NBC's Chuck Todd now predicts, according to Matt Lewis over at the Daily Caller, that if Rick Perry does win the nomination that a third-party presidential candidate will emerge. As near as I can tell, Todd isn't welcoming or advocating for such a thing, just predicting it's likely to happen. It's not a bad call -- but I'd say the same thing applies if Mitt Romney is nominated.
Third party campaigns don't emerge from carefully (or not so carefully) reasoned op-ed pieces from go-gooders. They require a demand for it, which is furnished by unpopular presidents, and a supply, which takes someone crazy enough to do it who meets conventional standards of, let us say, seriousness. The demand side is systematic; the supply side appears to be fairly random. After all, there are probably only a few hundred potential "serious" third party candidates -- leading politicians, mainly, but Ross Perot proved that the right kind of rich person can do it -- and there's no way of knowing which if any will take the plunge, even if the conditions are perfect. Because, after all, this third-party candidate isn't going to win, so why should she do it?
Where we are right now is that the demand side appears to be fulfilled (with Barack Obama at 39% approval today), although of course it's not hard to imagine him winding up reasonably popular in six (or twelve) months.
What I disagree with Todd about is the importance of the challenger. Apparently he compared this election with 1992, and that's exactly right: it appeared that Democrats had a weak field, and then an unproven nominee...until it "suddenly" no longer mattered what the field looked like apart from the nominee, and that the nominee "suddenly" gained stature and charisma and presidentialness.
So, yes, it wouldn't be surprising at all if over the winter it appears that the Republicans are weak and squabbling and not ready to govern, and that someone sees him self as a white knight and swoops into the race as an independent. And then the nominee, whether Perry or Romney, will (if the economy stays terrible or if Obama is otherwise doing poorly) suddenly find his charisma growing, and the party that was hopelessly divided will line up solidly behind him, and all that ideological rhetoric will be replaced by a move to the center. Or, perhaps, we'll go through this cycle knightless, as has sometimes happened in the past. Remember, the supply side of it is basically random. Either way, though, I doubt if it will make much of a difference whether Perry or Romney is nominated.
Thursday, September 15, 2011
Mind Reading and the District Plan
Over at Outside the Beltway, Doug Mataconis seems to know an awful lot about me. He knows how much I know about Pennsylvania politics (very little, it seems), and he knows how I would react to a Democratic attempt to switch to a Congressional district plan for electoral college vote apportionment in Florida or Texas (see his comments section). Unfortunately, what he doesn't know is who I am; he's taking aim at my Plum Line post yesterday, but he attributes it to Jared Bernstein, who he correctly identifies as a former Obama administration economist. Oops! Which I wouldn't bother with, except it does raise the question of what exactly he thinks he knows. Does he know quite a bit about Ja. Bernstein, and is mistakenly attributing his (alleged) partisanship and woeful lack of PA savvy to me? Is he a regular reader here, and has concluded that I'm a partisan hack with an inadequate background in the mid-Atlantic states, but then somehow managed to transpose our names and professional backgrounds? Or, perhaps...ah, I could go on, but you're getting bored already I'm sure.
OK, enough of that. What I find somewhat more puzzling, although a lot less fun, is Mataconis's endorsement of the district plan in general, but especially based on what it would have done in 2000:
Regardless, it's a silly analysis. There's nothing magic about the district plan that would prevent contested results; that's just how the numbers fell in 2000. Indeed, checking my Polsby & Wildavsky, it turns out that the 1976 election would have been a dead heat had the district plan been adopted nationwide back then.
It's also worth noting that the district plan appears to contain a GOP bias. In the two elections Mataconis cites, Republicans would have done better with it, and the same is true for four of the six elections P & W list in the edition I'm looking at -- with Nixon beating Kennedy in 1960 and the 1976 tie (disclosure: I might have been the one who compiled some of those numbers. I don't really remember, but I think so). Part of why I'm untroubled by the EC is that it doesn't appear to have any clear or consistent partisan bias. At any rate, partisan bias aside, we have a system that, in the four closest recent elections, would have picked the "wrong" winner twice and dumped a third into the House of Representatives, at least after all the lawsuits in all the close districts across the nation were resolved.
I obviously am not a fan of the district system. But what I really want to know from Mataconis, who takes the position that all's fair in politics, is whether he would be okay with the "give the Republicans all of Pennsylvania's Electoral Votes" plan that Matt Yglesias points out would be perfectly Constitutional. Indeed, if every GOP-controlled state Suppose that in fact every GOP-controlled state just cancelled their 2012 presidential election and (legally) awarded their electoral votes to the GOP nominee. Would that be OK?
If not, then there clearly is some line where we don't want to just say "it's politics, live with it." And actual regular readers won't be too surprised to learn that I'd put that line pretty far to the "it's politics" side. But this one -- not the district plan per se, which I think is just a terrible idea, but selectively adopting it in a handful of states in order to create a lopsided playing field in presidential elections -- is clearly a step way too far, in my book.
OK, enough of that. What I find somewhat more puzzling, although a lot less fun, is Mataconis's endorsement of the district plan in general, but especially based on what it would have done in 2000:
Thus, that would have given Bush a total of 288 Electoral Votes to Gore’s 250. And, if you did give Florida to Gore, assuming no shift in the district allocation, the total would have been Bush 286 Gore 252. There would have been no hanging chads, no Constitutional crisis, no Bush v. Gore. Sounds like another reason we should consider adopting this nationwide (his emphasis)Really? I happen to be okay with the status quo on the EC, and I'm willing to accept the possibility of mixed results (that is, a split between the vote winner and the EC winner), but I hardly consider it a feature. Yet Mataconis is so happy with a system that would prevent the plurality vote winner from entering the White House that he doesn't even bother to mention it as a potential problem at all? Never mind that it's not at all clear that he's correct even on his own terms; after all, a 288-250 win with Florida's two ECs contested means that if only 17 Congressional Districts are very close, we could easily have had the mess he hoped to avoid.
Regardless, it's a silly analysis. There's nothing magic about the district plan that would prevent contested results; that's just how the numbers fell in 2000. Indeed, checking my Polsby & Wildavsky, it turns out that the 1976 election would have been a dead heat had the district plan been adopted nationwide back then.
It's also worth noting that the district plan appears to contain a GOP bias. In the two elections Mataconis cites, Republicans would have done better with it, and the same is true for four of the six elections P & W list in the edition I'm looking at -- with Nixon beating Kennedy in 1960 and the 1976 tie (disclosure: I might have been the one who compiled some of those numbers. I don't really remember, but I think so). Part of why I'm untroubled by the EC is that it doesn't appear to have any clear or consistent partisan bias. At any rate, partisan bias aside, we have a system that, in the four closest recent elections, would have picked the "wrong" winner twice and dumped a third into the House of Representatives, at least after all the lawsuits in all the close districts across the nation were resolved.
I obviously am not a fan of the district system. But what I really want to know from Mataconis, who takes the position that all's fair in politics, is whether he would be okay with the "give the Republicans all of Pennsylvania's Electoral Votes" plan that Matt Yglesias points out would be perfectly Constitutional. Indeed, if every GOP-controlled state Suppose that in fact every GOP-controlled state just cancelled their 2012 presidential election and (legally) awarded their electoral votes to the GOP nominee. Would that be OK?
If not, then there clearly is some line where we don't want to just say "it's politics, live with it." And actual regular readers won't be too surprised to learn that I'd put that line pretty far to the "it's politics" side. But this one -- not the district plan per se, which I think is just a terrible idea, but selectively adopting it in a handful of states in order to create a lopsided playing field in presidential elections -- is clearly a step way too far, in my book.
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
September 14, 1971
President Nixon: What about the rich Jews?
Haldeman: Well, that's --
President Nixon: You see, IRS is full of Jews, Bob.
We're in the Oval Office, and Nixon is continuing his rant from the previous day. It's just the president and his Chief of Staff in this conversation.
Ready? Continuing:
--
Haldeman: Right.
President Nixon: That's what I think. I think that's the reason they're after Graham, is the rich Jews.
Haldeman: Well, the point that they took is that they've got to get the kind of guy -- we're not just interested -- we don't want to see the files.
President Nixon: We're trying to get anything on them.
Haldeman: But what we want to do is get a zealot who dislikes those people just as much as the zealot who dislikes Billy Graham...
--
Now, Chuck Colson joins the meeting
--
Colson: Well, Bob Brown has some friends who are going to have signs around the Muskie rallies, [Cleveland (black) Mayor Carl] Stokes for vice president. This raises the point [...]
Haldeman: In fact, [Pat] Buchanan has come in with a suggestion that may make a lot of sense which is that -- he says if we're going to spend $50 million in this campaign, then 10 percent of it, $5 million ought to be devoted --
President Nixon: To the fourth party.
Haldeman: -- to financing a black --
Colson: Shirley Chisholm and Julian Bond.
President Nixon: Do you think that the blacks will vote for a black party?
Haldeman: Some.
Colson: A lot of them will especially if --
Haldeman: Just to show the the Democratic party has no one...But Pat's point is we've got to get a viable candidate -- only if they get a viable candidate. If they got a Julian Bond --
President Nixon: Well, let me suggest this. Might -- $5 million would finance Eugene McCarthy. [...]
President Nixon: All right, Bob. Put that down for discussion -- not for discussion but for action. They should finance and contribute both to McCarthy and to the black thing.
--
A few quick notes.
For whatever reason, during this era what we refer to as "third parties" were invariably referred to as "fourth parties." I don't know exactly when it started or ended, but certainly by 1980 John Anderson was back to being a third party candidate. Of course, George Wallace had run a major campaign in 1968.
$50M in 1971 is somewhere north of $250M today.
Good to see that Pat Buchanan was earning his pay at the WH.
One of the interesting things in the tapes is how Nixon really does have, I don't know, maybe bemused contempt for conservative true believers. He certainly finds them useful, but otherwise he clearly has very little respect for the "zealots."
Haldeman: Well, that's --
President Nixon: You see, IRS is full of Jews, Bob.
We're in the Oval Office, and Nixon is continuing his rant from the previous day. It's just the president and his Chief of Staff in this conversation.
Ready? Continuing:
--
Haldeman: Right.
President Nixon: That's what I think. I think that's the reason they're after Graham, is the rich Jews.
Haldeman: Well, the point that they took is that they've got to get the kind of guy -- we're not just interested -- we don't want to see the files.
President Nixon: We're trying to get anything on them.
Haldeman: But what we want to do is get a zealot who dislikes those people just as much as the zealot who dislikes Billy Graham...
--
Now, Chuck Colson joins the meeting
--
Colson: Well, Bob Brown has some friends who are going to have signs around the Muskie rallies, [Cleveland (black) Mayor Carl] Stokes for vice president. This raises the point [...]
Haldeman: In fact, [Pat] Buchanan has come in with a suggestion that may make a lot of sense which is that -- he says if we're going to spend $50 million in this campaign, then 10 percent of it, $5 million ought to be devoted --
President Nixon: To the fourth party.
Haldeman: -- to financing a black --
Colson: Shirley Chisholm and Julian Bond.
President Nixon: Do you think that the blacks will vote for a black party?
Haldeman: Some.
Colson: A lot of them will especially if --
Haldeman: Just to show the the Democratic party has no one...But Pat's point is we've got to get a viable candidate -- only if they get a viable candidate. If they got a Julian Bond --
President Nixon: Well, let me suggest this. Might -- $5 million would finance Eugene McCarthy. [...]
President Nixon: All right, Bob. Put that down for discussion -- not for discussion but for action. They should finance and contribute both to McCarthy and to the black thing.
--
A few quick notes.
For whatever reason, during this era what we refer to as "third parties" were invariably referred to as "fourth parties." I don't know exactly when it started or ended, but certainly by 1980 John Anderson was back to being a third party candidate. Of course, George Wallace had run a major campaign in 1968.
$50M in 1971 is somewhere north of $250M today.
Good to see that Pat Buchanan was earning his pay at the WH.
One of the interesting things in the tapes is how Nixon really does have, I don't know, maybe bemused contempt for conservative true believers. He certainly finds them useful, but otherwise he clearly has very little respect for the "zealots."
Endless Summer 2009 -- the Biggest Myth of ACA Passage
You might remember the endless months in 2009 in which health care reform passage ground to a halt while Max Baucus pursued negotiations with Republicans, thus allowing Glenn Beck to destroy public support for the bill.
You might remember it, because everyone talks about it all the time -- David Atkins today in a post totally taken apart by Scott Lemieux today referred to it as "useless months of compromise-wrangling with a GOP acting in bad faith." You might remember it.
But it never happened.
Oh, sure, there was a Gang of Six negotiation. And yes, it did slow things down.
How much? By my estimate, about six weeks. Six weeks, most of which was concurrent with August recess, which was basically about four weeks long, and during which nothing would have happened otherwise. Realistically, I think the whole thing probably slowed things by 2-4 weeks, tops.
But it was certainly no more than six weeks.
What's more, I think there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to believe that anything changes in terms of public opinion had the Senate Finance Committee managed to finish their version of the bill before leaving for August recess (which would have required not only no Gang of Six delay, but rushing things in other ways too). It was certainly, in my view at least, entirely unrealistic to expect Senate floor action by August, and virtually all of the public relations damage was done by mid-August.
It is simply not even remotely plausible that the Gang of Six process made any difference to public opinion. As it turned out, six weeks would have been very useful because of the Scott Brown election in January 2010 -- but that's true of other delays in the schedule as well, and there was no real reason in July 2009 to believe that there was a mid-January deadline. What's more, the Gang of Six delay may well have helped, not hurt, as I argued at the time. It helped with the problem of marginal Democrats who were unable to find the bipartisan cover they wanted; by going through the Gang of Six process, Max Baucus and Harry Reid were (in my view) much better able to convince them that Republicans were just being unreasonable and that the only choices available were supporting the bill with all the Democrats or opposing it with crazed rejectionist Republicans.
Much less excusable, however, was the post-Gang set of delays. In general, although it's important to keep in mind that the 111th Congress was highly productive, I've come to believe that there was a major opportunity missed and a major error made by Barack Obama, Harry Reid, and Nancy Pelosi: they erred by sticking with a traditional Congressional schedule, instead of dramatically increasing the tempo. I don't really believe that an increased tempo would have done much for health care; it would have helped it pass in December 2009 instead of March 2010, but I don't really think that mattered very much. I do believe, however, that it was perhaps possible to have rushed through a couple of major pieces of recession-related legislation in spring 2009 had Congress come in and stayed in until they were done; I've suggested that perhaps Dodd-Frank and a bill to convert aid to state governments into an automatic (long-term budget-neutral) stabilizer would have been the things to go for. I'm not sure it could have happened -- remember that there were only 58 Democrats in the Senate at the time -- and there would have been some downside risks for trying it, but I really do believe it was possible, and that not trying was a significant mistake. Neither Obama's popularity (probably) nor the sense of crisis was nearly as high as it was in March 1933, but it was close enough that I suspect they could have used it. And certainly, as I argued then, Congress could have moved quicker on health care and other things (yes, nominations) by keeping to a more accelerated schedule.
All that said, however, a lot of the critics of the process just don't seem to have any sense at all of how long it takes to process major legislation. The thirteen months or so that Congress spent on ACA seems about par for the course to me, given that it was one of the more complex bills you'll ever see, and that it was extremely controversial and difficult to pass, and that Republicans used more or less every procedural avenue available to them to slow things down (some of which in my view the Democrats should have steamrolled over, but nevertheless).
And one way or another, the Gang of Six delay was really just spare change in all of that. The real time consuming negotiations weren't Gang of Six; they were sincere substantive negotiations among bill supporters, and very difficult negotiations between Democratic bill supporters and Democratic Senators who were reluctant to vote for it. I know I'm not going to change anyone's minds about this, but the Gang of Six thing just didn't matter very much, and it certainly wasn't responsible for months of delay.
You might remember it, because everyone talks about it all the time -- David Atkins today in a post totally taken apart by Scott Lemieux today referred to it as "useless months of compromise-wrangling with a GOP acting in bad faith." You might remember it.
But it never happened.
Oh, sure, there was a Gang of Six negotiation. And yes, it did slow things down.
How much? By my estimate, about six weeks. Six weeks, most of which was concurrent with August recess, which was basically about four weeks long, and during which nothing would have happened otherwise. Realistically, I think the whole thing probably slowed things by 2-4 weeks, tops.
But it was certainly no more than six weeks.
What's more, I think there is absolutely no reason whatsoever to believe that anything changes in terms of public opinion had the Senate Finance Committee managed to finish their version of the bill before leaving for August recess (which would have required not only no Gang of Six delay, but rushing things in other ways too). It was certainly, in my view at least, entirely unrealistic to expect Senate floor action by August, and virtually all of the public relations damage was done by mid-August.
It is simply not even remotely plausible that the Gang of Six process made any difference to public opinion. As it turned out, six weeks would have been very useful because of the Scott Brown election in January 2010 -- but that's true of other delays in the schedule as well, and there was no real reason in July 2009 to believe that there was a mid-January deadline. What's more, the Gang of Six delay may well have helped, not hurt, as I argued at the time. It helped with the problem of marginal Democrats who were unable to find the bipartisan cover they wanted; by going through the Gang of Six process, Max Baucus and Harry Reid were (in my view) much better able to convince them that Republicans were just being unreasonable and that the only choices available were supporting the bill with all the Democrats or opposing it with crazed rejectionist Republicans.
Much less excusable, however, was the post-Gang set of delays. In general, although it's important to keep in mind that the 111th Congress was highly productive, I've come to believe that there was a major opportunity missed and a major error made by Barack Obama, Harry Reid, and Nancy Pelosi: they erred by sticking with a traditional Congressional schedule, instead of dramatically increasing the tempo. I don't really believe that an increased tempo would have done much for health care; it would have helped it pass in December 2009 instead of March 2010, but I don't really think that mattered very much. I do believe, however, that it was perhaps possible to have rushed through a couple of major pieces of recession-related legislation in spring 2009 had Congress come in and stayed in until they were done; I've suggested that perhaps Dodd-Frank and a bill to convert aid to state governments into an automatic (long-term budget-neutral) stabilizer would have been the things to go for. I'm not sure it could have happened -- remember that there were only 58 Democrats in the Senate at the time -- and there would have been some downside risks for trying it, but I really do believe it was possible, and that not trying was a significant mistake. Neither Obama's popularity (probably) nor the sense of crisis was nearly as high as it was in March 1933, but it was close enough that I suspect they could have used it. And certainly, as I argued then, Congress could have moved quicker on health care and other things (yes, nominations) by keeping to a more accelerated schedule.
All that said, however, a lot of the critics of the process just don't seem to have any sense at all of how long it takes to process major legislation. The thirteen months or so that Congress spent on ACA seems about par for the course to me, given that it was one of the more complex bills you'll ever see, and that it was extremely controversial and difficult to pass, and that Republicans used more or less every procedural avenue available to them to slow things down (some of which in my view the Democrats should have steamrolled over, but nevertheless).
And one way or another, the Gang of Six delay was really just spare change in all of that. The real time consuming negotiations weren't Gang of Six; they were sincere substantive negotiations among bill supporters, and very difficult negotiations between Democratic bill supporters and Democratic Senators who were reluctant to vote for it. I know I'm not going to change anyone's minds about this, but the Gang of Six thing just didn't matter very much, and it certainly wasn't responsible for months of delay.
Added Points on the PA Electoral College Scheme
My Plum Line post today is about the possibility that Republicans may switch Pennsylvania's electoral vote system to a Maine-like districted plan, thus taking away about half the votes that a Democrat would get from the Keystone state in a national election in which the Dem had a small overall vote plurality (since PA is very marginally a Democratic state). My main point over there was that this is consistent with both Constitutional hardball (that is, violating norms that were never codified) and with the recent trend in which Democrats take advantage of landslides to enact substantive policy while Republicans use landslides to attempt to consolidate power.
I'll add a couple of things for now over here. One is that Matt Yglesias makes the point that states are in fact free to do whatever they want with their electoral votes; the Constitution doesn't say anything about elections at all, let alone how to apportion the votes. While that's true and a useful point to make, the counterargument would be that there probably are things that are so far from the norm that it's perhaps a mistake to extrapolate how people would react from what we know of political behavior in other situations, and a party canceling a presidential election in a state and conferring the EVs on their candidate would be one of those things.
The other thing to add is to send you all to an excellent post by Matt Glassman, who adds some historical perspective and explains why attempts such as these are rare and should remain rare even if state party leaders now would care more about national party success than maximizing state clout. I agree with him in general, but I'm not convinced as he is that Pennsylvania Republicans are unlikely to act. I think Glassman puts a bit too much emphasis on the possibility that Republicans could cost themselves EVs if they act (since Republicans could certainly win PA in 2012). After all, the partisan disincentive is only for the chance of PA going Republican when the rest of the nation goes very narrowly Democratic, so that the lost (Republican) EVs throw the election to the Democrats. That scenario is possible, but at least in my view far less likely than the chance that the opposite would happen, and neutralizing PA would shift the election to the Republican nominee. On the other hand, it is possible that Republicans could be risk-averse, and it's also possible that the threat of national disapproval might push them away from acting.
I'll add a couple of things for now over here. One is that Matt Yglesias makes the point that states are in fact free to do whatever they want with their electoral votes; the Constitution doesn't say anything about elections at all, let alone how to apportion the votes. While that's true and a useful point to make, the counterargument would be that there probably are things that are so far from the norm that it's perhaps a mistake to extrapolate how people would react from what we know of political behavior in other situations, and a party canceling a presidential election in a state and conferring the EVs on their candidate would be one of those things.
The other thing to add is to send you all to an excellent post by Matt Glassman, who adds some historical perspective and explains why attempts such as these are rare and should remain rare even if state party leaders now would care more about national party success than maximizing state clout. I agree with him in general, but I'm not convinced as he is that Pennsylvania Republicans are unlikely to act. I think Glassman puts a bit too much emphasis on the possibility that Republicans could cost themselves EVs if they act (since Republicans could certainly win PA in 2012). After all, the partisan disincentive is only for the chance of PA going Republican when the rest of the nation goes very narrowly Democratic, so that the lost (Republican) EVs throw the election to the Democrats. That scenario is possible, but at least in my view far less likely than the chance that the opposite would happen, and neutralizing PA would shift the election to the Republican nominee. On the other hand, it is possible that Republicans could be risk-averse, and it's also possible that the threat of national disapproval might push them away from acting.
Oy, Friedman
I'm not sure why I've been so Friedman-focused lately (maybe it's just Seth's fault), but...
So Tom Friedman's column today was fine but mostly pedestrian -- it's about climate change -- until he gets to the end:
Let's see...Barack Obama, of course, backed cap-and-trade. Which, Friedman also said earlier, was fine by him; in this column at least, he's equally happy with either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme. So it can't be Obama he's talking about. After all, he was so courageous that he advocated cap-and-trade even without a bogus connection to Social Security!
House Democrats? They passed cap-and-trade. Clearly not them, either.
Senate liberals? Nope.
What about Rick Perry, who Friedman calls out in the column, and other Republicans who disagree with Friedman about climate? Surely their problem isn't courage, is it? At least not on this issue. Perhaps Friedman thinks they're nuts, or corrupt, or foolish, but it's hard to see how courage figures in to it.
That leaves two groups who Friedman might be talking about: moderate Democrats and Republicans who actually believe that climate change is a real and important problem, but oppose doing anything about it because they fear electoral consequences. And you know what? If Friedman wrote a column saying that those groups lack courage and should be willing to stand up for what they believe even at the possible cost of their electoral careers, I'd probably just stay quiet (I'm not sure I would agree, but it's a very legitimate argument). Or if wrote a column just about conservative deniers and how they poison the debate at the expense of their constituents. Or if he wrote a column about Republican indifference to most of domestic policy including climate, or a column about how the choice is very clear for those who believe that government should act on these issues.
Oh, but wait! Friedman seems to have missed the part where Obama and Congressional liberals supported cap-and-trade. He does realize that Republicans blocked it, but he claims that Obama "has chosen not to push for a price signal for political reasons." Hey, Tom Friedman: if Republicans blocked something, doesn't that imply that someone was pushing for it?
You know what? What set me off this time wasn't really Friedman (once again) apparently having no idea what the President of the United States has done during his time in office. No, it was what he thinks that president -- and all other politicians -- really need to do. Pass the policies Friedman wants? Nope. Read that quotation above again: what he really thinks they need to do is to ask a question.
Oy.
So Tom Friedman's column today was fine but mostly pedestrian -- it's about climate change -- until he gets to the end:
Would you rather cut Social Security and Medicare or pay a little more per gallon of gas and make the country stronger, safer and healthier? It still amazes me that our politicians have the courage to send our citizens to war but not to ask the public that question.What could he possibly mean by that?
Let's see...Barack Obama, of course, backed cap-and-trade. Which, Friedman also said earlier, was fine by him; in this column at least, he's equally happy with either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme. So it can't be Obama he's talking about. After all, he was so courageous that he advocated cap-and-trade even without a bogus connection to Social Security!
House Democrats? They passed cap-and-trade. Clearly not them, either.
Senate liberals? Nope.
What about Rick Perry, who Friedman calls out in the column, and other Republicans who disagree with Friedman about climate? Surely their problem isn't courage, is it? At least not on this issue. Perhaps Friedman thinks they're nuts, or corrupt, or foolish, but it's hard to see how courage figures in to it.
That leaves two groups who Friedman might be talking about: moderate Democrats and Republicans who actually believe that climate change is a real and important problem, but oppose doing anything about it because they fear electoral consequences. And you know what? If Friedman wrote a column saying that those groups lack courage and should be willing to stand up for what they believe even at the possible cost of their electoral careers, I'd probably just stay quiet (I'm not sure I would agree, but it's a very legitimate argument). Or if wrote a column just about conservative deniers and how they poison the debate at the expense of their constituents. Or if he wrote a column about Republican indifference to most of domestic policy including climate, or a column about how the choice is very clear for those who believe that government should act on these issues.
Oh, but wait! Friedman seems to have missed the part where Obama and Congressional liberals supported cap-and-trade. He does realize that Republicans blocked it, but he claims that Obama "has chosen not to push for a price signal for political reasons." Hey, Tom Friedman: if Republicans blocked something, doesn't that imply that someone was pushing for it?
You know what? What set me off this time wasn't really Friedman (once again) apparently having no idea what the President of the United States has done during his time in office. No, it was what he thinks that president -- and all other politicians -- really need to do. Pass the policies Friedman wants? Nope. Read that quotation above again: what he really thinks they need to do is to ask a question.
Oy.
More Questions For Economists & Other Experts
I did one of these back in August, and I sort of liked it, so here's a follow-up. You'll note that one question here is a repeat, since I never saw an answer. Hey, economists! Someone have an estimate for this?
1. I'm not sure whether this is a question for economists, IR specialists, political economy types, or what, but I've been wondering about it for a while now: what, if anything, should the US (and Barack Obama in particular) have been doing for the last three years about the various problems in Europe? Is the general sense that the Obama administration is handling it well, or badly? Or is there simply nothing for the US to do (which seems highly unlikely to me, but again, I'm not an expert on it). I've seen very, very little reporting about what the US is doing, should be doing, could be doing.
2. Speaking of Europe, here's a more directly economic question...just how important have Europe's problems been for the US economy? I'm definitely not trying to excuse Barack Obama's performance here (see question #1 above), just wondering how much of the failure of the recovery to gain momentum is a result of Italy and Greece and the rest of it.
3. And here's the repeat question: I've seen estimates of how much state budget contraction has hurt the economy. Those seem to be based on direct effects. What about indirect effects? There sure are a lot of teachers, cops, firefighters, and prison guards who must have been very worried about their jobs over the last year and therefore didn't spend a lot of money; do we know what that does to the economy?
1. I'm not sure whether this is a question for economists, IR specialists, political economy types, or what, but I've been wondering about it for a while now: what, if anything, should the US (and Barack Obama in particular) have been doing for the last three years about the various problems in Europe? Is the general sense that the Obama administration is handling it well, or badly? Or is there simply nothing for the US to do (which seems highly unlikely to me, but again, I'm not an expert on it). I've seen very, very little reporting about what the US is doing, should be doing, could be doing.
2. Speaking of Europe, here's a more directly economic question...just how important have Europe's problems been for the US economy? I'm definitely not trying to excuse Barack Obama's performance here (see question #1 above), just wondering how much of the failure of the recovery to gain momentum is a result of Italy and Greece and the rest of it.
3. And here's the repeat question: I've seen estimates of how much state budget contraction has hurt the economy. Those seem to be based on direct effects. What about indirect effects? There sure are a lot of teachers, cops, firefighters, and prison guards who must have been very worried about their jobs over the last year and therefore didn't spend a lot of money; do we know what that does to the economy?
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