Showing posts with label 2010 cycle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2010 cycle. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 12, 2012

The Big Myth of Rejectionism

Here's how things are around here sometimes. I saw that Ezra Klein had written a post about "The Myth of the Presidential Mandate" late last week and open it in a tab. Didn't read it right away: I figured immediately that it was going to be a smart piece and that I'd agree with it, and since I wasn't really interested at that point in piling on about mandates, I'd put it aside for later. And when I did get to it last night, you know what? It was a smart piece, and I do agree with it.

Except.

Late in the piece, and separate from the mandate issue, Klein repeats what I think is one of the biggest myths out there: that rejectionism is the obvious strategy for the out-party because it works:
Minorities don’t become majorities by helping the other party govern successfully. When things go well, voters reward the party in charge. More often, minorities become majorities by grinding the gears of government to a halt, amping up partisanship and doing everything they can to make sure voters are disgusted with Washington.
That's been accepted wisdom for at least Republicans ever since 1994, and for everyone else after the first two years of the Obama presidency. But I don't think it's true.

Yes, both the 1994 and 2010 election cycles were marked by GOP rejectionism -- opposing every presidential initiative, regardless of what it was, as successfully as possible.

And yet: I don't really think it's fair to think of the 2006 Democratic landslide that way. Democrats certainly did oppose plenty of George W. Bush's initiatives, sometimes successfully, but I'm not sure I recall anything that Democrats had previously supported which they switch on in order to sink the president. I wouldn't characterize the 1980 or 1986 election cycles that way, either, even though they both produced flips in the Senate. The Democrats did quite well on the House side in 1982, despite certainly not practicing Gingrich-style rejectionism in 1981 and 1982.

Now, I'm certainly not arguing that out-parties should never oppose the majority. Of course not. But a full-on rejectionist strategy? At best, the effects are unproven.

I'd add two things to that. The first is about rejectionism working on a symbolic or messaging level. For that, one would think that choosing rejectionism over compromise on the most high visibility things is far more likely to have any effect at all on public opinion than is, say, blocking district or even circuit-level judicial nominees. Because, of course, the general public is not going to know about that. You have to go pretty far along a tenuous causal path to believe that the latter has any effect on voters at all (it would have to depend on the press processing the whole thing, and sending out a different signals based on those failures than it would have sent otherwise).

The second is that rejectionism that has real, voter-noticed effects is also going to be relatively rare, although presumably the economic crisis in 2009 was one of those times. Again, however, that speaks to the question of compromise or conflict mainly on the economy.

What that suggests to me is that all-out, across-the-board, rejectionism is probably electorally irrelevant. It may -- may -- make sense in electoral terms to oppose (regardless of policy preferences) an administration's  most visible legislation, and especially in dicey economic times it make make electoral sense to oppose bills that would help the economy. But that's about it; most of the rest of what Republicans have done over the last few years probably didn't matter.

Rejectionism can contain risks, too. It can hurt the reputation of a party if elites believe that the party is not acting constructively; rejectionism also presumably entails asking Members to take some tough votes (that is, if rejectionism is a deliberate strategy and not just the residue of polarization). More to the point: if Members do have policy goals, rejectionism will likely be terrible strategy most of the time.

Again, I certainly expect the out-party to oppose much of what the president wants to do. The question, however, is whether they should, for electoral reasons, oppose everything -- even when they can make policy gains by compromising. I'm not at all convinced that's a smart strategy, and I don't think that 1993 and 2010 proved that it is.

Friday, March 9, 2012

ACA and 2010, Revisited

Lots of blogging talk yesterday about a new paper forthcoming from Brendan Nyhan, Eric McGhee, John Sides, Seth Masket and Steven Greene showing the effects of ACA on the 2010 elections. Their finding is that (1) the final ACA House vote seems to account for the difference between expected Democratic losses from the economy and other fundamental factors alone and the actual losses the Democrats experienced in 2010; and, (2) that the way that actually happened was that voting for ACA made a Member appear far more liberal, and therefore voters seeking to vote for the candidate ideologically closest to them flipped to the Republican. Seth explains it here; John explains it here, Brendan here, and here's the ungated paper. In my view it's an excellent contribution.

That said: I still have the same critique of it that I had when the preliminary studies were published, and which Kevin Collins tweeted, and which Jonathan Chait wrote about yesterday.

The two main points that Chait covers are: suppose that the bill failed in the House, with all vulnerable Democrats voting against it and therefore dooming it (but avoiding the effect that Nyhan et al. find). What's the effect to Barack Obama and to Democrats in general for failing to pass anything? (This one is complicated, as Chait points out, because the House had already backed the bill the first time around). That's a good question, and one which the authors themselves raise in their concluding discussion.

Or, what happens if the Democrats simply never move forward on the bill in the first place? Would some other issue simply have substituted for health care reform in GOP advertising, and thus have achieved the same effect -- and meanwhile, what damage (if any) would it have caused among liberals?

The truth is that we don't know. It's certainly possible that there was something special about health care reform that sparked such a strong reaction, and that (in the Nyhan et al. paper) convinced swing voters that Members were more liberal than they otherwise would have believed. On the other hand, it's also possible that with health care out of the picture that something else would have worked just as well.

Thinking about it...on the one hand, there's the evidence that those Members who didn't vote for ACA did not, in fact, get a substitute effect. That is, one would think that in those districts their opponents would simply plug in the stimulus, or cap-and-trade, or some provision of an appropriations bill and pound in the message that the vote for whatever it was proved that Member Smith was very liberal. Perhaps the GOP and their various candidates weren't flexible enough to do that. Or, perhaps the local advertising only worked when it was accompanied by the general  information environment we actually had. That is: no health care bill at all, and Rush and Beck and the rest pound on Substitute Issue B and therefore local advertising against Member Smith for voting Yes on B works. Given health care, and Rush and Beck and the rest bounding on it, then a lone campaign claiming that Yes on Substitute Issue B proves extreme liberalism doesn't work. Or, again, perhaps there's something particular about health care in general or the ACA in particular that's doing the work, and it's really true that without a bill, there's no effect.

That's pretty much the response that John gives this morning -- that for the Republicans, finding an effective Substitute Issue B is easier said than done. For example, on the stimulus John says "Critiques of the stimulus amounted to garden-variety “wasteful government spending.”  I’m not sure that’s as, um, stimulating as “National Socialist Health Care: The Final Solution” and “death panels” and the like."

But that raises another question. Even if it really is ACA that's doing the work, we still don't know what it is about ACA that's doing it. The mandate? The "government takeover"? The "death panels"? The Medicare cuts? The spending? The taxes? The notion that health care should be a "right"? Simply an association with Obama? Some of those would seem to sort with "liberal" more than others, but which ones were actually moving voters towards concluding that their ACA-supporting Members were very liberal? Of course, you can't do everything in one paper, so I hardly would blame the authors here for not answering that question. But without knowing what it was about ACA that was so offensive to these voters, it's very hard to know whether finding Substitute Issue B would be easy or hard. After all, ACA wasn't really a "National Socialist" scheme with "death panels." So no health care bill, and maybe those slurs or other similar ones get thrown at something else.

Basically, it seems to me that their finding supports two stories, both absolutely fascinating.

One is that health care reform, as enacted in the ACA, was a uniquely dangerous issue for House Democrats, and supporting it may have cost them the election -- through the mechanism they describe, in which supporting the bill gets translated into "too liberal."

The other is that under some conditions (such as the election of a new Democratic president and unified Democratic control), Republicans are able to use one issue to demonize mainstream Members of the House as "too" liberal. It's a limited ability; it works only when both the national information environment and local campaigns are making the same point. But the particular bill selected is incidental to the effect.

I don't see any way in what they've reported to distinguish between these two stories, both of which seem entirely plausible to me. Especially since one might suppose that the part about the GOP-influenced national information environment would be more effective in 1993 than 1977, and more effective in 2009 than 1993, given the rise of the GOP-aligned partisan press. I expect we'll get more research that with any luck will clarify some of this going forward.


UPDATE: Don't miss Eric's response below.

Tuesday, April 5, 2011

Assessing the Effects of Votes in Congress

I don't think I've blogged yet about the new paper by Seth Masket and Steve Greene showing the costs to individual Democratic Members of Congress for voting for health care reform during the 111th Congress. It's an excellent paper, and a useful corrective to the general conventional wisdom (among scholars of elections and Congress, at least) that voters are too inattentive to have their vote affected by actions taken by their representatives.

That said, the one caveat I have about this kind of research is that they only study two of the possible outcomes Members were faced with when casting their votes: legislation becomes law, and the Member votes either aye or nay. As I said way back early in the health care debate (can't find it right now, alas), it was likely that a lot of Democrats believed that their best course of action was to vote no while the bill passed. However, alas for the party, if too many did that, then they would wind up with no bill at all. Not only might they prefer having the bill pass even if it put some Members in electoral jeopardy, but it's also possible that a failed bill might have had severe electoral consequences of its own.

Now, we have no idea whether such an effect was possible, let alone whether that hypothetical effect was larger than the direct effect Seth and Steve estimate for voting for the bill. We also don't know whether passing the bill will ultimately help Barack Obama win reelection (which might incidentally help Democrats lower on the ballot in 2012 -- although it could then hurt the Dems in 2014! Hey, this stuff can get complicated!). So I'm not criticizing, at all, the Masket and Greene study. Just pointing out that it's also worth keeping in mind the larger context.

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

Mandates

I feel obliged to mention it every time Matt Bai writes a decent piece, and I think he's basically in the right direction in today's piece on the fiction of electoral mandates.  This is good:
Of course, no party leader or strategist ever wants to admit — even to himself — that he owes his victory solely to the public’s disdain for the status quo, any more than a great general would want to believe that he won the decisive battle because his enemy ran out of bullets. Once you win, the human tendency is to credit the gravitational force of your own ideas, to assume that you made a more compelling and more substantive case than you actually did.

I'm afraid I can't help nitpicking a little.  Bai thinks, correctly, that reading the Constitution on the House floor is symbolic; alas, he believes that the business of citing specific Constitutional authority is "not-so-symbolic."  He's wrong; it's entirely for show, as is the repeal vote scheduled on health care.  Well, the latter is real legislative action, but since it has no chance to go anywhere beyond the House it's really more symbolic than substantive.  The Constitutional authority thing is purely symbolic.

Bai is also on shaky ground when he says that "voters endorsed the Tea Party ideal of a radically more parsimonious federal government," even though he qualifies it nicely by noting that "they haven’t yet gotten their heads around the excruciating choices it entails — or even the relatively easy ones. And that’s not really much of a mandate, when you think about it."  Truth is, we don't really even know if the first half of that statement is true.   It's also not really true that Barack Obama and the Democrats "came to enact a series of expensive new programs without ever really bothering to explain to the public why such investments were necessary or how they would be paid for."  They may not have been successful with those explanations (although I wouldn't put it that way), but they certainly did "bother" to try to make their case.

I could go on nitpicking, but that's not really very nice of me.  It's a good piece.  He doesn't quite say that mandates are all fiction, but he's most of the way there, and the point he makes that winners are apt to believe in their own fictions is a good one.  Of course, sometimes the fiction becomes true in a sense, if everyone believes it.  It would still be a fiction to describe that sort of mandate as what the voters said, or wanted.

Friday, December 24, 2010

Very Very Temporary

Via Sargent, I see that the historian Julian Zelizer is arguing that the electoral comeback of Republicans was and should have been unexpected from the perspective of November 2008:
[O]ne of the major stories of Obama’s presidency has been the revitalization of conservatism. Within only two years, Republicans have regained control of the House of Representatives through a dramatic midterm election. There are now an abundance of Republicans, some old (Newt Gingrich) and some new (Paul Ryan and Sarah Palin), who are jumping over each other to campaign for president in 2012. Republicans have been able to join hands, despite their differences, by using President Obama as their foil...

It is too easy to say that pundits simply exaggerated the crisis of conservatism. The problems facing the right toward the end of Bush’s presidency were very real and their ability to rebound was not inevitable. 
I'm really not convinced.  I don't think a GOP comeback is surprising at all -- yes, the extent of GOP gains in November 2010 were at the high end of the range, but some sort of bounce back was expected, certainly by standard political science models. 

As far as public opinion is concerned, John Sides had an excellent post up recently showing that opinion often moves against policy: that is, when Washington enacts conservative policies, people get more liberal, and vice versa. 

The same thing is basically true about election results.  Indeed, the most notable thing about unified liberal or conservative control of the presidency and Congress is how rare and brief it's been since the New Deal.  Yes, FDR did in fact keep large liberal majorities intact for about six years.  But since then, there really haven't been extended periods of either liberal or conservative working majorities in House, Senate, and White House at the same time.   Even under unified government (as in 1977-1980 or 2003-2006), majorities have typically been too small to allow either side to enact their core agenda, or at least much of it. 

If in fact people did believe that 2008 (and 2004, and 1994, and 1992, and 1980, among others) were going to be different, I'm afraid that a fair amount of the blame should go to the now-rejected theory of "critical elections" and "realignment."  Most (but not all) political scientists now, I think, have given up on thinking about party control in that way, but it has shown up and still sometimes appears in the textbooks that we use to teach our Intro to American Politics classes, which means there are a lot of people out there who have Officially Certified Learning that are expecting a critical election one of these years. 

Meanwhile, although it's obviously correct that Republicans did very will in 2010, I'm not at all sure that the diagnosis of conservatives that people were making two years ago was very far off.  The Republican Party is still unpopular, and at least to my reading conservatives are still far from having a viable policy agenda to meet the major issues of the day -- unlike, say, their agenda in 1980.  What pundits missed, perhaps, is that it's very possible for a party to win elections despite all those problems. 

At any rate, the point is that it was a mistake in 2008 to believe that there was anything permanent about the Democrats' success, just as it was a mistake in 2004 to believe that there was anything permanent about the Republicans' success.  That's just not how American politics works.  We have two parties: bad things are going to happen, the in-party is going to be blamed, and the out-party is going to benefit regardless of what it's been up to in the meantime.  That dynamic works whether the in-party is actually at fault or not.  It even works, as Democrats discovered this year, when the out-party was at least possibly just as guilty of causing the things that people are upset about as the in-party was. 

That doesn't mean that politicians can't affect events, which then will affect elections -- just as politicians can even affect election results directly by running good candidates and good campaigns (even if the latter only matters around the margins).  So while I'm all for analyzing just why Republicans wound up doing so well in November, and I'm open to the possibility that Congressional strategy or the other things Zelizer identifies were important factors, the real story is that any time someone offers to be that a defeated party will takes years to recover, you want to accept that bet.

Thursday, December 23, 2010

Comeback Talk

I'll point out two pretty good pieces debunking "comeback" talk -- one from Brian Beutler, who emphasizes that getting some comparatively easy stuff done in the lame duck session doesn't really change the math in the 112 Congress, and one from Jay Cost, who is absolutely correct to characterize Barack Obama's approval ratings as flat, not surging.

Although I will note that since Cost wrote, Obama has slipped up to 49% per Gallup -- so there might be a bit of a bounce.  Or perhaps just some positive random variation. 

But mainly, I think both are correct.  Some success in the lame duck session isn't going to have a major effect on Obama's approval rating over time, and come the new year, we'll have a new Congress and a lot more Republicans, and that will have real consequences, regardless of how the December spin war goes.

What does strike me, however, is the big dog that didn't bark: the Democrats, from Obama to the Hill to (near as I can tell) most bloggers, talk show hosts, and activists...they didn't panic.  Despite a devastating loss in the midterms, Democrats did not for the most part convince themselves that they were destined to be a minor party, did not for the most part declare factional war, did not for the most part attack the president, the Speaker, or the Majority Leader.  Certainly, both Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi easily survived any potential challenges. 

Moreover, as far as I can see, the neutral press mostly went along. 

In all, it was a sharp contrast with 1994, when the Democrats moved straight to fatalism and despair.  Indeed, it was a big of a contrast with winter 20092010, when Democrats seemed to expect themselves to panic and self-immolate after the Massachusetts Senate race. 

Granted, this is mostly impressions and speculation, but I suspect that those who remember 1994 and were paying attention then and now would agree. 

Why?  I suspect a large part of it is just the pattern.  If I had to describe what's happened (and again, this is all speculative, I admit), Democrats in 2008 began by thinking "This Is It!  This time is going to be different!"  By August 2009, and then through January 2010, that attitude was replaced with "It's Clinton all over again."  So the election disaster was already factored in by January 2010, but the legislative victories, beginning with health care reform, were basically pleasant surprises.  And now, Democrats believe they've seen this film before; a midterm landslide is supposed to be the prelude to comfortable reelection, even if it doesn't yield a newly favorable policy environment. 

Of course, even if I'm correct about all that, it doesn't necessarily mean it played a major role in getting things passed in the lame duck session; a lot of that was just about having the votes, and being willing to cut deals when they were available.  Still, the Democrats certainly could have tried to do less, so I think there may be at least a bit of something to explain, and I'll go with the favorable side of the Clinton pattern as, perhaps, a bit of what happened.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Nancy Pelosi Is Unpopular. What Matters Is Whether She's Good.

William Galston writes about the outgoing Speaker's poor polling numbers:
This is especially significant because, other than President Obama, Nancy Pelosi is the best-known and most visible public face of the Democratic Party.
...and other than Barry Bonds, Bobby Bonds Jr. was the best ballplayer son of Bobby Bonds.

It's early yet in postelection analysis, but I'll take any wager offered that at the end of the day, opinions of Nancy Pelosi will turn out to have absolutely no explanatory power on the 2010 vote.  Zero.

Now, one can make the case that the policy choices the Democrats made in 2009-2010 hurt them.  And one could even make the case that Pelosi moved House Democrats too far to the left, although I think that's a lot harder to show; I don't think there's a lot of evidence that what they actually did is far to the left of where House moderates are.  For example, as far as I know no Member of the House got in trouble for supporting radical stuff in the original House health care bill that was stripped by the Senate.  Whatever the effects of health care on the 2010 elections, it was based on a bill that won the support of Evan Bayh, Joe Lieberman, and Ben Nelson. 

Now, I do think that Dave Weigel has some good questions about Pelosi, including:
Progressives have convinced themselves that Pelosi's Democrats were unfairly punished because the Senate didn't act on the legislation she passed. Well, sure. But I assume she could have gotten senators on the phone.to ask whether the bills she was passing had chances of success. What was the point of passing a cap and trade bill far more painful to coal country and business than the one that Democrats knew could get through the Senate? 
It's a good question -- but there may be a good answer.  It may be that Pelosi, Harry Reid, and the White House were in fact working closely on climate/energy, but someone -- not Pelosi -- did a lousy job of counting votes in the Senate.  It could be that the overwhelming majority of the House Democratic caucus knew exactly what was likely, but still wanted to take the risk of passing the bill.  I don't know, and I'd love to see good research about House/Senate relations during the 111th Congress.  I do think there's a good chance that Pelosi and Reid and the White House erred repeatedly in that area, but  we need more information.

Regardless, that's all about how good Pelosi really is at playing the inside game.  Galston considers it to be "common sense" that the public relations aspects of the job are more important, but he's going to need some evidence for that beyond Pelosi's lousy poll ratings.  There's no reason to believe that voters thought they were choosing a Speaker when they voted, and lots of evidence over the years that such things are unlikely to matter.  Even if she is the second most visible Democrat.

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

In Partial Support of Partisan Hack Debate Moderators

Fascinating exchange today between Andrew Sullivan and Alex Massie about Republican presidential debates, which are coming way sooner than you think -- just a few months from now, in fact. 

In response to Hugh Hewitt's suggestion that conservative talk show hosts act as moderators for the first debate, Sullivan was unimpressed: "It's like Stalin being grilled by the Politburo."  Massie, however, thought it might be fun, besides that it would be a good chance to see candidates fail to stand up to Rush or Hannity, and the resulting obsequiousfest would mean that
Hewitt's notion could produce a debate that might actually reveal something useful and even important about the field. Just not, perhaps, in quite the way he imagines. 
I think they both have decent points.  On the one hand,  there's really no shortage of chances to have Republican candidates play up to the world view of Republican talk show hosts -- they're all going to go on Rush, Beck, Hannity, and Hewitt, and we all know in advance that none of them is going to dare contradict any goofy thing that those hosts ask them.  On the other hand, that's a good reason for Republicans to avoid that sort of debate, because it's not clear what it would accomplish that normal interviews wouldn't also produce.

To step back a bit: what's the point of these pre-primary debates in the first place?  Surely not to amuse bloggers, as much as I hope that they'll do so.

No, for the parties, the point of debates is, in part, to test whether the candidates are up one aspect of the fall campaign; and, in part, to pressure candidates to go on record on issues that matter to important party groups or factions.  The party also wants partisans, rank-and-file voters and activists, to learn about its candidates  In addition, the debates are, at least potentially, a general advertisement for the party to those who are not serious partisans.

The debates certainly are not a competitive event in which the party seeks to crown a winner.  Nor are they, from the point of view of the party, an opportunity to subject their leading candidates to tough grilling and its sad but common cousin, gotcha questioning.  The latter might be costs the party is willing to pay, but they aren't goals the party holds.

So, what gets a party to its goals?  For passing information along to party activists and voters, it doesn't matter who the moderators are; you want to maximize ratings among those groups, so the question becomes a pragmatic one of whether partisans are more interested in watching Rush and Hannity or Brian Williams. 

For advertising the party to independent or marginal voters, I assume that the best plan is partisan moderators serving up softball questions -- although, again, if that drives away marginal voters, a party might have to think of the tradeoffs involved.

For getting candidates on record, reliably partisan moderators have the advantage of (perhaps) having a better sense of what key party groups care about.  If I were a GOP leader, however, I'd be careful to limit this to solid hacks; you don't want to further empower rogue conservative hosts who have their own agendas which may not match that of the party in general -- or give the moderators a platform for whatever idiosyncratic issues boost ratings, whether or not key party groups care about them.  Of course, that can be a problem with the neutral press, as well.

For showing the candidates' ability to deal with questions from the neutral press and to handle the general election debates, it's pretty obvious that moderators with no partisan affiliation are best. I can say that were I a Republican leader thinking about which candidate(s) to support, I would want some reassurance that Sarah Palin is now capable of dealing with a Wolf Blitzer type without sounding like a complete idiot. 

On that last point: Massie says that "Lord knows, there will be plenty of opportunities for Wolf Blitzer and Brian Williams and the rest to ask dumb questions," but that's just Sullivan's point: it's not at all clear that GOP presidential candidates in 2012 will give what were once standard interviews with the nonpartisan press.  Once upon a time, the nonpartisan press controlled such a large share of the information market that candidates had no choice but to submit to whatever interviews those outlets demanded.  That's no longer true.  Party leaders would be well advised, I think, to take steps to avoid the party's tendency towards closed information loops, and the debates offer an opportunity for that.

Looking at the various party goals, it seems to me that there are advantages for both approaches -- and since there are typically quite a few debates, there's plenty of room for variety.  The truth is that it's just historical happenstance that outside reporters moderate these things and not, say, formal party officials (it's not unusual for local party organizations to host candidate fairs before local election primaries, nor does anyone think that strange). 

So sign me up for Hannity on the Republican side, and Maddow the next time the Democrats have to do it, at least as part of the mix. 

Monday, November 15, 2010

Next! (Why Romney and Palin May Be Overrated)

I don't know who the Republicans are going to nominate for president in 2012.  I do, however, want to take another shot at knocking down one piece of conventional wisdom as it applies to the 2012 contest: that Republicans habitually nominate whoever is next in line, which would presumably mean that either Mitt Romney or Sarah Palin will be nominated.  It just isn't true, or at least it isn't true in any sense that helps us understand this election cycle.

Let's go to the history.

First of all, there's a clear dividing line when it comes to the nomination process; the McGovern-Fraser reforms (which took place on the Democratic side, but affected Republicans as well, as did campaign finance rules changes around the same time) are a clean break; we're only interested in the modern era, which began in 1972.

Second, we can ignore all those cases in which a sitting president was renominated.  For the GOP, that eliminates 1972, 1976, 1984, 1992. and 2004.  I'd recommend also eliminating those cases in which a sitting VP was nominated to succeed a retiring president, further knocking out 1988.  It's true that the latter case(s) could be competitive, and the former have been on occasion, but I think it's fair to say they don't really tell us much about 2012.

So, for the Republicans, what does that leave?  1980, 1996, 2000, and 2008.  That's it. 

In 1980, the Republicans nominated a third-time candidate who had nearly defeated a sitting president four years back, and who had been the clear leader of the dominant conservative wing of the party for about fifteen years (oh, and he was also a two-term governor of the nation's largest state).  In 1996, the Republicans nominated a third-time candidate who had been the clear runner-up to a sitting VP in 1988, on the national ballot as the VP nominee in 1976, and, by the way, was also GOP leader in the Senate. 

So it's no surprise that Republicans nominated Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Bob Dole in 1996, and it tells us virtually nothing about the 2012 field, because there really is no living Republican who can come close to the resume that Reagan, or even Dole, brought to the show. 

The problem is that this leaves only two cycles in which Republicans had no obvious nominee.  In 2008, after quite a bit of uncertainty, they eventually nominated a previous candidate, the runner-up from 2000 who had no other obvious objective credentials.  In 2000, they had a lot less trouble settling on a first-time candidate who was governor of a big state and the son of a GOP president. 

At best, then, Republicans are one for two in nominating the "next in line" when the next in line isn't obvious.  In 2000, those with a claim at being next in line were former VP Dan Quayle, former VP nominee Jack Kemp, and 1996 candidates Steve Forbes, Lamar Alexander, and Pat Buchanan.  First-timer George W. Bush clobbered those from that group that tried.  In 2008, the same group, essentially, was still available, along with Dick Cheney.  None of them, for various reasons, wound up making the race, leaving it wide open, and there it remained until it was finally settled well into the primary season. 

So the 2012 cycle will be only the third truly open nomination without a serious heavyweight in modern GOP history.  Now, it may well be that Republicans are simply inclined to follow hierarchies (although don't ask Lisa Murkowski about that!), and that they saw Bush in 2000 and McCain in 2008 as more "next in line" than the others.  But that doesn't really tell us that Romney or Palin will (necessarily) be helped by that tendency; it implies only that whoever does benefit will seem, after the fact, to have been the logical next in line. 

For more, see some good posts from last year by Ed Kilgore and Josh Putnam.  Kilgore's post overlaps with what I said above, although my accounting is a bit different; Putnam critiques Kilgore, and says it's frontrunners who win.  Both are correct!  What I'd say is that sometimes it's fairly obvious who the frontrunner is (or will be), and sometimes it isn't; when it isn't, it seems to me that the way to find the frontrunner is to look at objective factors such as endorsements, money raised, and polling, rather than trying to puzzle out who is supposedly entitled to it.  But not just polling, especially not this early; as I said the other day, if Republican leaders rally around a candidate, name recognition and thus good polling numbers will rapidly follow.

Friday, November 12, 2010

Reform 3: Change for the Parties?

Item:  Lisa Murkowski lost her primary fair and square...and then decided to run as a write-in candidate, with quite a bit of support from one major faction of Alaska Republicans against the duly chosen nominee, and as of this writing appears to have won.

Item: Dan Maes won the Colorado GOP primary for governor fair and square, but looked like a lousy candidate...so the party leaders tried to get him to quit, and when that didn't work, the party wound up rallying around Tom Tancredo, who had filed as a third-party candidate, effectively ditching the duly nominated candidate.

Item: In the special election last year for New York's 23th district, a party committee chose a nominee -- and then Republicans, mostly led by national Republicans outside the district, decided to support a candidate who filed as a third-party candidate, leading to the duly chosen nominee quitting the race and endorsing the Democrat.

OK, we have three sort of similar cases; does that make a trend?

I can't really say it is; I don't know.  If it is, however, I can say what kind of a trend it is, and why it matters; as it stands, I can only say that it's something worth watching.  The issue is losing factions in party nomination fights refusing to accept the outcome -- and having a plausible means of fighting on.  Traditionally, the only options available to losing candidates were exit (that is, just sitting out the election) or switching sides.  The former was regularly practiced; the latter was an extreme measure, since there was no way of going back in most cases.

It may turn out that under current conditions, the "fight on" option is suddenly much more viable.  Why?  I have no idea.  Perhaps money is easier to come by; perhaps it has to do with the growth of a true national party (remember, national political parties are a recent development in American politics); perhaps it has something to do with communications technology; perhaps it's a consequence of norms that have broken down.  Perhaps it has to do with changes in the structure of parties.

Or perhaps it's a fluke, and we won't see more of these.

It matters because...well, let me hand this over to David Karol, party (and party network) scholar.  Here's what he said after NY-23:
If factions in a party do not respect their own nomination process that is a big problem for it. Alan Ware has shown that part of the reason party leaders supported the creation of the Australian ballot and, some years later, the establishment of primaries was that they needed a nomination process that would appear legitimate to losers in order to minimize splits. Part of being a successful party is accepting that you fight your fight inside the organization and then respect its verdict.
Since we don't know yet whether something systematic is happening or not,  I'll first of all call on party scholars to start thinking about this as a potentially serious issue.  For everyone else...want to know about how people voted before government-supplied ballots, and before primary elections?  The best thing you can do is to read book David mentioned above, the great Alan Ware's The American Direct Primary.

The next-best (but much quicker) thing you can do is to read my quicky summary of some of the issues involved, also from after NY-23 last year.  Want to know about "pasters"?  "Knifing"?  Click over!

I should note, however, that I ended that post by supposing that the lack of a primary election might be the problem in NY-23, and that "primary elections turn out to be really successful at convincing everyone to treat their winner as the legitimate choice of the party."  Oops!  Tell that to Joe Miller!

So I'll finish this one by speculating some more.  One thing that made all three cases plausible were local circumstances that made it easier for splitters to fight on.  In NY-23, the Conservative Party line helped.  In Colorado, Tancredo's candidacy gave Republicans a safe place to go when the duly nominated candidate appeared to have little hope of winning but plenty of promise for embarrassing the party.  In Alaska, I suspect the tiny size of the electorate helped; it also couldn't have hurt that a similar situation happened within the memory (perhaps) of longtime AK pols and observers (in 1968, on the Democratic side, a sitting Senator lost a primary and then finished third with a write-in campaign). 

I'll add one more thing.  Our political parties are currently quite strong.  Their weakest point, I've argued, is in the area of ritual, ceremony, and symbolism.  Image.  Normally, it doesn't matter that lots and lots of people, at both the mass and elite level, behave as if they were intense partisans while swearing off the party label, and imagining themselves as insurgents against a party establishment that they envision as their enemy.  In reality, very few "conservatives" are in fact principled conservatives; in actions, issue positions, and everything else they're Republican partisans (and, for the most part, same on the Democratic side, although with somewhat different behavior patterns, I think).

(I suppose I should make it clear that I'm not criticizing any of this; in my view, there are few things worse in politics than a true committed ideologue, while solid partisans are a healthy thing for any democracy).

But perhaps -- and again, this is speculative -- this is one place where it does matter.  If people thought of themselves as Republicans, not conservatives, it might be a lot harder to get them to support a candidate on a third-party line, or a write-in candidate, against the duly nominated candidate of the Republican party.  And it also might be more of a serious break with the party, similar to actually backing the other side (which is, still, a deal-breaker in most cases. and don't tell me about Joe Lieberman unless you think he has even a slim chance of winning the Democratic nomination next time around). 

The last time the parties couldn't enforce their own nominations, in the late 19th century, the results involved a complete overhaul of how Americans voted, which had all sort of consequences for how the parties evolved in the 20th century, and therefore how Americans governed themselves.  I'm not predicted any similar overhaul today, but I do want to underscore that these types of issues are in fact terribly important, and I'll be watching to see whether it was in fact a few flukes or the beginning of a new trend.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Proof That Health Care Sunk The Dems? Nope

I assume I can't really blame William Galston for the headline of his TNR piece arguing that ACA sunk the Democrats, but while the article happily doesn't use the word "proof", it is at any rate not a conclusive argument.

The real answer, I'm afraid, is that we don't know the effects of health care reform on the elections.

I've posted about this several times, but it's a pretty important point.  There's no real way to prove the effect of health care reform on the 2010 elections, one way or another. 

To begin with, Galston relies on surveys of voter intent about health care.  He notes that many self-identified independents (who certainly flipped from D to R in 2010) register strong opposition to health care reform, and also that those who identify health care reform as important to their vote broke sharply against Democrats.

The problem with that sort of evidence is that, as John Sides mentioned recently, people are poor judges of the reasons they do things, most certainly including voting.  One thing we do know is that there have been plenty of attack ads and commotion in the Republican partisan press about health care.  What we don't know from the surveys Galston cites, then, is whether people who otherwise would have voted for Democrats turned to the GOP because of ACA -- or whether people who had decided to vote GOP for other reasons (such as the economy, for example) turned to ACA as an explanation, since thanks to the ads it was convenient.

Now, fortunately, we do have some evidence on one, narrower question: all else equal, how did a vote for health care reform affect incumbent Democrats?  It's evidence, not proof (these things are difficult to model correctly for quantitative analysis, so different researchers can have someone different findings).  But Eric McGhee and John Sides do come up with an estimate that a "yes" vote cost about 4.5 points. 

However, I'd point out that the "all else equal" here really matters, and that the data give us little guidance on evaluating the "all else" if it wasn't equal.  What McGhee and Sides (or a similar analysis by Seth Masket and Steve Greene) show are the effects of voting yes compared voting no to the final passage vote in the House in Spring 2010, assuming that the bill passed.  That leaves a lot of questions, however. 

What if a handful of Democrats flipped to "no" (thus improving their election chances a bit) but the bill failed?  We can't really know what would happen next.  Would the president's approval rating been hit hard, as Bill Clinton's may have been after his health care initiative failed in 1994?  What would that have done to Democratic chances in November?  We don't know.  It's hard for me to imagine that Barack Obama would be more popular if he had done everything the same on health care but lost.  And we do know that the president's approval rating does affect House races.  So maybe the people who switch to "no" gain a few points, but the entire Democratic ticket loses...how much?  We don't know. 

There's more.  If the bill failed in a final vote because some Members who actually voted for it had instead voted no, also else equal, then some of those Members would also be carrying on their record a fall 2009 vote for passage of the original House bill.  Would they be safe because they voted against it in 2010, or in trouble from the earlier vote?  That's also a problem if we choose another path, which would be a decision to abandon health care reform after the fall House vote but before the final vote (say, after Scott Brown's election).

Another possibility would have been a decision to abandon health care reform after August 2009.  What would have been the effect of that decision?  To the extent that attacks on Barack Obama and the Democrats were in fact caused by health care reform -- a very dubious proposition in my view, but if they were -- September 2009 would probably have been too late to do anything about it.  No, Democratic Members of the House would not have "yes" votes to defend, but that would not have prevented Republicans from using the issue in attack ads.  After all, almost every Democrat in Congress had said nice things about health care reform at some point, and a September 2009 collapse would yield a nice story line about liberal Democrats who tried but failed to do nefarious things about health care.

Moreover, would the Democrats really want to abandon a major initiative after a few rowdy Town Hall meetings?  Reputation matters, and a party that allows itself to be intimidated that easily once would be vulnerable for a long time.

Now, what if Democrats had decided to pull the plug after realizing the size of the stimulus, back in early 2009?  No bill to committee; do S-CHIP expansion, and maybe a couple other small things, and call it a day.  Would that have saved them?  Again, I have no idea.  They certainly could have avoided attacks on health care.  However, it's virtually certain that Republicans would simply have substituted a different set of attacks -- on the stimulus, on "bailouts", on cap and trade, on spending, on deficits.  Since those (additional) ads never ran, we can't tell what effect they would have had. 

Gaming out this kind of counterfactual is fun, but hardly conclusive.  How would Democrats have reacted to everything else over the last two years without the passage of the ACA?  What else moves to the legislative calendar with health care gone (hard for me to believe that immigration or energy/environment helps the Dems; more state aid and other stimulus certainly might have, but how likely was that)? 

Of course, there's another set of counterfactuals that we can't really test.  What if instead of financing the thing through savings in Medicare Advantages, the Democrats had chosen to finance it through massive deficit spending, and while they were at it immediately closed the donut hole?  Would that have blunted attacks targeting seniors?  Given that virtually no one among swing voters and neutral opinion leaders gave the Democrats any credit for responsible budgeting, would they have been hurt worse if they had actually been massively irresponsible (yes, I know Andrew Sullivan and a few others gave them credit, but very few budget scolds did).  I suppose I should add that we also don't know what would have happened had marginal Democrats who were going to vote for the thing anyway had decided in for a dime, in for a dollar and supported a strong public option.  Would the costs, if any, in even more virulent opposition have been balanced by considerably more enthusiasm among liberals?  I don't know, but it isn't implausible (especially since the public option scored well, and therefore would have allowed them to put more otherwise irresponsible goodies into the bill). 

I've always believed, and see no new evidence that points the other way, that once the bill came to the House floor in 2009, the Democrats had little choice but to pass the thing.  I strongly suspect the same thing is true as far back as midsummer 2009.  Before that, I think Barack Obama and Congressional Democrats had a lot more flexibility -- but there are at least as many reasons to believe that dropping health care reform might have been just as damaging as moving ahead with it. 

One way or another, however, the postelection surveys just can't tell us what Galston wants them to. 

Oy, Bai

Matt Bai's bizarre, ahistorical "analysis" of the Alaska Senate contest:
Something like 230,000 Alaskans appear to have cast ballots in this month’s midterm election, compared with fewer than 146,000 who voted in the Republican and Democratic primaries combined...

You have to wonder, given this trend, whether the primary process as we’ve known it can remain tenable. With each passing year, it seems, an ever smaller group of voters in either party — rallying, in a year like this one, around ever more extreme points of view — get to effectively determine the options for the rest of the electorate. 
"An even smaller group."  Sure, Matt Bai.

He's making stuff up.

Let's see...he reports 146K in the primaries, compared with 230K in the general election.  So primary turnout was 63% of general election turnout.  How does that stack up historically?  Is it an "even smaller group"?  I don't think so.  How about some numbers:

Lisa Murkowski, as political junkies know, was appointed by her father, the previous Senator and then governor.  Frank Murkowski was first elected in 1980, another goofy election in which the incumbent Democrat, Mike Gravel, was defeated in his primary by Clark Gruening.  So, just like 2010, there was a contested incumbent primary on one side, and an open primary on the other.  Turnout?

In 1980, 100K* votes were cast in Alaska's primaries, compared with 157K in the general.  Primary turnout was...64% of general election turnout.

Gruening, you say?  Clark Gruening's grandfather was Ernest Gruening, who Gravel had defeated in a 1968 primary (Gruening, by the way, ran as a write-in in the general, although he finished third).  Oh, those wacky Alaskans!  So 1968 is our next comparison point, with once against a hotly contested challenge to an incumbent in one primary, while the other primary was open.  Again, turnout?

In 1968, 53K votes were cast in Alaska's primary, which was apparently an open, blanket primary at that point.  81K votes were cast in the general election.  So that makes primary turnout...65% of general election turnout.

OK, technically, I suppose 63% is smaller than 64% which is smaller than 65%, but really, we're talking about the exact same ratio.  No change.  None.  Nada.  Zip.  Not "an even smaller group."  The same size group.

I'm picking on this one "fact" because it points to something that's important to remember about Matt Bai, who writes for the New York Times -- paper of record, all that.

Matt Bai either makes stuff up, or hears things from others that are made up, and he doesn't bother to check whether it's true before he puts it in the Times.

Look, I have no idea whether primary turnout compared to general election turnout is up or down since the 1950s (his comparison point).  What I do know is that the ratio Matt Bai reported in the New York Times for the 2010 Alaska election isn't historically low; it's historically very, very high for a primary election -- no doubt because it was contested, but that basically undermines his claim that voters, having deserted the parties, no longer will be satisfied with primaries which exclude them from choosing candidates.

Just to demonstrate...This year's Nevada GOP primary was high-profile on the GOP side, with Harry Reid quietly renominated on the Democratic side.  Primary election turnout, 292K.  General election turnout, 720K.  Primary as percent of general, 41%.  And again, that's with a very spirited primary on one side. Anything over 60% is, really, shockingly high.

Unfortunately, I don't have readily available primary turnouts from the 1950s.  There's some evidence that midterm primary turnout has dropped since the mid-1960s, but so has general election turnout in midterms.  And one needs to be careful of all such numbers -- the denominator shifts with the addition of 18 year olds after the passage of the 26th Amendment matters, as do other relatively technical issues.  Moreover, with the demise of the Solid South, primaries in statewide races are now rarely the most important election, which may affect participation.

The point is, again, that after some quick checking I can't tell you for sure about whether the relationship between primary and general election voters has changed since the 1950s.  Neither can Matt Bai, but he's going to make grandiose claims, anyway.  I do know that a primary electorate that's over three-fifths the size of a general electorate is very high, either this year or historically.

And, yes, I should mention too that his basic premise of an explosion of independent voters is also completely wrong.  There are a lot of very interesting stories to explore in the Alaska Senate election, but none of them have anything to do with a mythical rise of independents.



*All other numbers here are approximate, but 100K primary turnout in Alaska in 1980?  How about: exactly 100K.  No rounding.  Exactly 100,000 votes cast.  At least according to the wikipedia page, and my (by hand, but twice) addition.  Weird, no?

Incumbents

(Updated below)

John Sides has a nice post up demonstrating that, contrary to some earlier speculation, incumbents still won most (86%) of the House elections in which they competed.  If this is his main point, I agree:
What is the bottom line? Don't read too much into a few isolated early primaries (see: Robert Bennett) or into polls where vast majorities of Americans disapprove of Congress or even indicate their willingness to vote for the challenger. 
I would throw in a little perspective, however.  It's absolutely correct that in House elections, the bottom line is that incumbents win.  Why they win, however, is another story.  There are two major factors that determine House elections.  One is, in fact, the evaluations votes have of the candidates, and for that incumbents do have an advantage, and from all accounts maintained that this year.

The most important factor, however, has nothing at all to do with candidates; it has to do with party.  Party is the most important factor in House voting, and since most House districts have lopsided advantages for one party, most House elections are essentially determined long before specific candidates are chosen.

That's easiest to see in the two districts in which GOP incumbents lost this year, one in Louisiana and one in Hawaii.  In both cases, Republican victories had been flukes (a crook on the ballot for the Dems in one, and a split Democratic party running two candidates in a special election in the other), and once the Dems got themselves a (single) acceptable candidate, that was the end of the story. 

So, yes, ignore the polling that says that Congress is unpopular, or that people want incumbents to lose.  But when John says "Incumbents still dominate congressional elections," I'm going to disagree with his wording.  Parties dominate congressional elections.  Incumbency is an advantage -- yes, even in 2010 -- but party is the biggest story.

UPDATE:  See Andrew Gelman's post at the Monkey Cage, in which he estimates the current size of the incumbent advantages at about 6% in House general elections, and notes that it doesn't seem to have moved much this year.  I fully agree with his final thought: "Once you're in, you generally get to run again and represent your party in the general election. This is the most important way in which incumbents "dominate": they don't need to compete for the nomination on a level playing field each time."

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

What Would Bill James Say?

It's been a week since the 2010 landslide, which seems to have put me in the mood for playing political consultant to both parties.  I can start not with wisdom from political science, but from the great baseball analyst Bill James, who had useful observations about both winners and losers that I think are worth learning from in the political context, even though it's obviously quite different.

About winners, Bill James noted their tendency to invariably keep everyone.  That means not only keeping the good players who would help win the next year, but also the bad players that made winning harder (because you can always remember at least one positive contribution, and you're going to be far more aware of the positives than the negatives); it also meant keeping the players who were useful now, but unlikely to be helpful in the future.  Translated to politics, this suggests that Republicans need to be wary about assuming that everything they did was successful just because they had a good year.  James counsels baseball teams to be ruthless in their self-assessments against the tendency to settle for what worked last time.  Republicans now should do the same.  

For losers, James identified the tendency of fans, and sometimes management, to focus most of their criticism on the stars, on the perceived (or even real) flaws of the very best players.  In the baseball context, this is usually insanely self-destructive.  Does the same thing happen in politics?  Yup.  Is it self-destructive?  Yup.

Now, there are, of course, big differences between sports management and political management.  A team can easily dump a bad outfielder and look for another one; the Republicans can't exactly dump the people who gave them O'Donnell, Buck, and Angle, and the Democrats can't dump the incumbents who made it difficult for mainstream Dems and the White House to carry out the economic recovery program they would have chosen if they had full party discipline.  (Granted, many of those incumbents did get dumped, by voters who seem to care more about economic outcomes than spending restraint).  Still, I suspect that the general advice is useful.

Sunday, November 7, 2010

Sunday Question for Liberals

OK, liberals, how do you interpret the elections:

1.  Inevitable pendulum swinging: there's only a truly liberal Congress plus presidency once in a blue moon when all the stars align, and it never lasts long.

2.  Inevitable result of Barack Obama coming in at the wrong point of the economic cycle; this is the 1930, not 1933 argument.

3.  The product of very crafty GOP actions.

4.  The produce of lots and lots of GOP money.

5.  The product of Democratic mistakes: too liberal (don't expect too many takers in a question addressed to liberals, but have to include it).

6.  The product of Democratic mistakes: too spineless.

7.  The product of Democratic mistakes: specific policy mistakes on the economy.

8.  The product of Democratic mistakes: poor messaging/campaigning.

9.  What else?

Saturday, November 6, 2010

What Mattered This Week?

Well, I hear that there were a few elections held...I suspect there's something to be had in that. 

And there's the Fed actions, and a relatively good jobs report (note: still no liberal hack economists to tell us that the economy is now booming because of the brilliant policies from Barack Obama).

So I guess one could dig through the big news for some good tidbits (redistricting?  State props?  Iowa judges?), or find the items that were buried by the bigger stuff. 

You know what I think mattered: the Giants won the World Series!  

Oh, and speaking of sports, I have no idea whether she'll win today, but whether she does or not, Zenyatta has been amazing.  There aren't enough adjectives.  And if she actually can win back-to-back Classics and retire 20 for 20....well, I can't think of any similar achievement in any sport over the last forty years.   I know practically none of you are interested in horse racing, but if you want to see a really special horse, you might want to flip over to ESPN this afternoon. 

At any rate: what do you think mattered this week?

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

And Now, The Spin

There are two types of explanations for what happens in elections.  One is an honest attempt to figure out exactly why elections turned out as they did.  For those, there's no need to rush to judgment.  I'll refer you to Brendan Nyhan's quick analysis, but with all due respect to Brendan, we're going to learn more as we go forward.  There are lots of important questions to answer, but don't expect good answers right away.

Then there's the other type of explanation: the spin.  Tea Partiers are going to have their version of why the GOP won, regular Republicans will have their own slightly different version, Democrats will have their own version.  Liberal Dems will say it proves that Democrats aren't liberal enough; moderate Dems will say it proves Democrats were too far to the left.  Then there's the issue groups: whether it's climate, or health care, or foreign policy, or social issues, or whatever, each group is going to claim a mandate that the new Congress and the continuing president should immediately drop everything and do whatever it is that they want.

Which one should prevail?

The spin!

Now, obviously, it's important to also find out why what happened did happen, and not just for curiousity's sake.  But, no, politicians and other political actors shouldn't limit themselves to the actual, factual reasons.  That's not how the system works. 

The way it really works is by everyone involved fighting for what they want, and claiming that The People are behind them.  Of course they're all lying spinning.  Of course they're all claiming mandates that are phony.  Everyone knows (or should know) that. 

So if it's all phony, where's the democracy?  In winning.  The spin that House Republicans use is going to count for more than the spin that House Democrats use not because they're interpretation of voter intentions is (closer to) the truth, but because they have way more seats in the House now.  Barack Obama's spin counts for plenty, too, because he's still going to be in the White House for the next two years.  That's true whether they really believe it, or whether they're just posing for what they think they want their voters to hear.

Of course, just who wins is only the start of it.  The spin is also contested.  The pro-lifers are going to be doing their best to convince Senate Republicans -- and everyone else in Washington -- that what The People were really saying was that every Obama judicial nominee should be filibustered, no question about it.  In this, groups are not equal.  The groups with the strongest ties to the parties, with the strongest relationships, the groups that have convinced politicians over time that they can deliver: those groups will have more weight than others, and that's democratic, too. 

It's not just numbers, either; they're going to put together whatever evidence they can, from polling numbers to individual "representative" election contests, to fragments of campaign rhetoric, to try to convince everyone that they're right.  Because the politicians themselves can sometimes be convinced.  Hey, sometimes the quality of the evidence actually counts.  That, too, is democratic.

I should be clear: this isn't, for the most part, about winning the spin war in simple partisan terms.  Indeed, the Obama crowd is correct that most of the short-term spin cycle isn't really very important. 
I was watching the president's press conference today, and the cable news yakkers were going on beforehand about whether Obama would accept responsibility, and whether he would act sufficiently chastened, and some other junk like that...that's all going to be forgotten in a week or two, or maybe in a day or two. 

No, I'm talking about more long-term effects.  How do the pols themselves, and other political actors, understand what happened?  That's what really matters.  That question might be affected to some extent by what pundits say, but it's also going to be affected by the experiences candidates have on the campaign trail, and what political elites say to each other, and what the leaders of various organized constituencies say.

So as important it will be down the road to figure out why the 2010 elections actually ended up as they did, the effects of those elections aren't really going to depend on that.  The effects are going to depend, first, on the actual numbers (and every seat counts, especially in the Senate); and, second, on how the politicians and political actors interpret what's going on. 

In other words, what's happening today, and tomorrow, and over the next few weeks, as everyone continues to fight the 2010 elections...well, that's  the reality of democracy.  Elections, as important as they are, are only the very beginning.

The Senate? Young, As When the World Was New

Well, perhaps not that young, but it's a fun line to quote.  I'll eventually get to quite a bit of postmorteming and future gazing, but at this point I want to wrap up the continuing story of the very old Senate now becoming not quite as very old.

I have a total of nineteen seats changing hands between Election Day 2008 and the new Senate that will begin work in January, assuming no further changes, and for the time being assuming that Bennet, Murray, and Murkowski all hang on to win.

Those nineteen new Senators are a grand total of...wait for it...276 years younger than the 19 Senators they replaced.  That's pretty dramatic!  Of course, it's a tough fight against inertia, since the continuing Senators are getting older.  Still, this will be the first Senate to turn back the clock in quite a while.

It actually could have been a bigger effect.  We could still see ten years taken off the total if Miller beats Murkowski in Alaska.  But it looks to me that she'll probably win that one, just as the older candidate won in Illinois, Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky, California, and Nevada, among other spots; the only really nice results for the Younger Party yesterday were in Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.  Three of the five biggest races (as far as age is concerned) went to the older candidate.

So, a bit of disappointment in the end, but at least in my view it's a definite step in the right direction.

One Precinct Still Out

I figured I should post something before I went to sleep (not quite yet...still awful curious about several outstanding House, Senate, and Gubernatorial contests). I'm not going to say much at this point...my instincts, as usual (and I think shared -- I don't see much posted on many of the political scientist blogs tonight) is to wait until all the numbers are in.  I'd rather be slow than say foolish things.  So I'll just make a couple quick comments, or mention a few questions, and then I'll be back for more in the morning.

1.  First of all, a very impressive victory for the GOP in the House, and generally across the nation.  A great night for the Republicans.

2.  The obvious first impression is going to be that poor candidates cost the Republicans dearly in a handful of crucial high-profile statewide races: for Senate in CT, CA, NV, DE, CA and perhaps CO; for Governor in CA, perhaps in FL, and in some other states.  That may be true; in fact I suspect it is true.  The one race that the TV folks didn't seem to make a fuss about that I would is NH-Sen, in which Kelly Ayotte barely survived as the moderate or mainstream candidate in the primary and then romped over a seemingly solid candidate by a whopping 25 points, more or less.  On the other hand, quite a few seemingly weak GOP candidates won.  We'll need to look at these more carefully before drawing any firm conclusions.

3.  Meanwhile, what about the House?  We've had some evidence about the challengers and open seat candidates there; now, with the results (mostly) in, it's going to be time to see what exactly happened.  Were flaky House candidates able to survive because of the media environment?  Were there fewer flaky House candidates, and if so, why?  

4.  One thing that was posted today that I want to repeat was from John Sides, who cautions us about relying on straightforward interpretations of exit poll questions about why people voted the way they did.  I'd add to be cautious about anything from exit polls.  They're nice to have, but they're notoriously hard to get right...one thing to recall is that even the basic demographic data will be adjusted once the actual vote totals are known.

I'm sure I have plenty more, but it's getting late.  Congratulations to all the winners, and plenty more analysis once I've had a little sleep.

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Every Seat Counts

Just one quick note as the results start coming in...the tendency is to focus on the big picture, and it certainly matters a lot whether the GOP takes the majority in the House back,  However, the little pictures matter a lot too.  Each Senate seat makes a great deal of difference; I think everyone knows that, but it's certainly true.  Individual House seats matter a lot less in the short run...but it's a mistake to think they aren't important at all.  Yes, Republicans will probably win most votes they want in the House whether they have 220 or 240 Members.  But 220 means that a lot of Republicans in marginal districts are going to have to cast tough vote after tough vote, while with 240 they'll be able to give those Members a pass when they need it. 

Meanwhile, it's not just about 2011-2012.  I know it's really obvious, but it's worth mentioning nonetheless: these Senate seats are six year seats -- which means that today's election is also the 2012 and 2014 election, as far as the Senate is concerned.  And House elections are sticky, thanks to the incumbency advantage. A Democrat who survives this election might go on to serve for a couple decades, while if the seat flips it could turn safe for the GOP for a while.  Or, looking at it from a slightly different angle, a 20 seat edge in the House is a lot easier to defend next time around than a 10 seat advantage.   So, in a way, today is the 2012 election in the House.  And then there's redistricting, which means that each statehouse matters nationally (well, outside of the tiny states).

Every seat counts.  Every seat counts.
Who links to my website?