning by making these arguments.
But Marc Thiessen is, in fact, getting away with it.
Something Not To Worry About
Via Sullivan, Professor Bainbridge is worried about the Paris Hilton-ization of American politics. Sarah Palin, and then...
Palin, on the other hand, may be a serious contender for the Republican nomination, but in that she is no different than other plucked-from-obscurity figures from the past, such as Spiro Agnew or Gerry Ferraro. Granted, neither of them became nominees for president, but then again neither, so far, has Palin. Yes, her credentials were on the thin side for a Veep, but not shockingly so (Palin's real problems aren't with her paper credentials, but with her behavior before and since the selection, behavior which was made her quite unpopular nationally and thus probably not a very likely nominee). Is Sarah Palin a below-average pol on the serious-o-meter? Sure. Is she the first of that type to become a big national name? Nope.
Six months ago, people thought that Joe the Plumber was a Serious Republican Leader. Guess what? He wasn't. Scott Brown isn't Joe the Plumber; he's a perfectly legitimate pol who just won a Senate seat in a huge upset. Of course Republicans, a party that hasn't won very much lately, are all excited about him. This is neither new, nor remarkable, nor a sign that either party is about to turn to Paris Hilton for leadership. Plenty of things to worry about in American politics, but this ain't one of them.
[Scott Brown is] at the start of his national career. He has zero legislative accomplishments. He hasn't really defined himself. He hasn't earned the right to be a viable Presidential candidate. Yet, there he is...C'mon. Scott Brown is not a serious contender for a presidential nomination; the guy is pro-choice, among other things. He's the flavor of the month, nothing more.
I think it says something even worse about our culture that we are starting to pick our leaders this way. We face serious problems and a growing list of serious threats. We need leaders who are serious people. Not leaders who are famous for being famous.
Palin, on the other hand, may be a serious contender for the Republican nomination, but in that she is no different than other plucked-from-obscurity figures from the past, such as Spiro Agnew or Gerry Ferraro. Granted, neither of them became nominees for president, but then again neither, so far, has Palin. Yes, her credentials were on the thin side for a Veep, but not shockingly so (Palin's real problems aren't with her paper credentials, but with her behavior before and since the selection, behavior which was made her quite unpopular nationally and thus probably not a very likely nominee). Is Sarah Palin a below-average pol on the serious-o-meter? Sure. Is she the first of that type to become a big national name? Nope.
Six months ago, people thought that Joe the Plumber was a Serious Republican Leader. Guess what? He wasn't. Scott Brown isn't Joe the Plumber; he's a perfectly legitimate pol who just won a Senate seat in a huge upset. Of course Republicans, a party that hasn't won very much lately, are all excited about him. This is neither new, nor remarkable, nor a sign that either party is about to turn to Paris Hilton for leadership. Plenty of things to worry about in American politics, but this ain't one of them.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
