Happy Birthday to Steven Bochco, 70.
I'm traveling and in meetings early this week, so posting may be sporadic, but that's no excuse for skipping the good stuff:
1. I mostly blame the mainstream conservatives who make up the bulk of the GOP conference for the shutdown; here's a perspective that puts Speaker Boehner at fault. I disagree, but plausible!
2. Josh Huder on the future of the filibuster.
3. And Dan Drezner: Yankees, or North Korea?
Showing posts with label John Boehner. Show all posts
Showing posts with label John Boehner. Show all posts
Monday, December 16, 2013
Friday, December 13, 2013
Yeah, Bipartisanship Isn't About To Break Out
Brian Beutler has this right:
The bottom-line context underlying the temporary (and it's certainly temporary) emergence of bipartisan peace in the House is the one I keep pounding on: at the end of the day, whether before or after a shutdown, John Boehner knows that eventually he and Barack Obama are going to wind up on the same side of something that funds the government going forward. That's an absolute, unavoidable fact of appropriations deadlines. Which means that at the end of the day, whatever he does on the way there, Boehner is going to be a sellout and a RINO for agreeing with the Kenyan socialist in the White House.
Given that context, a shutdown was, and is, an almost certain disaster for the Speaker (and for whatever Republicans would wind up voting for the eventual measure that ends the shutdown). I'm still not sure why the House went down that road in October, but having done it once and (believing they) paid the price, it was even more unlikely that they would do it a second time.
But there's no reason at all to believe that this means anything for those issues -- most issues -- in which there is no certainty that they end in agreement between Obama and Boehner.
Which means, for all those other issues, what matters is whether mainstream House Republicans want bills to pass (or, for GOP priorities, whether Obama and mainstream Senate Democrats want something to pass).
The rest, such as Boehner lashing out at conservative groups? It's mostly, or entirely, window dressing. This is one that fits perfectly into a story of clear incentives -- and the same incentives just aren't there on many other issues.
Ever since he became speaker, Boehner has been reluctant to forge coalitions with Democrats, particularly when Democrats end up controlling the policy and supplying the overwhelming majority of votes. As a rule he’s only done this when sticking with the right would send the country past some deadline or over some cliff, and even then he’s acted reluctantly.See also Jamelle Bouie.
The bottom-line context underlying the temporary (and it's certainly temporary) emergence of bipartisan peace in the House is the one I keep pounding on: at the end of the day, whether before or after a shutdown, John Boehner knows that eventually he and Barack Obama are going to wind up on the same side of something that funds the government going forward. That's an absolute, unavoidable fact of appropriations deadlines. Which means that at the end of the day, whatever he does on the way there, Boehner is going to be a sellout and a RINO for agreeing with the Kenyan socialist in the White House.
Given that context, a shutdown was, and is, an almost certain disaster for the Speaker (and for whatever Republicans would wind up voting for the eventual measure that ends the shutdown). I'm still not sure why the House went down that road in October, but having done it once and (believing they) paid the price, it was even more unlikely that they would do it a second time.
But there's no reason at all to believe that this means anything for those issues -- most issues -- in which there is no certainty that they end in agreement between Obama and Boehner.
Which means, for all those other issues, what matters is whether mainstream House Republicans want bills to pass (or, for GOP priorities, whether Obama and mainstream Senate Democrats want something to pass).
The rest, such as Boehner lashing out at conservative groups? It's mostly, or entirely, window dressing. This is one that fits perfectly into a story of clear incentives -- and the same incentives just aren't there on many other issues.
Monday, November 11, 2013
Elsewhere: Tea Party, Boehner Rule
It's a holiday, so no good stuff today. Just my latest columns (yeah, wise guys, very funny, you know what I mean).
My TAP column today returns to what I was talking about back in the winter and spring: the Boehner Rule. It's actually Sarah Binder's observation, first; what Boehner devised to deal with his dysfunctional party was to let the Senate go first. Then if most of his conference wants things to pass -- even if they want to publicly oppose them -- they get a vote. One effect, which we see now, is a logjam of popular items passed by the Senate and waiting for House action.
At Salon over the weekend, I talked about Tea Party candidacies, and why they aren't going to get any stronger over time. This is one where I'm not sure whether I'm making an overly obvious point that everyone knows or pointing out something new. That point being that with a normal political movement the early stages are going to generate some oddball candidates but that over time it should improve, but Tea Party political culture (and maybe even ideology) means that there won't be any evolution here.
I'll be over at Greg's place this afternoon, and I should have a PP post up sometime today. I'm also thinking of doing a bonus Sunday question here. If everything goes right, maybe even a Monday Movies Post later on. That's probably the plan for the day; enjoy the holiday, everyone.
My TAP column today returns to what I was talking about back in the winter and spring: the Boehner Rule. It's actually Sarah Binder's observation, first; what Boehner devised to deal with his dysfunctional party was to let the Senate go first. Then if most of his conference wants things to pass -- even if they want to publicly oppose them -- they get a vote. One effect, which we see now, is a logjam of popular items passed by the Senate and waiting for House action.
At Salon over the weekend, I talked about Tea Party candidacies, and why they aren't going to get any stronger over time. This is one where I'm not sure whether I'm making an overly obvious point that everyone knows or pointing out something new. That point being that with a normal political movement the early stages are going to generate some oddball candidates but that over time it should improve, but Tea Party political culture (and maybe even ideology) means that there won't be any evolution here.
I'll be over at Greg's place this afternoon, and I should have a PP post up sometime today. I'm also thinking of doing a bonus Sunday question here. If everything goes right, maybe even a Monday Movies Post later on. That's probably the plan for the day; enjoy the holiday, everyone.
Thursday, October 17, 2013
Elsewhere: Boehner, Cruz, more
Over at the Post this week...I think I'll pull a quote from today's PP post:
More on extortion for the sake of extortion
Why this is bad for Ted Cruz's nomination hopes
And looking ahead to January
We can’t know for sure, at least on the evidence we have right now, whether Boehner was following the wishes of the majority of his conference on October 1 or on October 16. But what evidence we have strongly suggests he was. There’s plenty of blame to go around for the shutdown and debt-limit fiasco, but any account which focuses mainly on Boehner is probably letting both the moderates and the mainstream conservatives — in other words, most House Republicans — off far too easy.Also:
More on extortion for the sake of extortion
Why this is bad for Ted Cruz's nomination hopes
And looking ahead to January
Pelosi Had an Easy Job This Time
During and after the vote last night, numerous pundits and passers-by were praising Nancy Pelosi, contrasting her "ability" to keep her caucus unified with the chaos on John Boehner's side of the aisle. Here, for example, is Ian Millhiser:
Nancy Pelosi controls 198 votes in the House.Hogwash.
John Boehner controls 87.
#leadership
Nancy Pelosi was an excellent Speaker -- as I've said, I rank her second only to Tip O'Neill in the modern era, and that's giving him points because he had to figure it out for the first time (since he was the first of the true modern Speakers; the reform era ran from 1959 to 1975). So this isn't anything against her.
But really: House Minority Leader is one of the easiest jobs in Washington. Keeping her party unified against an obviously losing strategy by a small minority of the most unpopular Republicans? C'mon, that's no achievement. You know who was able to lead an absolutely unified party? John Boehner, in 2009 and 2010. He hasn't suddenly lost his touch; it's just a different, and much harder, job.
And I apologize for taking the wording of a tweet too seriously, but neither Pelosi or Boehner or any other leader "controls" votes in Congress. Not in any kind of strong sense. We're talking about 435 independent, autonomous actors. Yes, Speakers have some influence on what individual Members do (far more than Senate party leaders do), but it only goes so far. They start to go very far from what the party wants, and..well, ask Jim Wright and Newt Gingrich how long a Speaker lasts who tries to "control" too much. Indeed: one of the reasons Pelosi was highly successful as Speaker is that she didn't attempt to be the dictator of the House.
Again: nothing against Pelosi. She was excellent when it counted. But this is all evidence not for Pelosi's skills and Boehner's lack of skills, but that structural things matter more than individual skills in many cases.
Boehner's problem isn't that he's a poor Speaker. His problem is that he has 232 Republicans, and a good 50 to 100 of them want no distance between themselves and Louie Gohmert. If Nancy Pelosi had been forced to deal with 50 to 100 Members who wanted no distance between themselves and Dennis Kucinich (or Cynthia McKinney), and if Kucinich and McKinney defined themselves in large part by establishing a distance between themselves and the "Democratic establishment"...well, that's a much harder job than she actually had. And that's only the beginning of the structural differences.
One more time: Pelosi was an excellent Speaker. But her skills just don't explain much of what's been happening in the House this month.
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
House CR/Debt Limit BIll Pulled
The news this evening is that John Boehner had to pull the bill Republicans had been scrambling to put together all day.
My general sense is that it's progress. If a GOP CR/debt limit bill passes the House, we're back to where we were, really; both sides have a position, with Democrats insisting that a deal amounts to paying a ransom, and so there's no deal to be had.
However, with House Republicans in disarray, the only game in town is the Reid/McConnell "deal," which is really just a GOP surrender with a minor fig leaf. Or maybe not even; there was talk at one point in the last day or so of it winding up as just a clean bill.
Or, to put it another way. From the very beginning, it's been clear that any bill to pass would need to be acceptable to both Barack Obama and Senate Democrats and also to most House Republicans. House Republicans mostly wouldn't have to vote for it, but they probably would have to accept it. So one way to look at it is that the whole game has been to get mainstream House Republicans to the point where they're willing to accept surrender, even if it means getting blamed for it by the radicals.
I'm no reporter; I only know what I read, and can guess at what seems likely. But I think it's extremely likely that most House Republicans blame the radicals, Ted Cruz, and Jim DeMint a lot more than they blame John Boehner. And I tend to agree with those who think that perhaps today was just about demonstrating to them, one more time, that the radicals who are a problem that they actually have to confront. If only by accepting a mostly-Democrats bill to re-open the government and extend the debt limit.
Maybe not! But whether Boehner actually plotted this all out this way or not, that's my best guess about where we are tonight.
My general sense is that it's progress. If a GOP CR/debt limit bill passes the House, we're back to where we were, really; both sides have a position, with Democrats insisting that a deal amounts to paying a ransom, and so there's no deal to be had.
However, with House Republicans in disarray, the only game in town is the Reid/McConnell "deal," which is really just a GOP surrender with a minor fig leaf. Or maybe not even; there was talk at one point in the last day or so of it winding up as just a clean bill.
Or, to put it another way. From the very beginning, it's been clear that any bill to pass would need to be acceptable to both Barack Obama and Senate Democrats and also to most House Republicans. House Republicans mostly wouldn't have to vote for it, but they probably would have to accept it. So one way to look at it is that the whole game has been to get mainstream House Republicans to the point where they're willing to accept surrender, even if it means getting blamed for it by the radicals.
I'm no reporter; I only know what I read, and can guess at what seems likely. But I think it's extremely likely that most House Republicans blame the radicals, Ted Cruz, and Jim DeMint a lot more than they blame John Boehner. And I tend to agree with those who think that perhaps today was just about demonstrating to them, one more time, that the radicals who are a problem that they actually have to confront. If only by accepting a mostly-Democrats bill to re-open the government and extend the debt limit.
Maybe not! But whether Boehner actually plotted this all out this way or not, that's my best guess about where we are tonight.
Tuesday, October 1, 2013
The 'Fraidy Cat Conference
OK, all through this thing, and all day yesterday, I thought that a shutdown was relatively unlikely. Not impossible, but below 50/50.
Why? Because it was pretty obvious that only a small group of Congressional Republicans thought it was a good idea. To some extent because it really isn't a good idea for them; to some extent because everyone has massively overlearned the lessons of 1995-1996 (Sean Trende is the latest to look at the minimal electoral effects).
Indeed, Byron York reports that the true believers are somewhere around 30 to 60 House Republicans -- and, reporting last night, that "175 GOP lawmakers, are willing, and perhaps even eager, to vote" for a clean CR.
This kind of reporting pins the blame for the shutdown squarely on Speaker Boehner -- who, as Brian Beutler puts it, "is a powerful person with agency and a conscience." If in fact 175 House Republicans were actually eager to end this thing without a shutdown, and Boehner refused to bring it to the floor because he feared that the 30-60 would cost him his job, then the responsibility lies mainly with him (see also Greg Sargent's similar numbers).
But I just don't believe it.
Oh, I believe that the bulk of the Republican conference thinks this shutdown is stupid strategy.
But "eager" to vote for a clean CR? Look, if the bulk of the conference wanted a clean CR and Boehner was resisting it because of fears about his job, then he's the stupidest man in the world...because no one keeps that chair for long if 175 of 233 disagree with a major decision like this. Yes, technically a handful of Republican defectors can prevent Boehner's re-election on opening day of the next Congress...but in reality there's not much they can do if the rest of the conference is happy with the Speaker. Just empty, noisy, protest. But if 175 think that Boehner is betraying them by not letting them vote on something they're "eager" to do, then they'll defeat him in the conference after the 2014 election -- or, more realistically, ask him to resign immediately and replace him with someone who will do what they want.
They aren't "eager" to end this thing with their own votes. They're eager, perhaps, for the whole thing to go away. But they aren't eager, and very well may not have been willing, to vote against the crazies.
Which we know, because when they had the chance they didn't do it. At any point along the way, those 175 Republicans could have simply voted no -- on the rule, on the amendments offered on Saturday night, on final passage to any of their offers to the Senate. I'm sorry to keep hitting on this same point, but in this matter the truth is that for all we can say about the Speaker being responsible for his own actions, it's more to the point that each individual Member of the House is responsible for his or her own actions. The Speaker is elected by Republicans to do what they want -- and as far as I'm concerned he's probably doing just that.
Oh -- it's not just their votes. It's also the reporting of what's happened in GOP conference meetings, and generally what people, York included, are reporting. There's been plenty of reports that "conservatives" are about to walk away from various potential CR offers, but virtually nothing about mainstream conservatives being unhappy with how Boehner is handling things. Because, most likely, they are not unhappy. He's doing what they want.
What it comes down to is that while York counts about 30 true believers and another 20-30 who might be willing to deal except for their fear of a primary, and then 175 or more who are "willing" or "eager" to vote for a clean CR, I see a very different math. I see 30 true believers; another 20-30 who are so paranoid about primaries that they are externally no different from the true believers, and than another 150 to 175 who are "willing" or "eager" to make it known to smart reporters that they aren't really crazy at all and are perfectly aware of how self-destructive this strategy is for their party...but almost in all cases without their names attached, and without any action to back that up. Which leaves somewhere below 20 who are actually willing to end this thing.
These 175, too, are mostly paranoid about renomination, even if they want reporters to know that they're not actually nuts. They're the ones who drive what Boehner does. They're the ones who have to bear the brunt of the responsibility for this shutdown. They're the ones who are the 'fraidy cat conference -- so paranoid about renomination, and more broadly about allowing any distance to appear between themselves and the "conservatives" who they probably honestly have contempt for, that they're willing to run their party right into a ditch.
Perhaps the Speaker could have given this group a more forceful shove. Perhaps he could have reminded them that this thing eventually ends with a GOP surrender, and so they might as well get it over with now. Perhaps it's his responsibility to force the issue by bringing up the clean CR, even if they didn't want him to. I'm not disagreeing with any of that, and certainly not the first two of those.
But the main responsibility here is the bulk of the Republican conference. Not the guy acting on their behalf.
Why? Because it was pretty obvious that only a small group of Congressional Republicans thought it was a good idea. To some extent because it really isn't a good idea for them; to some extent because everyone has massively overlearned the lessons of 1995-1996 (Sean Trende is the latest to look at the minimal electoral effects).
Indeed, Byron York reports that the true believers are somewhere around 30 to 60 House Republicans -- and, reporting last night, that "175 GOP lawmakers, are willing, and perhaps even eager, to vote" for a clean CR.
This kind of reporting pins the blame for the shutdown squarely on Speaker Boehner -- who, as Brian Beutler puts it, "is a powerful person with agency and a conscience." If in fact 175 House Republicans were actually eager to end this thing without a shutdown, and Boehner refused to bring it to the floor because he feared that the 30-60 would cost him his job, then the responsibility lies mainly with him (see also Greg Sargent's similar numbers).
But I just don't believe it.
Oh, I believe that the bulk of the Republican conference thinks this shutdown is stupid strategy.
But "eager" to vote for a clean CR? Look, if the bulk of the conference wanted a clean CR and Boehner was resisting it because of fears about his job, then he's the stupidest man in the world...because no one keeps that chair for long if 175 of 233 disagree with a major decision like this. Yes, technically a handful of Republican defectors can prevent Boehner's re-election on opening day of the next Congress...but in reality there's not much they can do if the rest of the conference is happy with the Speaker. Just empty, noisy, protest. But if 175 think that Boehner is betraying them by not letting them vote on something they're "eager" to do, then they'll defeat him in the conference after the 2014 election -- or, more realistically, ask him to resign immediately and replace him with someone who will do what they want.
They aren't "eager" to end this thing with their own votes. They're eager, perhaps, for the whole thing to go away. But they aren't eager, and very well may not have been willing, to vote against the crazies.
Which we know, because when they had the chance they didn't do it. At any point along the way, those 175 Republicans could have simply voted no -- on the rule, on the amendments offered on Saturday night, on final passage to any of their offers to the Senate. I'm sorry to keep hitting on this same point, but in this matter the truth is that for all we can say about the Speaker being responsible for his own actions, it's more to the point that each individual Member of the House is responsible for his or her own actions. The Speaker is elected by Republicans to do what they want -- and as far as I'm concerned he's probably doing just that.
Oh -- it's not just their votes. It's also the reporting of what's happened in GOP conference meetings, and generally what people, York included, are reporting. There's been plenty of reports that "conservatives" are about to walk away from various potential CR offers, but virtually nothing about mainstream conservatives being unhappy with how Boehner is handling things. Because, most likely, they are not unhappy. He's doing what they want.
What it comes down to is that while York counts about 30 true believers and another 20-30 who might be willing to deal except for their fear of a primary, and then 175 or more who are "willing" or "eager" to vote for a clean CR, I see a very different math. I see 30 true believers; another 20-30 who are so paranoid about primaries that they are externally no different from the true believers, and than another 150 to 175 who are "willing" or "eager" to make it known to smart reporters that they aren't really crazy at all and are perfectly aware of how self-destructive this strategy is for their party...but almost in all cases without their names attached, and without any action to back that up. Which leaves somewhere below 20 who are actually willing to end this thing.
These 175, too, are mostly paranoid about renomination, even if they want reporters to know that they're not actually nuts. They're the ones who drive what Boehner does. They're the ones who have to bear the brunt of the responsibility for this shutdown. They're the ones who are the 'fraidy cat conference -- so paranoid about renomination, and more broadly about allowing any distance to appear between themselves and the "conservatives" who they probably honestly have contempt for, that they're willing to run their party right into a ditch.
Perhaps the Speaker could have given this group a more forceful shove. Perhaps he could have reminded them that this thing eventually ends with a GOP surrender, and so they might as well get it over with now. Perhaps it's his responsibility to force the issue by bringing up the clean CR, even if they didn't want him to. I'm not disagreeing with any of that, and certainly not the first two of those.
But the main responsibility here is the bulk of the Republican conference. Not the guy acting on their behalf.
Monday, September 30, 2013
Elsewhere: Boehner, Cruz, more
Today's TAP column was about how John Boehner is far more secure in his job than people seem to think.
Over the weekend at Salon, I argued that Ted Cruz didn't get closer to the White House this week; it's one thing to annoy other Senators, but it's another to lead your party off a cliff in a very visible way.
And at PP today, I pointed out again that if 25 or so sane Republicans refuse to vote for the Cruzified CR, the fight would likely be over.
Later this afternoon, there was some reporting that exactly that might happen -- in fact, that the latest CR (which has the Vitter Amendment and a delay of the individual mandate) might lose Republican votes on both sides of the GOP. If it does go down, then there's only one House majority on the CR, and it's going to be pretty hard at that point for Boehner to resist putting a clean CR on the floor and letting it pass. On the other hand, if it passes...then Republicans are threatening at least one more round tonight (all-night ping pong!). So we'll see.
I'm remembering that the House was in, for some reason, during the epic 16 inning Mets/Astros Game 6. Maybe we'll get a great game in the AL 2WC playoff tonight to keep us entertained during the ping pong. Anyway, I see the House is in; guess we'll learn more soon.
Over the weekend at Salon, I argued that Ted Cruz didn't get closer to the White House this week; it's one thing to annoy other Senators, but it's another to lead your party off a cliff in a very visible way.
And at PP today, I pointed out again that if 25 or so sane Republicans refuse to vote for the Cruzified CR, the fight would likely be over.
Later this afternoon, there was some reporting that exactly that might happen -- in fact, that the latest CR (which has the Vitter Amendment and a delay of the individual mandate) might lose Republican votes on both sides of the GOP. If it does go down, then there's only one House majority on the CR, and it's going to be pretty hard at that point for Boehner to resist putting a clean CR on the floor and letting it pass. On the other hand, if it passes...then Republicans are threatening at least one more round tonight (all-night ping pong!). So we'll see.
I'm remembering that the House was in, for some reason, during the epic 16 inning Mets/Astros Game 6. Maybe we'll get a great game in the AL 2WC playoff tonight to keep us entertained during the ping pong. Anyway, I see the House is in; guess we'll learn more soon.
Shutdown Notes
Bullet-point style, looking ahead...
* The government shuts down if Congress doesn't act today. There is still, however, plenty of time if everyone cooperates to do a short-term extension, whether it's a one-day, one-week, or any other length.
* The House can do that easily if Republicans want it. In the Senate, it could be blocked by one Senate...however, it would make little sense for any Senator to do so (which doesn't mean that Cruz or Lee won't, but I don't think they would).
* If Republicans (or, for that matter, Democrats, although the latter seems extremely unlikely to me) back down at the last minute...no harm done. Everyone bluffs; if this is all a bluff, then a lot of the claims about GOP norm-defying in this case are massively overblown.
* Along with that: a very short term shutdown, really anything up to a week, isn't all that big a deal. Most past shutdowns were like that; if we get one of those, it's really more hype than anything else. Yes, it costs some money, and inconveniences some people, but it'll be forgotten rapidly.
* However: the same dynamics that get us to shutdown are fairly likely to produce a longer one.
* Yes, House Republicans will begin to hear complaints about the shutdown from the start. But at least for a while, those complaints will surely be outnumbered by partisans urging them to fight on.
* That's particularly true if Republicans really are testing the theory that a shutdown will eventually produce a major public opinion swing in their favor, with people joining them in saying that Democrats should just give up ACA in order to get the government opening. I think that's a crazy theory, but if they believe it, then the next logical step would be to wait and see whether it works.
* Basically, if Boehner is deliberately moving to a shutdown in order to teach his conference a lesson (and there are hints of that in the reporting), he's making a bad move.
* On the other hand, if there's a plan to retreat within a day or two that doesn't rely on Republicans suddenly coming to their senses...that seems like a silly plan to me, but again, a very short shutdown is no big deal.
* I suppose I can imagine at least one way it might make some sense: if many Republicans really believe that Obama (and Senate Democrats) are bluffing and would never allow a shutdown over Obamacare.
* But otherwise, if Boehner thinks (or if mainstream conservatives think) he can get a controlled one or two day shutdown, he's playing with fire. There's going be a lot of pressure to "fight this through to the end," and only moderate, if building, pressure to end it quickly.
* All of which is why I've always thought that Boehner's best move was to avoid a shutdown, and why I still think there's a fair chance he'll avoid it.
* The government shuts down if Congress doesn't act today. There is still, however, plenty of time if everyone cooperates to do a short-term extension, whether it's a one-day, one-week, or any other length.
* The House can do that easily if Republicans want it. In the Senate, it could be blocked by one Senate...however, it would make little sense for any Senator to do so (which doesn't mean that Cruz or Lee won't, but I don't think they would).
* If Republicans (or, for that matter, Democrats, although the latter seems extremely unlikely to me) back down at the last minute...no harm done. Everyone bluffs; if this is all a bluff, then a lot of the claims about GOP norm-defying in this case are massively overblown.
* Along with that: a very short term shutdown, really anything up to a week, isn't all that big a deal. Most past shutdowns were like that; if we get one of those, it's really more hype than anything else. Yes, it costs some money, and inconveniences some people, but it'll be forgotten rapidly.
* However: the same dynamics that get us to shutdown are fairly likely to produce a longer one.
* Yes, House Republicans will begin to hear complaints about the shutdown from the start. But at least for a while, those complaints will surely be outnumbered by partisans urging them to fight on.
* That's particularly true if Republicans really are testing the theory that a shutdown will eventually produce a major public opinion swing in their favor, with people joining them in saying that Democrats should just give up ACA in order to get the government opening. I think that's a crazy theory, but if they believe it, then the next logical step would be to wait and see whether it works.
* Basically, if Boehner is deliberately moving to a shutdown in order to teach his conference a lesson (and there are hints of that in the reporting), he's making a bad move.
* On the other hand, if there's a plan to retreat within a day or two that doesn't rely on Republicans suddenly coming to their senses...that seems like a silly plan to me, but again, a very short shutdown is no big deal.
* I suppose I can imagine at least one way it might make some sense: if many Republicans really believe that Obama (and Senate Democrats) are bluffing and would never allow a shutdown over Obamacare.
* But otherwise, if Boehner thinks (or if mainstream conservatives think) he can get a controlled one or two day shutdown, he's playing with fire. There's going be a lot of pressure to "fight this through to the end," and only moderate, if building, pressure to end it quickly.
* All of which is why I've always thought that Boehner's best move was to avoid a shutdown, and why I still think there's a fair chance he'll avoid it.
Saturday, September 28, 2013
House Follies
So the House is going to apparently pass, on another party-line vote, another doomed CR -- this one delaying the ACA for a year.
Two quick points: I do wonder what that actually means, in legislative language -- what happens to already-implemented items? Does implementation preparation proceed? Obviously, it doesn't matter, since it's not going to happen, but still presumably there will be a bill...
More to the point, though, is this gem from Robert Costa's reporting:
Perhaps it's just that Boehner has a plan, but isn't telling anyone. If not...well, if it's really true he hasn't thought throgh the next step, then he really doesn't deserve to be Speaker.
Unreal.
Two quick points: I do wonder what that actually means, in legislative language -- what happens to already-implemented items? Does implementation preparation proceed? Obviously, it doesn't matter, since it's not going to happen, but still presumably there will be a bill...
More to the point, though, is this gem from Robert Costa's reporting:
[F]or now, Boehner doesn’t have a plan beyond passing this resolution and waiting to see what happensGiven that there's zero chance that the Senate will go along...really?
Perhaps it's just that Boehner has a plan, but isn't telling anyone. If not...well, if it's really true he hasn't thought throgh the next step, then he really doesn't deserve to be Speaker.
Unreal.
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Boehner's Unlikely But Plausible Anti-Insanity Program
Information is starting to emerge about what the House is going to try to do in the next few weeks. Nothing is certain, especially the details, but the broad outline is fairly clear now.
What's John Boehner up to? Remember, my view is that he's trying to avoid a shutdown or debt limit breach (because the situation for him gets worse post-deadline than pre-deadline) while at the same time keeping his conference from blaming him for anything. At least privately; one of the costs I assume he's willing to accept is for many of them to blame him publicly for things they actually want him to do. But that has to be done sparingly. If he consistently "sells out" mainstream conservatives, even if they want him to, at some point they won't be able to sustain it and will have to get rid of him for the pretense to work.
This is not an easy position for him.
So in response, he's preparing a series of votes that is intended, apparently, to keep all those balls in the air at the same time. He has to win each of these votes, but not always with the same voting coalition. And remember, he's already won the initial vote on the defunding-included CR. Remaining:
* A CR retreat bill.
Proposed voting coalition: Ideally, for Boehner, it's a unanimous GOP plus a fair-sized chunk of Democrats. The CR retreat bill would be a "clean" CR (sequestration funding levels), still to mid-December, and would also include face-savers, perhaps including repealing the medical device tax and prohibiting Members and staff from getting subsidies on the exchanges.
Problems: if it's not a full surrender, which it apparently won't be, then conservatives are going to push for just a little more...which will drive away Democrats, risking (1) that the bill might fail in the House if the Crazy Caucus votes no without Obamacare defunding, or (2) that the Senate sends it back with everything stripped out again.
* Possible short-term CR extentsion(s)
Proposed voting coalition: the entire House. Leadership was floating a one-week CR yesterday afternoon; the idea would be to leave time for a proper (ha!) 10 week CR. Everyone should be willing to live with it, unless Cruz's allies decide it's a trick to get a long-term clean CR a bit at a time.
* Possible 3rd try at a CR
Proposed voting coalition: Majorities of both parties? This one shows up if the CR retreat bill winds up passing on a partisan vote and the Senate sends back a clean (or cleaner) one a second time. Boehner's hope has to be that at this point he can find a majority vote from both parties, perhaps by paring down the extras again (a totally clean one would presumably need mostly Democratic votes). Perhaps by now his conference is convinced to finally accept the win on funding levels, or just sick enough of it that they're willing to vote to get it over with.
* Christmas Tree debt limit bill.
Proposed voting coalition: Full GOP conference. This appears to be a bill filled with goodies for everyone in the GOP conference; it should pass with little trouble on a party-line vote.
* Debt limit surrender
Proposed voting coalition: This is where Boehner's going to have to violate Hastert, with every Democrat and a small number of Republicans averting a debt limit breech and accepting a clean debt limit increase that the Senate will send back to them. Maybe, if Boehner is really lucky, he can find something like forcing a vote on the budget (that the Senate wanted to take) as a fig leaf on this one, although it won't fool anyone.
* Possibly more: it's possible that they'll ping-pong the debt limit multiple times; it's possible that there could be a short-term debt limit increase (yes, they can do that).
Okay, I think that's it.
Can he pull it off?
If you squint just hard enough...it really could be possible. Each step along the way seems plausible, doesn't it? Boehner has been preparing his conference for a surrender on the CR for a while now; they got to take a defunding vote and send it to the Senate, where they can blame its failure on either Ted Cruz (for those looking for the sane primary vote) or Mitch McConnell, John McCain, and the rest of the squishes (for everyone else). The pitch, from Boehner is to transfer the demands from CR to debt limit, preparing for the CR retreat votes. Then all that's left is to capitulate on the debt limit with a Hastert violation after the Senate sends back a clean debt limit extension.
I think the key to this whole thing is to get a majority of Republicans agreeing to whatever the final (until December) CR might be. If Boehner can manage that, then it's only one Hastert violation in the whole sequence -- only one bill where Boehner probably has to take a lot of (public) blame from mainstream conservatives.
Granted, it could blow up in any number of ways.
But it avoids the procedure that could win better results but that Tea Partiers won't all: striking a deal with the White House. The best thing about this whole strategy is that Boehner can, if the votes line up right, get through the entire thing with absolutely no negotiation with Harry Reid, Barack Obama, or Nancy Pelosi.
Notice that one of the things he's doing here is that since negotiating is forbidden, he's using the first run at these bills not to establish a negotiating position, but to give his conference an opportunity for position-taking. That's the way to understand the Christmas tree debt limit bill they're preparing; knowing that eventually they'll have to settle for little or nothing, this way Republicans in the House get to declare what they were for before the Senate (and, perhaps, Boehner) sold them out.
Oh, and remember: there's still a rest-of-the-year CR that they'll have to do in November or December -- and that's the one that Democrats are claiming that they're going to fight on.
What's John Boehner up to? Remember, my view is that he's trying to avoid a shutdown or debt limit breach (because the situation for him gets worse post-deadline than pre-deadline) while at the same time keeping his conference from blaming him for anything. At least privately; one of the costs I assume he's willing to accept is for many of them to blame him publicly for things they actually want him to do. But that has to be done sparingly. If he consistently "sells out" mainstream conservatives, even if they want him to, at some point they won't be able to sustain it and will have to get rid of him for the pretense to work.
This is not an easy position for him.
So in response, he's preparing a series of votes that is intended, apparently, to keep all those balls in the air at the same time. He has to win each of these votes, but not always with the same voting coalition. And remember, he's already won the initial vote on the defunding-included CR. Remaining:
* A CR retreat bill.
Proposed voting coalition: Ideally, for Boehner, it's a unanimous GOP plus a fair-sized chunk of Democrats. The CR retreat bill would be a "clean" CR (sequestration funding levels), still to mid-December, and would also include face-savers, perhaps including repealing the medical device tax and prohibiting Members and staff from getting subsidies on the exchanges.
Problems: if it's not a full surrender, which it apparently won't be, then conservatives are going to push for just a little more...which will drive away Democrats, risking (1) that the bill might fail in the House if the Crazy Caucus votes no without Obamacare defunding, or (2) that the Senate sends it back with everything stripped out again.
* Possible short-term CR extentsion(s)
Proposed voting coalition: the entire House. Leadership was floating a one-week CR yesterday afternoon; the idea would be to leave time for a proper (ha!) 10 week CR. Everyone should be willing to live with it, unless Cruz's allies decide it's a trick to get a long-term clean CR a bit at a time.
* Possible 3rd try at a CR
Proposed voting coalition: Majorities of both parties? This one shows up if the CR retreat bill winds up passing on a partisan vote and the Senate sends back a clean (or cleaner) one a second time. Boehner's hope has to be that at this point he can find a majority vote from both parties, perhaps by paring down the extras again (a totally clean one would presumably need mostly Democratic votes). Perhaps by now his conference is convinced to finally accept the win on funding levels, or just sick enough of it that they're willing to vote to get it over with.
* Christmas Tree debt limit bill.
Proposed voting coalition: Full GOP conference. This appears to be a bill filled with goodies for everyone in the GOP conference; it should pass with little trouble on a party-line vote.
* Debt limit surrender
Proposed voting coalition: This is where Boehner's going to have to violate Hastert, with every Democrat and a small number of Republicans averting a debt limit breech and accepting a clean debt limit increase that the Senate will send back to them. Maybe, if Boehner is really lucky, he can find something like forcing a vote on the budget (that the Senate wanted to take) as a fig leaf on this one, although it won't fool anyone.
* Possibly more: it's possible that they'll ping-pong the debt limit multiple times; it's possible that there could be a short-term debt limit increase (yes, they can do that).
Okay, I think that's it.
Can he pull it off?
If you squint just hard enough...it really could be possible. Each step along the way seems plausible, doesn't it? Boehner has been preparing his conference for a surrender on the CR for a while now; they got to take a defunding vote and send it to the Senate, where they can blame its failure on either Ted Cruz (for those looking for the sane primary vote) or Mitch McConnell, John McCain, and the rest of the squishes (for everyone else). The pitch, from Boehner is to transfer the demands from CR to debt limit, preparing for the CR retreat votes. Then all that's left is to capitulate on the debt limit with a Hastert violation after the Senate sends back a clean debt limit extension.
I think the key to this whole thing is to get a majority of Republicans agreeing to whatever the final (until December) CR might be. If Boehner can manage that, then it's only one Hastert violation in the whole sequence -- only one bill where Boehner probably has to take a lot of (public) blame from mainstream conservatives.
Granted, it could blow up in any number of ways.
But it avoids the procedure that could win better results but that Tea Partiers won't all: striking a deal with the White House. The best thing about this whole strategy is that Boehner can, if the votes line up right, get through the entire thing with absolutely no negotiation with Harry Reid, Barack Obama, or Nancy Pelosi.
Notice that one of the things he's doing here is that since negotiating is forbidden, he's using the first run at these bills not to establish a negotiating position, but to give his conference an opportunity for position-taking. That's the way to understand the Christmas tree debt limit bill they're preparing; knowing that eventually they'll have to settle for little or nothing, this way Republicans in the House get to declare what they were for before the Senate (and, perhaps, Boehner) sold them out.
Oh, and remember: there's still a rest-of-the-year CR that they'll have to do in November or December -- and that's the one that Democrats are claiming that they're going to fight on.
Thursday, September 19, 2013
If John Boehner Really Had Chutzpah...
...what he'd do today is convince over 100 Members of his conference who have been griping about Ted Cruz and the Crazy Caucus to stand with him while he makes the following statement:
--
Over the last several months, I was convinced by enthusiastic Tea Party conservatives that their defund Obamacare idea really had a chance to work. I admit I was against it at first. But they convinced me that I was trapped in politics-as-usual Washington thinking, and that what we had here was a one-time opportunity to turn the tables on Barack Obama and the Democrat Party. They were right. A House vote for defunding Obamacare along with the CR would set the stage for a battle in the Senate -- and with the House giving them momentum, a groundswell of opinion from small towns, from big cities, and from farms across America could finally put an end to this terrible socialist experiment. Tea Party conservatives had me smelling the phone wires and emails and spontaneous grass-roots demonstrations that would have started as soon as our plan passed the House and hit the Senate. And so we scheduled the vote.
Unfortunately, Senator Ted Cruz undermined all that by his pre-emptive surrender yesterday. What was once a promising strategy has been destroyed. There's no going back; as much as we wish it, conservatives are very sensible and pragmatic people, and there's no way they're going to rise up to support a plan when a prominent Senator who had been talking up the idea, one who had been thought to be a real conservative, has already admitted defeat.
Therefore, now that Ted Cruz has given away our chance of using the budget deadlines to end Obamacare, we're going to move ahead with a more positive plan, centered on the budget and the spending. After all, what Americans really want to know is: What about the spending? So we're going to solve his crisis that the president caused. We'll vote tomorrow to keep the government open for the year and to adjust our debt limit to account for the lower deficits that Republican policies have brought us. But that's not all: we're also going to force the Senate to vote on our new Balanced Budget Amendment, the one that answers the question: Where are the jobs? And we're going to make them vote again -- three times -- on a budget. That'll show 'em.
I've heard recently that whoever doesn't carry the fight against Obamacare is therefore basically an Obamacare supporter. I guess that makes Ted Cruz the biggest Obamacare supporter of them all. As for us, we've voted 41 times to repeal against this terrible program, and I pledge right now that we'll vote 41 more times if necessary. I'll never give up, and neither will any of us Republicans in the House of Representatives.
Thank you very much.
--
Over the last several months, I was convinced by enthusiastic Tea Party conservatives that their defund Obamacare idea really had a chance to work. I admit I was against it at first. But they convinced me that I was trapped in politics-as-usual Washington thinking, and that what we had here was a one-time opportunity to turn the tables on Barack Obama and the Democrat Party. They were right. A House vote for defunding Obamacare along with the CR would set the stage for a battle in the Senate -- and with the House giving them momentum, a groundswell of opinion from small towns, from big cities, and from farms across America could finally put an end to this terrible socialist experiment. Tea Party conservatives had me smelling the phone wires and emails and spontaneous grass-roots demonstrations that would have started as soon as our plan passed the House and hit the Senate. And so we scheduled the vote.
Unfortunately, Senator Ted Cruz undermined all that by his pre-emptive surrender yesterday. What was once a promising strategy has been destroyed. There's no going back; as much as we wish it, conservatives are very sensible and pragmatic people, and there's no way they're going to rise up to support a plan when a prominent Senator who had been talking up the idea, one who had been thought to be a real conservative, has already admitted defeat.
Therefore, now that Ted Cruz has given away our chance of using the budget deadlines to end Obamacare, we're going to move ahead with a more positive plan, centered on the budget and the spending. After all, what Americans really want to know is: What about the spending? So we're going to solve his crisis that the president caused. We'll vote tomorrow to keep the government open for the year and to adjust our debt limit to account for the lower deficits that Republican policies have brought us. But that's not all: we're also going to force the Senate to vote on our new Balanced Budget Amendment, the one that answers the question: Where are the jobs? And we're going to make them vote again -- three times -- on a budget. That'll show 'em.
I've heard recently that whoever doesn't carry the fight against Obamacare is therefore basically an Obamacare supporter. I guess that makes Ted Cruz the biggest Obamacare supporter of them all. As for us, we've voted 41 times to repeal against this terrible program, and I pledge right now that we'll vote 41 more times if necessary. I'll never give up, and neither will any of us Republicans in the House of Representatives.
Thank you very much.
Wednesday, September 18, 2013
In Which John Boehner Tells a Little White Lie
So House Republicans are going to (try to) pass a semi-clean CR except for including an ACA defunding mechanism. John Boehner says:
Look: with a normal, healthy party, 218 could be important, as the process of getting to consensus would involve internal compromises and as the various factions agree to work together going forward. That would allow the conference leadership to negotiate on behalf of the party, with everyone understanding that the leadership would cut the best deal possible -- even if what they could not win might not be spread equally around all party groups.
That's not what we have with the House GOP. Instead, we basically have a group that is large enough to prevent any GOP-only measure from passing which makes crazy demands that have zero chance of being achieved in those final negotiations. And most of the rest of the party is terrified of allowing any perceived distance between themselves and the wacko demand group.
But at the same time, everyone knows that sooner or later something will have to pass the House that is also acceptable to the Democrats. And that implies that there will, at some point, be real bargaining, just as there was, for example, on the fiscal cliff. But House Republican absence from the real bargaining isn't related to whether they can first participate in a symbolic Ritual of Conservative Obedience. Basically, Boehner hasn't been involved in bargaining because his conference (reportedly) ordered him to stay out of the bargaining.
That said: I agree with Brian Beutler that the Ritual of Conservative Obedience -- the defund-Obamacare CR vote now scheduled for Friday -- doesn't make the final deal any more difficult, and it's probably a step forward that at least House Republicans have (apparently) agreed on the appropriate ritual.
“On every major issue we’ve faced for the past two and a half years, the math has been the same: House Republicans either find a way together to get to 218, or the Democrats who run the rest of Washington essentially get everything they want,” he added, pressing for House GOP unity.This is, well....not true.
Look: with a normal, healthy party, 218 could be important, as the process of getting to consensus would involve internal compromises and as the various factions agree to work together going forward. That would allow the conference leadership to negotiate on behalf of the party, with everyone understanding that the leadership would cut the best deal possible -- even if what they could not win might not be spread equally around all party groups.
That's not what we have with the House GOP. Instead, we basically have a group that is large enough to prevent any GOP-only measure from passing which makes crazy demands that have zero chance of being achieved in those final negotiations. And most of the rest of the party is terrified of allowing any perceived distance between themselves and the wacko demand group.
But at the same time, everyone knows that sooner or later something will have to pass the House that is also acceptable to the Democrats. And that implies that there will, at some point, be real bargaining, just as there was, for example, on the fiscal cliff. But House Republican absence from the real bargaining isn't related to whether they can first participate in a symbolic Ritual of Conservative Obedience. Basically, Boehner hasn't been involved in bargaining because his conference (reportedly) ordered him to stay out of the bargaining.
That said: I agree with Brian Beutler that the Ritual of Conservative Obedience -- the defund-Obamacare CR vote now scheduled for Friday -- doesn't make the final deal any more difficult, and it's probably a step forward that at least House Republicans have (apparently) agreed on the appropriate ritual.
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
The Big Difference Between 1995 and Now
One more point about Speaker Boehner and the Republicans as we approach a possible shutdown: this is very different than 1995-1996. Newt Gingrich, unlike Boehner now, really did believe that Bill Clinton was going to fold; his entire strategy for the year was to play chicken with Clinton, who he mistakenly saw as a weakling.
Newt, too, really was coming off of a stunning electoral victory. Bill Clinton's approval ratings were fairly similar to where Barack Obama is now, but where we sit in the electoral cycle is totally different, since the most recent election was an Obama-reelection in which Democrats gained seats in both Houses of Congress. In other words, it wasn't nuts for Republicans to believe that the will of the voters was on their side. It was wrong -- but not totally nuts.
Moreover, in 1995 Republicans had an understandable sense that anything was possible -- they had done something everyone had told them was impossible. Not just that -- but Newt had led them to an electoral victory everyone told them was impossible. In real life, sure, not everyone thought it was impossible, and Newt had very little to do with it, but that they thought otherwise wasn't nuts....well, I suppose it's not exactly rational to believe that your leader has magic powers, not to mention that falling for Newt's snake oil has never been very smart, but it was in a lot of ways a normal (incorrect) reaction to events. In that sense, comparing it to 2010 doesn't get at it at all; sure, there were some overenthusiastic Democrats who claimed that 2008 was the dawn of a solid Democratic era, but 2010 was far less of a shock than 1994 had been.
Put it all together, and it makes this fall very different from 1995. It still doesn't mean that we won't get a shutdown...plenty of factors make it hard to make a deal, even if leaders on both sides want one. But in 1995 Republicans sprinted off the cliff, following and in many cases believing a leader who promised them they could float on air. That's not where they are this time.
Newt, too, really was coming off of a stunning electoral victory. Bill Clinton's approval ratings were fairly similar to where Barack Obama is now, but where we sit in the electoral cycle is totally different, since the most recent election was an Obama-reelection in which Democrats gained seats in both Houses of Congress. In other words, it wasn't nuts for Republicans to believe that the will of the voters was on their side. It was wrong -- but not totally nuts.
Moreover, in 1995 Republicans had an understandable sense that anything was possible -- they had done something everyone had told them was impossible. Not just that -- but Newt had led them to an electoral victory everyone told them was impossible. In real life, sure, not everyone thought it was impossible, and Newt had very little to do with it, but that they thought otherwise wasn't nuts....well, I suppose it's not exactly rational to believe that your leader has magic powers, not to mention that falling for Newt's snake oil has never been very smart, but it was in a lot of ways a normal (incorrect) reaction to events. In that sense, comparing it to 2010 doesn't get at it at all; sure, there were some overenthusiastic Democrats who claimed that 2008 was the dawn of a solid Democratic era, but 2010 was far less of a shock than 1994 had been.
Put it all together, and it makes this fall very different from 1995. It still doesn't mean that we won't get a shutdown...plenty of factors make it hard to make a deal, even if leaders on both sides want one. But in 1995 Republicans sprinted off the cliff, following and in many cases believing a leader who promised them they could float on air. That's not where they are this time.
Monday, September 16, 2013
Q Day 2: Speaker Boehner?
Kal asks:
So, what would make Boehner a failure? First and foremost, if his own conference turned against him (especially early in his tenure). That would be pretty good evidence. But you're probably thinking: there was a semi-revolt against him at the beginning of this Congress! Well, yes, but I think that's hard to hold against him; those who opposed him were from the fringes of the party. There's not much any Speaker could do, as far as I can see, to control that. What I'd take as a sign of failure would be if the revolt came (as it did against Newt Gingrich and Jim Wright) from the party and conference mainstream.
Both Newt and Wright were "too strong" -- that is, they tried to be party dictators in the House, and Members rebelled against that. It's harder to find objective evidence that the Speaker is "too weak." That was the problem with Tom Foley (and perhaps Hastert; his Speakership is harder to characterize because of his relationship with Tom DeLay). There does seem, however, to be general consensus that the Foley House was often unable to pass party priorities despite seemingly having enough votes to do so. I don't think that's really a problem for the Boehner House; the problem passing things appears to be based on real party divisions. One might argue that the Farm Bill is something that the overwhelming majority of the conference would like to pass, and that Boehner has failed to figure out a way to make that happen. But I can't really think of another example.
A third problem would be if the sausage-making is unnecessarily ugly. Boehner might be faulted on that one; he's had multiple episodes in which bills had to be pulled off the House schedule at the last minute, or even brought to the floor and defeated. My general sense, however, is that this isn't really that big a deal. And that Boehner deserves more credit for avoiding a truly damaging fiasco (a long government shutdown, or a debt limit breach) than blame for a bunch of awful-looking false starts.
Basically, I think the House Republican conference is a mess, and that it's going to look bad no matter who the Speaker is. There seem to be a dozen, maybe two dozen, Members whose primary motivation appears to be differentiating themselves from their own leadership (in order to prove that they are Real Conservatives and not sell-out RINOs). It doesn't appear to be issue-based, so it's just about impossible for any Speaker to cut deals to make the problem go away; indeed, the form of the opposition is hostility to any deals, regardless of policy content, with anyone. And on top of that, almost everyone else is terrified of distance between themselves and the fringe -- and terrified of agreeing with a president who, given divided government, they're simply going to have to cut deals with in order to get anything done. Those conditions make the Speaker's job impossible, and unless Boehner is responsible for those conditions -- and I think he is not -- then it's hard to blame him for the consequences.
I'm probably going too long on this, but I should add one more thing: if it turns out that Boehner does in fact retire after this term, and it further turns out that his retirement was involuntary and that mainstream Members of his conference wanted him out, then I'd have to revise my thinking, perhaps quite a bit.
What would it take for you to consider Boehner a "failure" as Speaker?This is a great question, since I often say that Boehner is a pretty good Speaker, but don't always really explain what I mean.
So, what would make Boehner a failure? First and foremost, if his own conference turned against him (especially early in his tenure). That would be pretty good evidence. But you're probably thinking: there was a semi-revolt against him at the beginning of this Congress! Well, yes, but I think that's hard to hold against him; those who opposed him were from the fringes of the party. There's not much any Speaker could do, as far as I can see, to control that. What I'd take as a sign of failure would be if the revolt came (as it did against Newt Gingrich and Jim Wright) from the party and conference mainstream.
Both Newt and Wright were "too strong" -- that is, they tried to be party dictators in the House, and Members rebelled against that. It's harder to find objective evidence that the Speaker is "too weak." That was the problem with Tom Foley (and perhaps Hastert; his Speakership is harder to characterize because of his relationship with Tom DeLay). There does seem, however, to be general consensus that the Foley House was often unable to pass party priorities despite seemingly having enough votes to do so. I don't think that's really a problem for the Boehner House; the problem passing things appears to be based on real party divisions. One might argue that the Farm Bill is something that the overwhelming majority of the conference would like to pass, and that Boehner has failed to figure out a way to make that happen. But I can't really think of another example.
A third problem would be if the sausage-making is unnecessarily ugly. Boehner might be faulted on that one; he's had multiple episodes in which bills had to be pulled off the House schedule at the last minute, or even brought to the floor and defeated. My general sense, however, is that this isn't really that big a deal. And that Boehner deserves more credit for avoiding a truly damaging fiasco (a long government shutdown, or a debt limit breach) than blame for a bunch of awful-looking false starts.
Basically, I think the House Republican conference is a mess, and that it's going to look bad no matter who the Speaker is. There seem to be a dozen, maybe two dozen, Members whose primary motivation appears to be differentiating themselves from their own leadership (in order to prove that they are Real Conservatives and not sell-out RINOs). It doesn't appear to be issue-based, so it's just about impossible for any Speaker to cut deals to make the problem go away; indeed, the form of the opposition is hostility to any deals, regardless of policy content, with anyone. And on top of that, almost everyone else is terrified of distance between themselves and the fringe -- and terrified of agreeing with a president who, given divided government, they're simply going to have to cut deals with in order to get anything done. Those conditions make the Speaker's job impossible, and unless Boehner is responsible for those conditions -- and I think he is not -- then it's hard to blame him for the consequences.
I'm probably going too long on this, but I should add one more thing: if it turns out that Boehner does in fact retire after this term, and it further turns out that his retirement was involuntary and that mainstream Members of his conference wanted him out, then I'd have to revise my thinking, perhaps quite a bit.
Wednesday, September 4, 2013
The Post-Boehner House?
Rumors are circulating, apparently, that John Boehner will retire after the current election cycle. Ryan Grim and Jon Ward report. Are they true? I certainly have no idea. I do suspect that Boehner could keep the job if he wants it for at least two more years, but whether he wants it? It's hard to get inside a politicians head. There's surely a good case to be made that the reporting here couldn't have happened unless Boehner was willing to let it happen...at any rate, that's what we have for now.
What might be more useful is to speculate about what comes next. The assumption here is that Boehner retires after a status quo election, with Republicans picking up a handful of seats in the House. Just for fun, I'll put percentages on the possibilities:
45%: The new Speaker, whether it's Cantor or someone else who currently seems like a likely candidate, basically changes nothing. Within two months, the new Speaker is widely regarded by conservatives as the "establishment" brake on "real conservative" legislation.
45% The new Speaker, whether it's Cantor or someone else who currently seems like a likely candidate, is very similar to Boehner but not as effective, leading to either a government shutdown, some other real disaster for Republicans, or at least a notable increase in floor fiascos; party/committee conflict increases.
6% The new Speaker is a real Tea Partier, and deliberately runs the House over the cliff, leading to a complete disaster for Republicans
2% The new Speaker, Cantor or someone else who seems like a likely candidate, is very similar to Boehner but significantly more effective. The Speaker is still denounced as an establishment sell out, but floor fiascos are a thing of the past, and deals are cut more easily.
1% The new Speaker somehow transforms House Republicans, putting an end to Republican and House dysfunction, and finding a way to enact a conservative policy agenda into law while cutting deals with Barack Obama and the Senate to give them some of their priorities.
1% New Speaker? What new Speaker? Republicans split, and can't elect anyone as Speaker, leading to chaos and unpredictable results.
What might be more useful is to speculate about what comes next. The assumption here is that Boehner retires after a status quo election, with Republicans picking up a handful of seats in the House. Just for fun, I'll put percentages on the possibilities:
45%: The new Speaker, whether it's Cantor or someone else who currently seems like a likely candidate, basically changes nothing. Within two months, the new Speaker is widely regarded by conservatives as the "establishment" brake on "real conservative" legislation.
45% The new Speaker, whether it's Cantor or someone else who currently seems like a likely candidate, is very similar to Boehner but not as effective, leading to either a government shutdown, some other real disaster for Republicans, or at least a notable increase in floor fiascos; party/committee conflict increases.
6% The new Speaker is a real Tea Partier, and deliberately runs the House over the cliff, leading to a complete disaster for Republicans
2% The new Speaker, Cantor or someone else who seems like a likely candidate, is very similar to Boehner but significantly more effective. The Speaker is still denounced as an establishment sell out, but floor fiascos are a thing of the past, and deals are cut more easily.
1% The new Speaker somehow transforms House Republicans, putting an end to Republican and House dysfunction, and finding a way to enact a conservative policy agenda into law while cutting deals with Barack Obama and the Senate to give them some of their priorities.
1% New Speaker? What new Speaker? Republicans split, and can't elect anyone as Speaker, leading to chaos and unpredictable results.
Thursday, August 22, 2013
Iron Law of Politics? House Republican Leaders Are Always Squishes
There's a lot of good talk this morning about the GOP House leadership's current maybe-plan to trade in the possibility of shutting down the government over Obamacare for the threat of defaulting the government over Obamacare. Regardless of how it plays out, it occurs to me that there may be an Iron Law of Politics: House Republican Leaders Are Always Squishes.
John Boehner, of course, is a well-known traitor to true conservatives. He replaced Denny Hastert, who mostly was a blank slate for most people...at any rate, by the end of his tenure as Speaker, conservatives were quite unhappy with the drift of the House towards earmarks and spending.
Hastert replaced Newt Gingrich, who is sort of an unusual case; his demise probably had more to do with his overly centralized style as Speaker than about his lack of fidelity to conservative ideas. But conservatives never trusted him (and with good reason).
Gingrich replaced Bob Michel, who was clearly chased out as Minority Leader because he was insufficiently conservative and confrontational.
I'm not aware of any significant conservative action against John Rhodes, who preceded Michel. Before Rhodes was Gerald Ford, who everyone seemed to have liked.
Ford defeated Charles Halleck. According to one source I have (Richard Reeves' biography of Ford), the confrontation was along age, and not ideological lines...Halleck wasn't seen as a squish, or not sufficiently conservative, but just out of touch.
Halleck, however, ousted Joe Martin because Martin wasn't aggressive enough.
OK, that's the basic outline. The idea here isn't just about who is more conservative; it's a particular complaint that the current leader is always too accommodating of liberals, too ensconced in the "Washington" culture, not sufficiently confrontational, and other such complaints.
Hmmm...does that make an Iron Law? I'm mostly working from memory here. Hey, House historians! Am I getting these transitions right? The clear cases I see on transitions are Martin/Halleck, Michel/Newt, and Hastert/Boehner, with the current unhappiness with Boehner also a very good fit. I don't really know or remember enough about the pre-Michel leaders, though. I'm comfortable cutting it off with Martin, though.
Granted: at all times in every party, there are going to be moderates and hardliners, and the hardliners are going to find the leaders to be too moderate; that's the nature of an ideological spectrum, at least to the extent that spectrum is real. But I don't really see a similar dynamic happening with the other three Congressional leadership chains, especially within the House and Senate. Tom Foley might fit as someone regarded as insufficiently confrontational. There's a bit of that in the Senate, but I think it's mostly about complaints from outside interest groups and party actors about Howard Baker, Bob Dole, and Trent Lott. I don't think many Republican Senators joined in. And it's important that the complaints are regularly personal; there are (often? usually? always?) a group within the House who believe that Republicans would get much better outcomes with tougher, more confrontational leadership.
John Boehner, of course, is a well-known traitor to true conservatives. He replaced Denny Hastert, who mostly was a blank slate for most people...at any rate, by the end of his tenure as Speaker, conservatives were quite unhappy with the drift of the House towards earmarks and spending.
Hastert replaced Newt Gingrich, who is sort of an unusual case; his demise probably had more to do with his overly centralized style as Speaker than about his lack of fidelity to conservative ideas. But conservatives never trusted him (and with good reason).
Gingrich replaced Bob Michel, who was clearly chased out as Minority Leader because he was insufficiently conservative and confrontational.
I'm not aware of any significant conservative action against John Rhodes, who preceded Michel. Before Rhodes was Gerald Ford, who everyone seemed to have liked.
Ford defeated Charles Halleck. According to one source I have (Richard Reeves' biography of Ford), the confrontation was along age, and not ideological lines...Halleck wasn't seen as a squish, or not sufficiently conservative, but just out of touch.
Halleck, however, ousted Joe Martin because Martin wasn't aggressive enough.
OK, that's the basic outline. The idea here isn't just about who is more conservative; it's a particular complaint that the current leader is always too accommodating of liberals, too ensconced in the "Washington" culture, not sufficiently confrontational, and other such complaints.
Hmmm...does that make an Iron Law? I'm mostly working from memory here. Hey, House historians! Am I getting these transitions right? The clear cases I see on transitions are Martin/Halleck, Michel/Newt, and Hastert/Boehner, with the current unhappiness with Boehner also a very good fit. I don't really know or remember enough about the pre-Michel leaders, though. I'm comfortable cutting it off with Martin, though.
Granted: at all times in every party, there are going to be moderates and hardliners, and the hardliners are going to find the leaders to be too moderate; that's the nature of an ideological spectrum, at least to the extent that spectrum is real. But I don't really see a similar dynamic happening with the other three Congressional leadership chains, especially within the House and Senate. Tom Foley might fit as someone regarded as insufficiently confrontational. There's a bit of that in the Senate, but I think it's mostly about complaints from outside interest groups and party actors about Howard Baker, Bob Dole, and Trent Lott. I don't think many Republican Senators joined in. And it's important that the complaints are regularly personal; there are (often? usually? always?) a group within the House who believe that Republicans would get much better outcomes with tougher, more confrontational leadership.
Thursday, August 15, 2013
Hey, Everyone: We Haven't Avoided Shutdown Yet
The conversation over the last couple of days has moved on from the threat of an imminent shutdown of the government over Obamacare to a possible debt limit breach over Obamacare. That's thanks to reporting by Robert Costa and others that House leaders are pitching that switch to hard-liners. Which is all well and good, except:
1. Costa's an excellent reporter. Nevertheless, it's not entirely clear that he's reporting Congressional leader success -- or Congressional leader spin. It is clear that Congressional Republicans are not going to stand solidly behind Lee and Cruz, but especially in the House if a few dozen Republicans stick with the Lee/Cruz plan, then Boehner can't pass anything with a party-line vote.
2. Even if it's true that the Obamacare showdown has been delayed, perhaps indefinitely...as I said the other day, that only brings us back to square one. Boehner still probably wants to find 218 votes for a CR to take to conference, and certainly needs to find 218 to pass a final CR that will also pass the Senate and get signed into law by Barack Obama. It's still hard to see any yes votes out of the hard-liners; it's still the case that the bulk of his conference hates voting with Democrats and against the hard-liners, regardless of substance.
I'm not saying a shutdown is inevitable. If I had to bet, I'd bet on Boehner dodging this one, too. But it's very much a touch-and-go question. It ain't over and won't be until the votes are counted, no matter what Republican leaders wish -- we're still heading for a shutdown confrontation.
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
Catch of the Day
What Greg Sargent said:
This latest move from a shutdown-based strategy against Obamacare to a debt limit-based one (presuming it will even happen) is part of a larger pattern, in which GOP leaders try to talk conservatives out of the favored insane and dangerous strategy of the moment by promising another confrontation around some other leverage point later. Indeed, GOP leaders have done exactly this in the past, in order to avoid a confrontation over — yup — the debt ceiling...Here's the thing: no matter what happens -- no matter what the Speaker does, or who the Speaker is -- the Speaker is going to be the squish in the little morality play being staged by conservatives. Why? Because on true must-pass legislation under the current conditions of divided government, at the end of the day the Speaker is going to support, tacitly or explicitly, a deal with the Democratic Senate and the Kenyan Islamist-Atheist Socialist in the White House. Because eventually (before or after a shutdown, before or after a debt limit breach) the must-pass thing will pass, and the only way that happens is that it passes both Houses and is signed by the president. Which means that the Speaker goes along with something that the Democrats can live with.
Now we are being asked to believe that Republicans will use the debt limit — on which they caved last time — to force concessions on Obamacare. But the problem is that the timing of all of this makes this strategy even more suspect this time.
And the way that Capital-C Conservatives prove that they're real Conservatives and not RINOs is by opposing whatever that deal is, and by making the Speaker the scapegoat. If only they had held their breath even longer, and turned an even more beautiful shade of blue, surely then the Democrats (who are both incredibly devious partisan fighters and wimps about to cave any second now) would have surrendered. The fault is with their traitorous leaders. Always.
What follows from this is a few things...
1. Boehner's kick the ball down the road might be working not because he's duping hard-line conservatives in his conference but because they need him to do it for their story.
2. Boehner's position is relatively safe, as long as he wants it in these conditions (and yeah, most Members who get on the leadership ladder at all really, really, really want to be Speaker for Life, whatever the conditions it's under) -- in large part because the opposition to him is structural, not personal, and whoever is next in line would have exactly the same problems. And everyone knows it. So the rest of the leadership is content to wait for a better time to grab the big chair -- and even the nuttiest of the Crazy Caucus don't really want to be toppling a Speaker once a month.
3. As I've been saying for a while: the specific demands of those who aren't going to vote for the eventual deal really don't matter very much.
None of this means there won't be a shutdown or a debt limit disaster. Boehner will still need the votes, and that's going to be hard; even beyond that, brinkmanship always carries with it the danger of miscalculation.
But, yeah, the Speaker has developed a solid record of ducking disaster in these showdowns, and there's a good chance he's on course to do it again.
And: nice catch!
Monday, July 22, 2013
Hey, John Boehner: Wanna Make a Deal?*
The Speaker (emphasis added):
Every time the House votes to repeal or otherwise destroy the Affordable Care Act, Reid will call that bill up in the Senate.
And in exchange, every time Reid does that, he also gets to pick one Senate-passed bill for John Boehner to bring to the floor of the House.
Starting with, oh, say....immigration.
Oh, I should explain; I'm not just being snarky. The real point here is that the Speaker -- or, really, the majority party, but in operational terms it's the party leadership -- really does absolutely control the floor of the House. It's not quite impossible for something to get full House consideration if the Speaker doesn't want it, but it's next-to-impossible. Over on the Senate side, the Majority Leader has no such authority. Oh, sure, Reid gets to decide which bills to bring up...but he can't control what gets offered as an amendment, which means anyone who has a bill that's being ignored has the option to offer it as an amendment, even if it isn't relevant to the bill under consideration. So if any Senator really wants to get a vote on something, that's usually going to happen.
On the other hand, thanks to the full 60 vote Senate, Reid can bring something up without much fear of getting rolled. All he has to do is to hold 41 of the 54 Democrats. Boehner has no such protection; under normal procedure, anything that comes up in the House passes if it gets a simple majority. But don't call that "majority rule" -- remember, the only majorities that matter in the House are those that the majority party allows to operate. It's majority party rule, not majority rule.
At any rate, what do you think of my deal? As Boehner says, "let's see what happens."
*Or: Sauce for the goose, Mr. Saavik?
BOEHNER: Well, Bob, I've been around this town for a little while, like you have -- not quite as long -- but around here, never, ever, ever is not usually a good prescription. The senators know, the Democrat senators know that this law's not workable. They know it's not ready. It was Max Baucus, Senate chairman, Democrat chairman of the Finance Committee, who said that this was a train wreck. They know it's a train wreck, so I wouldn't be so quick to suggest that they're never going to take this up. Matter of fact, I would urge Senator Harry Reid, the majority leader, put these two bills on the floor of the Senate to delay the employer mandate and to delay the individual mandate, and let's see what happens.You know what I bet Harry Reid would be willing to do? I bet he'd be willing -- more than willing, he'd be thrilled -- to make the following deal:
Every time the House votes to repeal or otherwise destroy the Affordable Care Act, Reid will call that bill up in the Senate.
And in exchange, every time Reid does that, he also gets to pick one Senate-passed bill for John Boehner to bring to the floor of the House.
Starting with, oh, say....immigration.
Oh, I should explain; I'm not just being snarky. The real point here is that the Speaker -- or, really, the majority party, but in operational terms it's the party leadership -- really does absolutely control the floor of the House. It's not quite impossible for something to get full House consideration if the Speaker doesn't want it, but it's next-to-impossible. Over on the Senate side, the Majority Leader has no such authority. Oh, sure, Reid gets to decide which bills to bring up...but he can't control what gets offered as an amendment, which means anyone who has a bill that's being ignored has the option to offer it as an amendment, even if it isn't relevant to the bill under consideration. So if any Senator really wants to get a vote on something, that's usually going to happen.
On the other hand, thanks to the full 60 vote Senate, Reid can bring something up without much fear of getting rolled. All he has to do is to hold 41 of the 54 Democrats. Boehner has no such protection; under normal procedure, anything that comes up in the House passes if it gets a simple majority. But don't call that "majority rule" -- remember, the only majorities that matter in the House are those that the majority party allows to operate. It's majority party rule, not majority rule.
At any rate, what do you think of my deal? As Boehner says, "let's see what happens."
*Or: Sauce for the goose, Mr. Saavik?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
