I mostly want to call everyone's attention to two excellent posts, by Brian Beutler and by Ryan Grim, which take seriously a key fact about the gun bill consideration: simple majority votes on amendments would have not only allowed Democratic amendments to pass, but would also have allowed Republican amendments to pass. In particular, the Grassley substitute, backed by the NRA, received 52 votes. But I'll do a little speculation and thinking about reform options from where they leave off.
As they both point out, in a simple-majority environment, things might have been different. It's absolutely possible that Democratic defectors might have been willing to hang with mainstream Democrats if their votes were needed -- any whipping on amendments surely went into the close Democratic amendments, not the GOP items.
This is not, in and of itself, a reason to oppose Senate reform in general, or even a majoritarian Senate in particular. But as I said before the bill came up: reformers should be clear what they want.
For example: in a Senate with very loose controls on what bills and amendments come to the floor; with one tightly disciplined (or ideologically rigid) party; and with simple majority voting on everything, then the tightly disciplined party might do very, very, well over time. Even when it's in the minority, even when it's in a fairly significant minority, that party shouldn't find it hard at all to get its way on many, and maybe most, bills.
Moreover, that minority party would have strong incentives to act as tightly disciplined as it could. After all, in a 55/45 Senate, if the minority can figure out something that can pick off six majority party Senators, they get to win as long as they all hold together. And as long as there are loose controls over the floor, they can design whatever they want with that goal in mind.
The obvious recourse for the majority, in that situation, is to eliminate opportunities for the minority to offer amendments. Otherwise, they risk simply get repeatedly rolled by any smart minority willing to hang together.
In other words, it's very easy for reform, once it starts, to wind up where the House has wound up -- with a majority party quasi-dictatorship.
Again: that doesn't mean one should oppose reform. But anyone who thinks that majority party rule in which the minority cannot participate meaningfully in governing, including offering alternatives which can receive votes, is some sort of obvious democratic system is overlooking some very real problems with that kind of system.
At the same time, anyone who is happy with a status quo which requires an arbitrary 3/5 supermajority for everything, and thinks that such a system is obviously the democratic one, is at least just as wrong if not more.
What remains unclear is whether it's really possible to get a third alternative -- one that gives the minority party meaningful participation, and which allows intense minorities (whether they are partisan minorities or just minorities on some issue) to have real chances to succeed against indifferent majorities.
To be sure, there are reasonable arguments in favor of majoritarianism and against that third alternative, but in my view they are losing arguments (as are those favoring the 60 vote status quo). But if it isn't possible to design the third alternative, then it doesn't really matter whether the theoretical arguments hold or not.
Still, I think the arguments about democracy are important and worth keeping at center stage during these debates. It's simply not true that democratic theory would consider a pure majority-party-run Senate to be necessarily the most democratic. You can argue it, but you need to do so, from where I'm sitting.
Thursday, April 18, 2013
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I think the actual answer to this problem is simply that Presidential systems and bicameral legislatures don't work very well.
ReplyDeleteIn a Parliamentary system with a unicameral legislature, it is very simple. You get a majority, you pass your program. If the voters don't like it, they vote you out, and the other side gets to pass its program. The fact that your program is actually going to get enacted actually works as an effective check, because candidates are less likely to advocate crazy or stupid political positions if they know they are going to get enacted and cause havoc. The result is that parties are forced to move towards the center.
That's basically how it should work, and you will note that in that system the minority party has zero rights. But that's actually how it should be. A minority party is not like a Carolene Products discrete and insular minority that is politically disfavored. All a minority ever has to do is win the next election, and all it has to do to do that is either convince the public it is correct or move to the center and co-opt the other party's issues. There's no reason to protect the rights of parties that are electoral losers at all. All that does is incentivize their intransigence, by assuring them they can still screw up the other side's governance and have some power and influence without having to actually win an election.
Our system, however, is screwed.
The problem with "pass your program, if they don't like it they'll vote you out" is that it's entirely unrealistic given what we know about voters, and even given the logic of multi-issue policy. Keep the economy strong and avoid ugly wars, and you have enormous leeway with the voters on most things. Parliamentary systems do have their merits, but I'm really not convinced that they do an inherently better job of furnishing electoral incentives across all issue areas.
DeleteI also have problems with parliamentary systems on grounds of participatory democracy, but that's to some extent a bit of a different issue.
Well, it seems to me that in terms of participatory democracy, minority rights (as you are defining them-- I am not talking about racial and other "Carolene Products" minorities) are completely unimportant. If your side doesn't carry a minority, but there's no barrier to your side making electoral compromises that can allow it to win a majority, there really isn't any reason to protect its rights in the legislature unless and until it does so.
DeleteAs for multi-issue policy, I agree, parliamentary systems present platforms as all or nothing affairs. But they still handle multi-issue policy better than presidential systems do. It's just that the adjustments on various issues happen BETWEEN elections, in party platforms, and they happen based on what the party thinks it needs to jettison or trim in order to win the next election.
In contrast, actually our system is absolutely terrible on multi-issue policy. We have parties (well, OK, especially one party) that advocate lots of positions on subsidiary issues they don't ever intend to enact. And the reason is because our system is sufficiently opaque that they can always point to some roadblock that prevents enactment.
I tend to agree that Madison's system is poorly conceived and deeply flawed, and that a well-functioning parliamentary system would be much superior. However, it is hard to develop such a good system. To choose two examples, it took the British some 300 years, while the French just kept chucking out constitutions till they found one that worked.
DeleteOn the other hand, a great virtue of a parliamentary system is that it forces people to confront the consequences of their decisions. If the voters don't pay attention, or don't participate, or choose poorly - well, too bad for the voters. Meanwhile the necessary functions of governing move smoothly. One inherently sickening characteristic of the American system is the perpetual, infantile whine "we didn't want THIS!". At least in a parliamentary system the ready answer is "tough, you voted for it."
Of course, that is no comfort if you are a minority is a system dominated by your enemies. Another reason that well-functioning parliamentary systems are hard to develop.
But again, I fail to see what the compelling case is for granting ANY rights whatsoever other than voting rights to POLITICAL minorities (as opposed to historically oppressed groups like blacks, minority religions, or gays).
DeleteIf you are a POLITICAL minority, in a functioning parliamentary system, you simply have to move to the center. If you don't do so, you have no power.
One of the big problems we face right now is that Republicans have a lot of power despite losing elections, and they can use that power both to screw up Obama's policies (by screwing up the country) and to block legislation with widespread popular support. In a properly functioning system, what would happen instead is that Republican politicians would need to start throwing right-wing positions overboard until they got to a place where they could get more votes, the way Labor did during the Thatcher and Major administrations. Here, that's only happening on immigration and may not even happen there.
But they don't feel they need to move, because they have a lot of power even though not enough people voted for them.
As I say, I tend to agree in the most part. I guess I just don't understand why we should design a system that protects voters from their own flaws. JB says that voters really don't "vote them out" if they don't like their policies. Okay, but that is a virtue, not a flaw. If the voters want to hurt themselves by not paying attention or behaving stupidly, they should be allowed to do so. The correct answer when they complain is "tough, get smarter." if they simply refuse to do so, then they should be allowed to suffer. Democracy is about self-government. It is true if the self in question is flawed or stupid or inattentive government will do bad things. Once again, a feature, not a bug. Voters are adults to feel the pain the create with their mistakes, not children to be protected from the consequences of their actions.
Delete"The problem with "pass your program, if they don't like it they'll vote you out" is that it's entirely unrealistic given what we know about voters, and even given the logic of multi-issue policy. Keep the economy strong and avoid ugly wars, and you have enormous leeway with the voters on most things."
DeleteThat seems much preferrable to a system in which a minority can sabotage the economy and spring themselves back into power.
I work in a state legislative body that doesn't have a filibuster, and it essentially operates by majority party rule. But that doesn't mean the minority doesn't a meaningful voice. The minority is able to offer amendments whenever it wants and can even force floor votes on bills that are stuck in committee. There's just a strong presumption that everyone is going to vote the party line on procedural motions. You don't need procedural tricks to block votes to have discipline. You just need to have discipline.
ReplyDeleteI'm no expert in state legislatures, but my impression is that there's a wide range of practices. Which is pretty good! I don't think there's any magic system.
DeleteAnd in fact, I'm not really that down on the current (US) House, either. I just don't think it's obvious that the House is a model system.
I'd like to know more about how parties in parliamentary systems develop/choose their platforms, programs, and so on. And, relatedly, how they determine nominations/who is on the list.
ReplyDeleteAny good resources?
"even a majoritarian Senate" seems like a pretty artificial concept when Wyoming gets the same 2 votes as California.
ReplyDelete"even a majoritarian Senate" seems like a pretty artificial concept when Wyoming gets the same 2 votes as California.
ReplyDeleteOne important point about parliamentary systems: the career bureaucrats end up wielding a lot more power.
ReplyDeleteIt's true that bureaucrats have less influence in the US than in most other democracies; it's not clear to me the extent to which that's related to Madisonian vs. parliamentary system.
DeleteAnd another important point is that not all Parliamentary systems act the same. The British and Canadian systems, which I think is what most people are thinking of when they talk about Parliamentary systems, have first past the post district representation, which tends to yield two large parties that trade power back and forth. The danger with that is that gerrymandering or maldistribution of voters can easily cement a party in power who represent a clear minority of voters. Proportional representation systems get around that, but they can dissolve into a quagmire of interparty intrigue, shifting coalitions, and constantly collapsing governments. Frankly, I think the virtues of either approach are superior to our own poorly designed system, but there are problems and dangers.
ReplyDeleteI suppose many would say that the chief danger is the Republican party, that is to say a Parliamentary system would allow them to monopolize power and pass wildly destructive and unpopular policies. Well...so what? As I've said, democracy is about self-government. Like it or not, many of the American people favor the Republican party and want its policies to pass. I guess poli sci folks would say "well, they don't REALLY favor those policies, its loyalty and branding and...and...and...but not decisions based on policy." To which my response would be, tough taffy. Democracy is about self-government, and if adults want to behave stupidly, then they should face the consequences. What about the election of 2010? Yes, although I generally favor Obama I think the Tea Party should have been able to form a government and pass its program. The American people had made their wishes clear, and those wishes should have been honored.
1. Different political scientists would say different things.
Delete2. This particular political scientist rejects the notion that self-government means that the majority should always win. I just don't think that's true, for a variety of reasons.
See e.g. this post
http://plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/02/majorities-madison-and-democracy.html
Democracy, IMO, is rule by the people -- not rule by the majority.
I don't have a problem with saying the majority shouldn't always win. I do, however, have a problem with saying that POLITICAL minorities have any rights other than voting. (Racial minorities, sexual orientation minorities, religious minorities, sure. But not political minorities.)
DeleteA political minority just has to moderate its positions and tell its base to go screw itself and suddenly it can win the next election. The thing is, that's painful and they don't do it unless they have to. Granting the minority any rights at all in a political system encourages them not to do it.
The Swedish parliamentary system gives seats to any party that wins 4% of the national vote. There are currently eight parties represented in parliament.
ReplyDeleteIn my opinion, it is much better than the British system. But currently, there are four parties that formed an alliance to gain power. Of course, after six years, cracks are forming in the alliance and support for two of the parties is currently below the 4% level. Something that is probably good for the system and, hopefully, discourages alliances BEFORE elections in the future. Coalitions should form depending upon the specific issue up for a vote. That is when this system works best.
I agree that it's not obvious whether the majority party dictatorship (with the majority party able to stifle amendments) or the simple majority with free amendments is the more democratic system. However, in my view that means either of these systems could fairly be called democratic.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I absolutely can't accept a system in which a minority can block legislation as democratic. It's biased towards the status quo. Reformers need a supermajority, while the already privileged don't even need a majority to hold onto what they have. Supermajorities don't protect all minorities equally--they only protect minorities who already have what they want.
I also think your intuitions about "intensity" in your older linked post aren't quite right. Frequently, intensity is a privilege. Wealthier people are going to be paying closer attention to politics, have the means to make their voice heard louder, and more likely to have the resources to call upon to save themselves if, for example, fiscal hostage taking blows up in everyone's face. "Intense minorities", in practice, just means "powerful minorities". Powerless minorities need not apply.
Actually, thinking again, I'm not sure what the point of the abstract argument over democracy is with regards to the Senate.
ReplyDeleteWe already have plenty of anti-majoritarian checks and balances in our system. Obama was not going to sign a bill with those GOP amendments (e.g. nationalized concealed carry) into law. We have a bicameral legislature, a presidential veto, and a court that can throw out unconstitutional laws. To get your legislation passed as law, you need to win a majority of all districts, a majority of all states, a majority of the electoral college, and a majority of the supreme court to find it unobjectionable.
That seems like a lot of hoops to jump through already. Why add an extra-constitutional one?
Also, one last argument. The filibuster wasn't necessary to kill gun control--as you've argued, the House would have defeated it, even as 90% of voters support universal background checks. That seems to indicate that plain-old majority rule--whether by dictatorship or free amendment--offers plenty of space for intense minorities to get their way on specific issues.
I agree that the filibuster - in any form - is by no means necessary to assure sufficient antimajoritarian elements in the overall US system.
DeleteAnd, remember, I'm not for a 60-vote Senate. I'd much prefer a pre-1993 Senate in which filibusters were available but used very selectively.
I might prefer a majority-party dictatorship to a 60-vote Senate if those were the only two choices.
But the main reason I don't want a House-like Senate is not because I want 41 Senators to regularly defeat 59 Senators. It's because I very much want individual Senators to have strong incentives to become legislators, and I think the traditional rules of the Senate are pretty good (not perfect, but pretty good) for that.
That's to some extent about minorities, but it's not about minorities beating majorities; it's about (simplicifying...) minorities getting effectively represented.
That makes sense to me--I think I see better where you're coming from now.
DeleteI sense we are all circling the same problem, which is that it is hard to have a democracy that is well functioning in a purely technical sense while also preventing majority abuse of power. Not surprising, as Madison also struggled with this, and the system he created has glaring flaws. The issue, however, is one of the Senate writ large. Majorities simply will not tolerate, in a democratic culture, being permanently stymied by minorities. It has nothing necessarily to do with political ideology. Liberals point to gun control. Conservatives point to abortion, which a majority wants to be rare and highly controlled. Ultimately minorities have to depend on persuasion to gain the favor of the majority. They simply cannot rely on the system forever, else in the eyes of most people democracy becomes a sham front for minority dictatorship.
ReplyDeleteI do not agree that majorities are stymied on guns or abortion, or on most issues -- because I don't think majorities exist on either. Or: the majority is mostly "don't care."
DeleteIt is of course true that if you poll people and ask them, you can get them to give answers. IMO, that's not the same thing as being part of a majority.
Thanks for clarifying this point. It ties together much of what you've said in the past, but I hadn't put two and two together: how polling skepticism bears upon understanding "majoritarian" democracy, how theories of democratic government must have some account of weak but apparent popular support should or shouldn't be translated into consequential representation.
DeleteMaybe this is just the usual question of "intensity," but it becomes more stark once one says that weak support is as good as nothing, that it's properly non-existent within the representative dynamics of our democratic system.
You are probably right, JB, as far as it goes. Unfortunately, such a sophisticated understanding of the democratic system probably isn't very reflective of many popular dynamics, particularly popular psychological dynamics unpopular as those kinds of things are in some quarters. To invoke a character I often disagree with, but respect in an intellectual way, William Galston likes to point out that Americans have withdrawn their trust from all governing institutions, in his view because they are no longer seen as representing the people, but only the interests. Now, one might complain that the seperation between people and interests is false, and one might be right. That does not, however, indicate that Galston isn't on to something. There does seem to be a sense, vague but powerful, that government just doesn't represent people like ME, whoever ME is. Now, one might say to that "well, you should be involved," or "the country is just bigger and more diverse than it once was" or ... well, whatever. As Galston I think rightly points out, this is especially a problem for Democrats and Progressives, as they tend to stand for government actually having policies and doing things, and it is very, very hard to gather trust for policies and doing things when ME is constantly ignored by those people in Washington. So, perhaps rightly a problem to be discussed in the power conclaves of the Democratic party, but also a problem for anyone who believes in, yes that dreaded and reviled term, good government.
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