What I'd add to that is just that context matters, too. Greenberg emphasizes that the long stretch of the twentieth century during which the Senate went along with the president was historically unusual and attributes it to deference to presidents, but I suspect that a larger portion of it was that divided government was less common in that era. Bork's nomination actually came just after an extended period of unified government, at least between the White House and the Senate. Ronald Reagan basically ignored that and tried to make a highly ideological pick; it's not a surprise that it didn't work. The similarly ideological Scalia pick (and the Rehnquist elevation) might have succeeded because Bork did such a terrible job of acting "mainstream" in his hearing, but a larger part of it was that the 1986 elections intervened, with Democrats regaining control after six years.
Back to Greenberg:
The Democratic campaign against Bork in 1987, then, wasn’t anything new; it merely resumed a dynamic that had been temporarily obscured — one as old as the republic and a perfectly fair, if often cynical, deployment of the Senate’s power to advise and consent.
The use of the verb “to Bork” may seem like a dig at an important intellectual figure in conservative jurisprudence and a martyr of the political right. But it really represents an unjustified triumph of a right-wing narrative that wrongly imagines blocking judicial nominees on ideological grounds to have begun with a gang of liberal Democrats — rather than with Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats opposed to the legal revolutions of the 1960s and keen to hand Lyndon Johnson a political defeat. It has given the legitimate restraint of presidential power a bad name.
And: nice catch!