Gun Control Didn't Ruin Obama's Second Term

Alex Seitz-Wald test-drives what could easily become a new liberal fantasy:

The Connecticut massacre set in motion a cascade of events that led the White House to burn through its only real window to accomplish its goals. The month before the shooting, Obama had won a convincing reelection and a modest popular mandate. One major liberal wish-list entry, immigration reform, seemed not only within reach but almost inevitable.

Instead, not only in this story did Obama's gun control initiative sink immigration reform, but it derailed, at least so far, his entire second term.

C'mon. Let's see...this argument depends on a bunch of stuff: To begin with: that there's such a thing as a mandate (and that Obama had one on immigration), and that "The first few months of any president's term, closest to their electoral win and furthest from the next congressional midterm, are usually the most fruitful." The latter holds for first terms, but as far as I know there's no similar evidence on second terms, and certainly not second terms which also yield continued divided government.

For that matter, the list of reelections with continued divided government is a short one -- in the last hundred years, only 1956, 1972, 1984, and 1996 fit that category before 2012, and of those 1972 wasn't much of a test. I don't think it supports Seitz-Wald's point, either. Just looking at wikipedia...the 99th Congress didn't pass any major bills until December 1985, but passed several, including tax reform, in 1986. Tax reform is as good a comp as any. Reagan sent up his proposal in May 1985; Ways and Means marked up a bill in September through December, 1985 and it passed the House in the same month; Senate Finance finished their markup in May, 1986; the Senate passed it at the end of June; and then after a formal conference in July and August, both chambers passed the bill in September, 1986.

Ike's 85th Congress did pass three major laws in 1955, but several more in 1956. As for Clinton, not too much happened in the 105th (although unlike in Ike's case, the second Congress of Clinton's second term was more productive.

What I think all this says is: the "almost inevitable" was an illusion. Presidents re-elected with continued divided government don't have a Hundred Days, and they basically don't pass partisan initiatives.

Or, to put it another way: whether immigration reform passed was always going to be about what mainstream House conservatives wanted, and they really don't care very much whether Barack Obama's approval rating is at its honeymoon peak of around 51%, or if it's fallen to around 48% (post-gun bill), 46% (after the Senate passed immigration), or 41% (now). Now, if Obama was at 70% that might scare a few moderates, but that wasn't going to happen in winter and spring 2013.

Obama's second term legislative agenda was derailed on election night 2012 when Republicans retained the House. After that, it's just been a question of where to find a few productive compromises that work for both parties.

More broadly, it's just not true that Congress, or even one chamber of Congress, can only do one thing at a time. Even when the bills are going to go through the same committees, it's actually perfectly possible for two or more bills to advance through the process together. Sure, small delays are possible if two bills reach the exact same stage at the exact same time, but usually that's not the case. The more likely explanation for the delay in the immigration bill -- just as with the ACA in 2009 -- is that it takes time for Congress to work its way through complex, contentious bills.

Pass it along: gun safety probably had no effect at all on the rest of Barack Obama's second term.

Immigration: Dead or Undead?

Greg Sargent has been doing great reporting and analysis on immigration, and today he reports on a third Republican Member who has signed on to the House Democrats' bill.

There are important differences between immigration and the clean CR needed to re-open the government earlier this month, but in many respects the way to look at it is similar. A handful of Republicans willing to go public with their support for comprehensive immigration reform isn't likely to get a bill to the House floor. Even twenty of them, which would be enough for a House majority (if Democrats are unanimous, which may not be the case) wouldn't be enough to force Boehner's hand. It's easy to imagine two dozen Republicans voting for a comprehensive bill; it's a lot harder to imagine them breaking with their party on procedural votes (or a discharge petition) to force that bill to the floor.

Which means that it all comes down to the same thing is always has: what do the bulk of mainstream conservatives in the Republican conference really want?

The biggest difference between immigration (and VAWA, on the one hand) and the clean CR a few weeks ago (and the fiscal cliff deal) is that in this case, there is no eventual must-pass situation. So really mainstream conservatives can do whatever they want; the only limitation on them is that if they do want the bill to pass, at least a handful of them may have to actually vote for it. In that sense, a period in which pro-immigration Republicans come out for a bill may be useful, since every one them is one "yes" vote that those who want a bill over their "no" vote do not have to supply.

And remember: if there is a fairly large group who wants a bill to pass over their public opposition, they're hardly going to tell reporters that they're in it. Since that sort of defeats the purpose. So both the group who sincerely opposes it and almost all of the group who actually wants it to pass are going to tell the press that they oppose it. Right up to the point where it passes. If it does!

In other words, we're back to where we've been on this all year: we really don't know whether the bill is dead or undead. It all depends on what mainstream conservatives want, and while they may tell Republican leadership, they probably aren't going to tell the press.

Q Day 1: Immigration Timing?

Leviathan asks:

...[F]or most Republicans standing in the way of reform, the issue is a primary challenge and not a general election challenge.

If for a good chunk of those congressmen, their main disincentive is a primary challenge while their true preference is for immigration reform to pass either out of personal conviction or because of their assessment of the GOP's future, then the most opportune time for a vote would be after primary season either before or after the general election.

So my question is this. What do you think of this theory and what do you think of the chances of immigration reform in general?

First, that seems like a reasonable analysis. My addition to it would be that one might argue that the off-year is particularly dangerous for an issue on which the big problem is nomination challenges, because that's when potential challengers decide whether to run or not. So there might be a brief post-election window that's safe right at the beginning of a new Congress (that is, this time around, in winter-spring 2013), but then it gets more and more difficult up to the point where filing deadlines pass. Which is a large spread, since congressional primaries are spread out from spring to September...filing deadlines are as early as December 2013, and are done or almost done by mid-June.

I'd add that we've had a pretty steady run of lame duck, post-election Congressional sessions lately; presumably, immigration might do even better in a lame duck session, with defeated or retiring Republicans perhaps willing to vote for (perceived) party benefit instead of their own electoral self-interest.

As far as the chances for comprehensive immigration reform? I don't know. Most, but not all, reporters on the Hill seem to think it's dead or almost dead. That could be true. On the other hand, I really wouldn't place all that much importance on John Boehner's promise that it won't pass on a "Hastert" violation. It makes sense that he would say that; however, if the bulk of his caucus wants the bill to pass (even if they don't want to vote for it), then he'll bring it up and have it pass with mostly Democratic votes, and he won't suffer for it.

So the question really is, and always has been, whether mainstream House Republicans want the bill to pass or not, in a situation in which almost everyone believes that (1) it would be good for the GOP as a whole for it to pass, but (2) it would be risky for most Republican Members of the House to support it. And with GOP-aligned organized interests split. But that's as far as I can go from the outside; I really don't have a guess about what eventually happens.

Read Stuff, You Should

Happy Birthday to Sir Ian Holm, 82. I've actually only seen him in a handful of movies, with a bunch of things that I easily could have seen but for whatever reason haven't. But two of those I have seen stand out for me: his performances in Big Night, and as Fluellen in Henry V. Terrific.

Ah, nothing like a little good stuff:

1. Margo Schlanger on solitary confinement.

2. Gabriel Arana on the immigration bill.

3. Jamelle Bouie reports from rally for defunding Obamacare.

4. I like this Roseanne McMannus analysis of Obama going to Congress very much; I've argued it was a good idea because it would generate information for him, but she sees it as a way to signal he was serious about a strike. I would add: it's a way to continue to up his threat without actually taking the action. In other words, it may have been a way to extend the bluff (or at least the bluster) one more round before he had to show his cards.

5. While James Fearon is smart as always about Syria.

Elsewhere: Immigration, Age Limits, More

I'm mostly over at Greg's place this week, so I guess I should drop one of these "elsewhere" posts by now, no? Let's see...

Yesterday, I responded to an excellent Ezra Klein post and asked (and partially answered) the question of what should incoming Senators read?

This afternoon at Plum Line, I said that the "calendar" as an obstacle to immigration reform is bunk.

And I'm beating the drum again for eliminating minimum age requirements for federal offices.

More:

Why going to Congress before war helps presidents

Yes, people still dislike ‘Obamacare.’ But they also dislike GOP plans to undermine it.

Conservatives make selling them out really easy

The debt limit timetable

The Iowa caucuses aren’t going anywhere

Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Great judge, terrible political analyst

Hey, John Boehner: Wanna Make a Deal?*

The Speaker (emphasis added):

BOEHNER: Well, Bob, I've been around this town for a little while, like you have -- not quite as long -- but around here, never, ever, ever is not usually a good prescription. The senators know, the Democrat senators know that this law's not workable. They know it's not ready. It was Max Baucus, Senate chairman, Democrat chairman of the Finance Committee, who said that this was a train wreck. They know it's a train wreck, so I wouldn't be so quick to suggest that they're never going to take this up. Matter of fact, I would urge Senator Harry Reid, the majority leader, put these two bills on the floor of the Senate to delay the employer mandate and to delay the individual mandate, and let's see what happens.

You know what I bet Harry Reid would be willing to do? I bet he'd be willing -- more than willing, he'd be thrilled -- to make the following deal:

Every time the House votes to repeal or otherwise destroy the Affordable Care Act, Reid will call that bill up in the Senate.

And in exchange, every time Reid does that, he also gets to pick one Senate-passed bill for John Boehner to bring to the floor of the House.

Starting with, oh, say....immigration.

Oh, I should explain; I'm not just being snarky. The real point here is that the Speaker -- or, really, the majority party, but in operational terms it's the party leadership -- really does absolutely control the floor of the House. It's not quite impossible for something to get full House consideration if the Speaker doesn't want it, but it's next-to-impossible. Over on the Senate side, the Majority Leader has no such authority. Oh, sure, Reid gets to decide which bills to bring up...but he can't control what gets offered as an amendment, which means anyone who has a bill that's being ignored has the option to offer it as an amendment, even if it isn't relevant to the bill under consideration. So if any Senator really wants to get a vote on something, that's usually going to happen.

On the other hand, thanks to the full 60 vote Senate, Reid can bring something up without much fear of getting rolled. All he has to do is to hold 41 of the 54 Democrats. Boehner has no such protection; under normal procedure, anything that comes up in the House passes if it gets a simple majority. But don't call that "majority rule" -- remember, the only majorities that matter in the House are those that the majority party allows to operate. It's majority party rule, not majority rule.

At any rate, what do you think of my deal? As Boehner says, "let's see what happens."





*Or: Sauce for the goose, Mr. Saavik?

The Next Step on Immigration (Fun Times in the House)

Good reporting today from NR's Jonathan Strong highlights the weird dynamic on the next step for immigration reform.

Here's the deal. Most Republicans, at the very least, want to pass something -- so that they can deflect at least some of the blame for comprehensive reform failing, and at least to some extent because they really do support some legislation. But they can't pass a comprehensive bill (at least not without relying on mostly Democratic votes), or even a mostly comprehensive bill. So the plan has been to pass a series of small bills that have wider support.

The problem? They may not have the votes for those, either.

There are two things going on here. One is that the tactical play for Democrats is to oppose each of the individual small bills unless they get some assurance that Republicans will eventually allow a vote on the part of reform that Democrats care about -- the path to citizenship. The question is whether moderate Democrats will hang tight, even on small bills, such as "border security" provisions, which they actually support (or at least want to be on record as supporting).

And then on the Republican side, there's a group which just likes voting against everything, even if they support the substance. On immigration, the excuse for voting no is that Boehner could use any successful bill as a mechanism for getting to conference, and then return to the House with something like the Senate bill, which would then pass the House with mostly Democratic votes. Now, this is basically nonsense. Not that Boehner might choose to pass a bill with mostly Democratic votes; that's a real threat, or at least a real potential threat. But if the Speaker wants to do that, there's nothing to prevent him from simply bringing up the Senate bill right now. Doesn't matter; the "no" caucus just likes opposing everything.

Now, in a normal legislature with a normal majority party, the "no" caucus could be marginalized...well, they would be marginalizing themselves. If Boehner can't pass something with 218 Republicans because the loony right won't help him, he would move a bit to the center to pick up moderate Democrats.

However, that doesn't work in the House we have. Partially because those moderate Democrats don't want to play along (especially since they'll be supporting any bills which are actually intended to become law, since those bill must get Barack Obama's signature and therefore can't be GOP-only). But mostly because many mainstream House Republicans are terrified of being called RINOs and sellouts, and therefore are terrified of separation between themselves and the crazy caucus.

At any rate: border security, at least, will pass the House if either moderate Democrats or the fringiest of conservative Republicans, all of whom support it, actually vote for it. My guess all along is that they probably won't.

Immigration Blame Game

A good point from Dave Hopkins:

Will be hard for GOP leaders to blame Dems if immig reform falls apart in part b/c plenty of conservatives will take credit for killing it.

The trick will be threading the needle somehow, right? To be clear: within the conservative information loop, it's probably perfectly possible for both arguments to gather steam, both that conservative heroes saved the nation from an amnesty bill and that Barack Obama deliberately undermined the bill for cynical political reasons. Make them forcefully, and no one who wants to support the GOP line will notice a contradiction.

However, the key constituency for the argument is neutral Latino groups and opinion leaders (and perhaps also GOP-aligned Latino leaders who are nevertheless upset about their position on the issue and considering splitting). For them, yeah, it does seem that having a bunch of conservatives celebrating the death of a bill might be a problem.

Come to think of it, there's probably another key constituency: both Latinos and non-Latinos who would otherwise be open to the GOP but are disgusted by what they perceive as intolerance. The problem there is obvious; it's more than likely that those conservatives bragging about killing the bill will say things that sound intolerant to that constituency, and Democrats will certainly be aggressive about making sure the right ears hear what's being said. Indeed, the strongest argument for passing a bill (when it comes to electoral politics) is that getting the issue off the table will reduce the chances of Republican politicians saying the wrong thing in the future.

Anyway, in related immigration discussion, I have a post up at PP talking about what's going wrong for immigration in the House -- it needs full-out Republican supporters, and it doesn't seem to be getting any.

For Republicans, Hastert Violation Beats Discharge Petition

The latest excitement among those who want an immigration bill is the possibility that the House could use a discharge petition to bring a bill to the floor. 

There are basically two possibilities here in which a discharge petition happens, and neither is likely. Why? Because the House leadership really, really, doesn't want discharge petitions to become common. And the rank-and-file share an interest in it, too.

One is that Speaker Boehner and most Republicans really want a bill to pass, but they don't want the blame. That means the eventual floor vote would have the bill passing with mostly Democratic votes, so the only question is the path to get it there: either Boehner can bring it up despite his promises not to (presumably after some event "changes" things, such as a House-authored bill going down in flames), or they can give tacit approval to some Republicans to sign a discharge petition. He'd rather have the former. Sure, that means that he has to take the heat, but that's what you get for sitting in the big chair.

The other is that Boehner and most Republicans really oppose having something pass. In that case, the Republicans who signed a discharge petition would be seriously undermining what the rest of the Republicans want. 

The key here is that House leaders strongly want to maintain party discipline on procedural votes, and a discharge petition is a very strong violation of party discipline -- even stronger, really, than a vote against a "rule" on the House floor.

The power of the majority party in the House basically comes down to agenda-setting, exercised in part by committee chairs but most critically by control of the House floor through the Rules Committee. 

A "Hastert" violation -- putting something on the floor that most Members of the majority party oppose -- doesn't cede control of the floor. A discharge petition does.

Therefore, it's far more likely that if they want something to pass, they'll put it on the floor themselves. And if they don't, it's unlikely that rebels would sign a discharge petition. It's one thing to vote against the party on substance; it's a much bigger deal to work with Democrats to gain control of the House floor.

Granted, for supporters of the bill, using the possibility of a discharge petition to apply pressure to Republicans who support a bill makes sense anyway. But the practical effect would almost certainly be having those Republicans push Boehner to bring the bill up, not to have them actually sign on. 

So the existence of the discharge petition procedure is a lever that bill advocates can use. But ultimately, that's probably not how a bill gets to the House floor.

Hey, Immigration Reporters! Will "Blame Both Sides" Work?

Brian Beutler has a nice piece today arguing that Republicans are already turning towards blaming Barack Obama and the Democrats for the collapse of the immigration bill.

Here's my question: is there anyone out there listening?

Presumably, the target for this sort of thing is neutral Latino opinion leaders -- not a large group, but a non-zero one -- who are open to a "blame both sides" argument. Maybe even Republican Latino opinion leaders who are willing to accept a lot, but not everything.

It seems to me (and I'm working from memory here, but I think I'm correct) that in fact Republicans had some success during Obama's first term in blaming him for the lack of progress on immigration. Of course, the facts were a little different then; Obama and the Democrats weren't pushing a comprehensive bill, and Obama's administration was in fact disappointing to Hispanics on deportations and other border issues. Sure, Democrats had an argument (support for DREAM Act, and that Republicans were even worse and were blocking them from even trying for a major bill), but at any rate my strong impression is that Republican spin was at least somewhat successful.

So: Hey, reporters! I don't care what whether the arguments Republicans are going to make hold water or not; I want to know whether they'll work. What's up with those Latino opinion leaders who took a "blame both sides" view of immigration reform during Obama's first term? Are they open to the arguments that Obama wants to sabotage the bill in order to have the issue for 2014? Or are they going to shift from "blame both sides" to "blame House Republicans"?

Five Points on Farm Bill/Immigration

Yesterday, I wrote over at PP about "What the Farm Bill says about immigration in the House." I've already linked to Greg, who had a similar view, and there were others, too. 

But Ezra Klein has a bit of a counterintuitive view this morning:

I’ll admit it: I don’t know what the collapse of the farm bill portends for immigration reform. But I suspect the answer is: not much.
[...]
Will immigration go the same way? Perhaps. But it’s not a sure thing, either. There’s not going to be an immigration bill that all House Republicans are happy with. And they’re not going to pass an immigration bill because Boehner begs and pleads. But they might, in the end, pass an immigration bill — or allow one to be passed — because they trust the basic strategy.

That’s not just the difference between immigration and the farm bill. It’s the difference between immigration and everything. Washington is acting surprised that Boehner can’t control his members. But we knew that already — remember Plan B? If you’re surprised that the House is a mess, you simply haven’t been paying attention.

I think there are a few quick points to be made here.

1. He's correct that we're not getting new information here. We knew "the House is a mess." All we had here is yet another example. So in that sense, it's fair to say that close observers of the House don't really have anything new to say after the farm bill. It's less "What the Farm Bill says about immigration in the House" than "What the Farm Bill says about immigration in the House -- if you were just tuning in." Of course, lots of people are just tuning in!

2.  I don't think it's correct to say that there's a "difference between immigration and everything." Specifically, I don't think it's correct to say that House Republicans don't care about passing a farm bill. Yes, they may be post-policy, but the farm bill? I would think that a lot of them want that to pass.

3. Which gets to an important point: it's one thing to say, as I've been saying that it may be the case on immigration that mainstream conservatives want the bill to pass but without their votes; it's another thing to solve that coordination problem. The same applies if their goal is to get something to committee and then let it die; there's still a coordination problem in actually getting that done.

4. By the way: yesterday's fiasco notwithstanding, there's still every possibility that we'll still get a farm bill this year. It wouldn't be the first time something collapsed on the floor only to be revived.

5. To the extent that the farm bill and immigration have any causal pull on each other, it may well be the other way around: if Boehner thinks he's eventually going to have to pass the Senate bill on immigration with mostly Democratic votes, he may be more reluctant to pass the Senate farm bill the same way. That's assuming the Senate version of the farm bill wouldn't get bipartisan majorities; it receive a fair number of Republican votes in the Senate, but short of a majority.

And once again: I still have no idea what House Republicans actually want to do on immigration. They may well want to kill it. We'll just have to see.

Finding a House Majority on Immigration

The news on immigration today is John Boehner rejecting the option of passing a bill with mostly Democratic votes. Or so he says; Jonathan Chait points out that Boehner's position makes him prone to bluffing. But for now:

"I just don't think that's the winning formula here," Cole told The Washington Examiner. "What the speaker wants to do is have a hopefully bipartisan product -- certainly one that has the majority of Republicans -- pass the House. This has got too much emotional, political impact and I think it really has to be genuinely bipartisan."

I'm sure that the Speaker wants a "bipartisan product."

I just don't see how it happens.

As Greg Sargent explains today, there's really "no papering over" the key question: is there a (real) path to citizenship, or not?

If there is, then it's virtually certain that the majority of House Republicans will oppose. If not, it's virtually certain that an overwhelming majority of House Democrats will oppose.

That, it seems to me, is obvious and easy. The more complicated question is whether there's any House majority at all behind anything.

Is there a GOP-only majority? I really doubt it. There are 234 Republicans right now, so if they lose more than 16 they will need help from the Democrats. It's possible that the whole GOP conference can be rallied to support something, but it's clearly hard work. I'm pretty convinced that there are at least 20 Republicans who would only support immigration-bashing measures, and also at least 20 Republicans who are pro-immigration. As far as I can tell, the only way something gets 218 Republicans is if they wind up putting the value of proving they can pass something ahead of their policy positions, and I'm not sure why they would want to do that.

What about a mostly-Republican bill? I'd love to see some reporting on where the remaining "Blue Dog" Democrats are on this. It seems (at least based on what we're seeing in the Senate) that most or all of them would support a comprehensive bill, but they could support, say, a border-security-only bill and still say they were for comprehensive reform. On the other hand, they would be getting on the wrong side of Latino groups -- and, remember, the wrong side of business. My guess, and it's completely just a guess, is that it's going to be very, very difficult to find a mostly-Republicans majority.

In other words, the reason I've been saying that Boehner would eventually have to decide whether to move bill with mostly Democratic votes is because I don't really think he has another option. Not just for something that could become law, but for anything to get through the House at all.

That could be wrong! A GOP-only bill is possible if Republicans agree to ignore their policy preferences for a while in order to get the "narrative" victory of passing something. A GOP-mostly bill is possible if a fair number of Democrats who would vote for a comprehensive bill would also vote for a GOP-written bill without citizenship. I don't think those votes are there, but I could easily be wrong about it. Note, however, that even if they are, that just gets something to conference...actually getting something enacted into law just gets them back to the original question, because it's pretty certain that nothing becomes law without citizenship. And, once again, most Republicans are not going to vote for citizenship.

All of which gets back to my initial sense that the question is all about whether House Republicans want a comprehensive bill to become law, or not. If not, Boehner won't bring it up, and it's dead. If so, Boehner will bring it up, and it probably has the votes (with, that is, a fairly large group quietly wanting that solution even as they vote against it and very likely denounce Boehner publicly for doing what they want him to do).

What Mattered This Week?

I'm pretty much with the people who suspect that US involvement in Syria will matter less than it may seem, but at the same time that the overall Syria conflict does matter. 

As far as something that doesn't matter? Skirmishes about the "Hastert rule" and immigration over on the House side. It's all for show. John Boehner isn't going to try to bully this thing through unless most of his Members want him to. Whatever they say for the cameras.

Immigration? Maybe

I have a post up over at Greg's place about Marco Rubio's (perhaps) flip on immigration, and at PP about the breakdown of the House bipartisan talks. I'm sticking with what I've always said: the big question here is whether mainstream House conservatives want a bill or not. If they do, John Boehner will bring up the Senate bill and let it pass; if not, he won't. End of story.

Matt Yglesias has the same logic, but thinks that surely House Republicans will want it to fail, as have a few people I've seen on twitter. I've written a bunch of things that all concluded that it was all up to House mainstream conservatives, but haven't engaged at all on what their incentives are. So I'll give it a shot here.

Here's Yglesias:

From the GOP perspective, the calculus of a path to citizenship has two elements. On the one hand, most of these new citizens would probably be Democrats. On the other hand, taking part in a bipartisan immigration reform effort might open Latino voters' ears to other aspects of the GOP message. But the absolute worst-case scenario is one in which a path to citzenship becomes law over the loud objections of GOP-elected officials. 

So he concludes it's "unlikely" that the House would do it.

He might be right! But there's another point of view which also might win out. Republicans might decide that there's a collective action problem here in which the party as a whole (and especially their future presidential candidates) are better off if immigration passes, but most Members of the House (and many Senators) are better off if they vote against it.

And what Yglesias considers the worst-case might not be. Remember, the bill that's going to move, if one does, is the bipartisan Senate bill -- a bill which guarantees that at least three Republicans (the Gang of Eight minus Rubio) will get a fair amount of the credit and will earn a trip to a White House signing ceremony. So opposition to the bill might not be seen as a partisan split even if the majority of Republicans vote against it, and at any rate it might be better for GOP-Latino relations to have the issue disappear after a bill passes than for the issue to stick around to 2016 and beyond.

What it might come down to, really, is that bit about "loud objections of GOP-elected officials." If Congressional opponents of the bill can manage to avoid arguments perceived as bigoted -- if they can restrict themselves to praise for immigrants and immigration reform but just not quite this bill -- then the whole thing could at least plausibly work for both individual Members and the GOP as a whole. But if the debate is bound to descend into immigrant-bashing, then it doesn't.

The only other thing I could add here is that all of this is about perceptions, not reality. The question isn't what will actually be good for the GOP as a whole; it's what individual Members of the House believe will be good.

I have no idea what House conservatives are actually thinking. I just can't see either side being clear and obvious. And my guess is we won't start to know the answers until after the Senate acts.

Read Stuff, You Should

Happy Birthday to D.M.C., 49.

Good stuff:

1. Francis Wilkinson on the House and immigration.

2. Andrew Gelman on "those 'Psychological Science' papers (menstrual cycles and political attitudes, biceps size and political attitudes)."

3. And Alyssa Rosenberg on being a writer.

Sunday Question for Conservatives

I've said that the fate of the immigration bill depends on whether mainstream conservatives in the House Republican conference want it to pass or not. Most of them won't have to vote for it (ultimately, Democrats are going to vote for any comprehensive immigration that can get through the Senate), but John Boehner won't put something on the floor if they don't want him to.

So: first, what do you think they'll choose to do? And, what should they do?

Read Stuff, You Should

Happy Birthday to Pablo Schreiber, 35.

Some good stuff:

1. Josh Barro notes: "There is still no Republican health policy agenda."

2. Adam Serwer on the guest worker problem and the provisions in the Senate immigration bill.

3. The Hawaii Democratic Senate primary, reported by Scott Bland.

4. Do Members of Congress have any idea how the ACA works? Aaron Carroll says: looks like they don't.

5. And Molly Ball on women running for office.

Read Stuff, You Should

Happy Birthday to Christopher Newman, 58. Nope, I never heard of him, either. But he was on the crew -- assistant director or some such on...ready? Match Point; Sense and Sensibility; Much Ado; Brazil; Return of the Jedi; The Great Muppet Caper; and Supermans II and III. Also, Rome -- and he's a producer on Game of Thrones. And lots more. That's not bad! Enough to even mean we should forgive whatever contributions he had to, alas, The Phantom Menace.

Good stuff:

1. Sean Trende on the possible electoral effects of passing immigration reform.

2. Okay, there are lots of good reasons not to like Dilbert, but the basic point of Dilbert is one worth knowing. Kevin Drum doesn't talk Dilbert, but makes a good point about real government waste.

3. Reid Wilson has a good overview of Senate 2014 recent developments.

4. And no Medicaid expansion for Montana...because a state legislator hit the wrong button. Stochastic universe, anyone? Sarah Kliff has the story.

Sunday Question for Liberals

I'll go with the same question: just in terms of electoral politics, what's the best outcome for the Democratic Party on immigration?

Sunday Question for Conservatives

Just in terms of electoral interests, what is the best outcome for the Republican Party on immigration?